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Abstract 
Attention to effective local flood response has become a necessity in urban governance as 
issues pertaining to floods become increasingly visible with disasters rising. This research 
identifies components of response capacity to floods and municipal action, and potential 
mechanisms to increase response capacity in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple 
Ridge using interviews (n=7), Q methodology (n=12), and a literature review. Findings show 
that legislation, institutional behaviour and collective action, technological pathways and 
resource management are fundamental to an institution or organization’s response capacity. 
Municipal action is influenced by competing priorities as determined through legal 
responsibility and liability, collective agreements, public behaviour, risk, vulnerability and 
uncertainty, and the politics of municipal governance. It is viewed by participants that resource 
efficiency, collaborative, co-management and adaptive co-management techniques could lead 
to greater response capacity. The findings presented provide a proposed conceptual framework 
to response capacity to floods and municipal action. 
 
Keywords 
Flood management, response capacity, municipal action, disaster risk reduction, Q 
methodology. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the Research 
Floods are defined as “an overflow of water onto normally dry land. The inundation of a 
normally dry area caused by rising water in an existing waterway, such as a river, stream 
or drainage ditch. Ponding of water at or near the point where the rain fell” (National 
Weather Service, 2010). They can be caused by a host of various conditions—including 
severe weather events, sea-level rise, and excess water to a river—and their impacts are 
diverse. They have and will continue to impact local, regional and national economies, 
exploit inequalities among social classes, and have profound health and political 
implications. 
Recent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
others have suggested that under various Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 
scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions, future climate conditions are expected to cause 
more frequent and intense severe weather related events (IPCC, 2007; 2013). Observations 
in climate change research, including disaster research, have shown that the effects of a 
changing climate are already occurring (NatCatSERVICE, 2015; IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2013; 
Nicholls et al., 2007). With predictions of more frequent and intense severe weather events 
in the future, regional resiliency can be expected to decrease as the ability to recover from 
a disaster may become difficult if regions experience a multitude of disasters over a short 
timeframe, resulting in the failure to effectively and efficiently mitigate impacts as 
conditions worsen.  
 Recent progress toward climate change adaptation and mitigation has been made 
with regards to understanding the severity and the necessity to address the issues nationally 
and, also, at municipal and regional scales. Due to communities’ differentiated risk (Balica 
et al., 2012; Wisner et al., 2004; Cutter et al., 2000; Cutter, 1996), a universal solution that 
adapts to future conditions in all communities is impractical. As such, individual 
communities must make necessary adjustments to their policy and practices specifically 
addressing their vulnerability to the potential conditions and disasters that the community 
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may be subject to. In Canada, cities are responsible for addressing local impacts of large-
scale environmental issues, including natural disaster events.1 Although both the provincial 
and federal governments do have a role in disaster governance, the specific implementation 
and governance over practices and policies within Canada is, in large, municipal. 
Understanding the characteristics of urban governance and local practices seeks to promote 
disaster resilient policies and practices in order to mitigate future potential loss caused by 
climate change.  
In Canada, more frequent flood events caused by sea-level rise, storm surges, or 
freshet snowmelt are becoming a new norm. In this introductory Chapter the need for this 
study is contextualized and the parameters of the study identified. The research, that is 
described in more detail later in this Chapter, is an extension of Sarah Burch’s (2009), 
Sustainable Development Paths: Investigating the Roots of Local Policy Responses to 
Climate Change, in which the author “seeks to begin a conversation focused on the need 
to investigate the highly path dependent trajectories that form the context out of which 
human responses to global climate change arise” (185). As Burch explains, development 
pathways provide insight on action, identifying barriers and policy-relevant analysis of 
environmental issues. As climate change is a very large, encompassing term, this research 
explores one aspect of climate change, focusing on components influencing response 
capacity to floods and institutional action.  
As noted, the following sections of this Chapter provide context for the research 
and the parameters of the study. Sections on flood context cover climate change and floods, 
and the economic, social, health and political impacts of floods, as well as the role of 
government in Canada. Sections regarding the parameters of this research define 
development pathways and the purpose of this study and outlines the study area.   
                                                 
1
 Refer to Chapter 3, Responsibility and Liability in Emergency Management. 
3 
 
1.2 Climate Change and Floods 
Evidence shows the number of disaster events around the world has been increasing over 
recent decades. Over the last century it is evident that the number of reported disasters 
leading to loss is increasing, particularly from 1980 to 2014 (refer to Figure 1). Recent 
flooding in the United Kingdom (2014), Philippines (2010, 2014), Pakistan (2010), United 
States (New York, 2014, and New Orleans, 2005), Haiti (2010) and others are evidence of 
an increase in the frequency of flood events around the world. From 2001 to 2011, there 
have been approximately 785 disasters per year around the world (Institute of Catastrophic 
Loss Reduction (ICLR), 2012). Although not all of these disasters are flood-related, the 
evidence is illustrative of an increase in the frequency of natural events around the world.  
Figure 1: Loss Events Worldwide, 1980-2014 (NatCATSERVICE, 2015) 
Scholars have argued that such an increase can be attributed to climate change 
(IPCC, 2007; 2013). As temperatures rise and changes to the energy budget continue, 
effects on the hydrological cycle can be seen. Floods are becoming more frequent than in 
the past and are, in large part, due to heavy precipitation events, rising sea-levels, and, in 
some locations, due to more extreme annual freshet snowmelts. Historical evidence 
analyzed by the IPCC (2013) suggest that starting in the late 19th and early 20th century the 
rate of global mean sea-level change is unusually high with virtual certainty (99-100% 
probability) that global mean sea-level rise has accelerated over the past two centuries. 
Between 1993 and 2010, the rate of global sea-level rise was very likely (90-100% 
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probability) 3.2mm per year, with 0.8mm per year being attributed to the warming of the 
ocean.  
Based on the IPCC reports (IPCC, 2007; 2013; 2014a), sea-levels are expected to 
continue to rise. Under an extreme scenario, RCP8.5, sea-level rise is expected to increase 
by 0.53 to 0.97 meters by 2100. As such, coastal regions can expect more hazardous 
conditions in the near future. In some areas, evidence of the impacts on the region are 
already becoming a reality. In Tuvalu—a small island country in the South Pacific north 
of Australia—the population is in the process of being evacuated as, with climate change, 
rising sea-levels are encroaching and if IPCC climate models are accurate (IPCC, 2007; 
2013) then Tuvalu is expected to be completely submerged by the turn of the next century. 
In Maldives, similar concern over the country’s future is evident. As much as the 
area is developing, sea-level rise caused by climate change threatens the safety and security 
of the country. While the country is not yet submerged, the situation is dire. As former 
environment minister, Mohamed Aslam, stated, “Just because you are not dead now does 
not mean you are not dying” (Carrington, 2013). 
 In Canada, cities are experiencing more frequent and intense floods than in the past. 
Exposed to a variety of different flood stressors, Canadian cities are increasingly vulnerable 
to flooding. Recent floods in Alberta (2013), Greater Toronto (2013), and lower Manitoba 
(2014) have illustrated how severe the impacts of weather-related events can be. In British 
Columbia, observations show an increase in precipitation since 1950 (ICLR, 2012). As the 
Institute of Catastrophic Loss Reduction (2012) explains, 
Since 1950 there has been a 20-30% increase in rainfall in coastal British Columbia, a 
5-10% increase in the northern interior, and an annual change in rainfall of -10% to 
+25% in the southern interior. The large variation in these projections is due in part to 
the potential for large spatial variation that can occur in mountainous regions and 
interior plateaus. (50-51).  
As climate change continues, regional precipitation can be expected to increase (IPCC, 
2013). Current climate change models predict that such exposure to flooding is expected 
to increase throughout parts of Canada (IPCC, 2013). As the ICLR (2012) further states,  
A 5-10% increase in precipitation is expected over the period through 2050, with the 
largest increase occurring in coastal areas and the northern interior. Increased 
precipitation is expected across [British Columbia] in the winter, but rainfall should 
5 
 
decrease in the summer, particularly in the southern interior. There is high confidence 
that there will be a 10-15% increase in intense rainfall events. (50-51). 
Flooding is an issue. How countries, regions, and local areas perceive flooding as 
an issue varies; however, that does not elude the reality that floods are happening and they 
are becoming more frequent and intense. Attention to disaster risk reduction research 
continues to grow with emphasis being placed on the diverse impacts of flooding (IPCC, 
2007, 2013, 2014b; Chambwera et al., 2007; Pearce et al., 2012; Ford et al., 2010; Du et 
al., 2009; Confalonieri et al., 2007), climate change vulnerability and vulnerability 
indicators (Oulahen, 2014; Mitchell, 1989; Watts & Bohle, 1993; Bohle et al, 1994; Dow 
& Downing, 1995; Alexander, 1993; Adger, 2006; Liverman, 1990) and developing 
disaster resilient communities (Burby et al., 2000; Norris et al., 2008; Paton & Johnston, 
2001; Leichenko, 2011). As climate properties change, the social, cultural, economic, 
political and environmental characteristics of regions are vulnerable. It is by examining the 
impact to these characteristic properties that we can understand the need and urgency for 
appropriate action.  
1.3 Economic Impacts of Floods 
From 1980 to 2015, observations show that the costs of floods have been increasing and 
they have resulted in billions of dollars in damages for single events (EM-DAT, 2015). 
Over the last decade, insured losses have ranged between $10 billion to $50 billion dollars 
annually throughout the world (Economics of Climate Change Adaptation, 2009). 
Damaged infrastructure, loss of material goods, and inadequate local responses and 
strategies have resulted in immediate economic damage following a disaster. For example, 
in 2013 Calgary experienced a flood that resulted in approximately $6 billion in damages 
(Wood, 2013). That same year, Toronto experienced a flood resulting in $850 million in 
damages (Mills, 2013). In 2010, the City of Vancouver experienced a flood caused by 
heavy rainfall that resulted in 173 filed claims for negligence with the City in association 
with maladapted/outdated infrastructure (City of Vancouver, 2013).   
Fundamental to the costs to homeowners in Canada is that no insurance company 
in Canada offers flood insurance under a home policy (The Co-operators, 2014). While 
coverage is offered for extended water damage, this type of insurance covers some types 
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of sewer backups and not accidental flooding that may be caused by certain climate related 
conditions, including sea-level rise, and riverine flooding (The Co-operators, 2014). 
As climate change continues to affect the hydrological cycle, more frequent and 
intense storms will likely increase the costs to insurance companies, globally, while in 
Canada increasing the costs to homeowners substantially. As the IPCC (2007) reports, “it 
is very likely (90-100% probability) that all regions will experience either declines in net 
benefits or increases in net costs for increases in temperature greater than about 2-3 degrees 
Celsius” (TS-4.7). Their 2014(b) report states, 
The incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for additional temperature 
increases of ~2°C are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income (±1 standard deviation around 
the mean) (medium evidence, medium agreement). Losses are more likely than not to 
be greater, rather than smaller, than this range (limited evidence, high agreement). (663). 
 
As we know from IPCC reports (2007; 2013) in particular, warmer temperatures are linked 
to the hydrological cycle. With increasing temperatures, the effects on the hydrological 
system will cause more intense and frequent rainfall events. Combine this information with 
a rising sea-level scenario, global and regional costs to flood related events can be expected 
to increase. In Ontario, a study has suggested that insured losses, due to high precipitation 
events and impacts associated with flooding, will continually increase by approximately 
13% by the 2020s, 20% by the 2050s, and 30% by the 2080s (City of Vancouver, 2013). 
The evidence suggest that to mitigate future costs related to floods it is necessary 
to develop effective and adaptive responses. The effectiveness of existing responses to 
flooding are difficult to measure as it is only after a flood event occurs that these responses 
can be evaluated and the complexity of a system makes it difficult to capture all the costs 
and net saving of a specific response. Investment in designing and implementing specific 
responses to address flood-related issues may prove to be costly, but understanding how 
those decisions are made is something that this research is designed to evaluate. In fact, 
many studies have found that adaptation choices have an impact on issues, such as: 
macroeconomics (Fankhauser & Tol, 1995); funding allocation (Hallegatte et al., 2007; 
Wang & McCarl, 2013; Chambwera et al., 2007); future resource availability (Chambwera 
et al., 2007); and risk distribution of the previous issues (Chambwera et al., 2007).  
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Although future climate conditions and subsequent costs of flood events have a 
degree of uncertainty it is important that action is taken now. Risk-sensitive decisions, as 
described by Linquiti and Vonortas (2012) are oriented towards acting or waiting. 
According to Chambwera et al. (2007), they recommend that due to minimal temperature 
variability over the next few decades the time to invest in adaptation in now. It will be more 
beneficial to prepare for the uncertain than to wait for that uncertainty to become a reality. 
If the proper infrastructure and adaptation strategies are not in place when this uncertainty 
becomes a reality, the costs to urban characteristics and the economic system of a city, 
region and/or country could cause a failure/collapse (as illustrated in Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Adaptation-Climate Change Cost Relationship (Chambwera et al., 2007, 
953) 
1.4 Social Impacts of Floods 
Vulnerability is a concept that has emerged over recent decades. Its acceptance as a 
necessary component in hazards research and its importance in policy-making and coping 
strategies have been evident in recent years (Pearce et al., 2012; Ford et al., 2010). 
Although it is defined differently from study to study, vulnerability can broadly be defined 
as “the potential for loss” (Cutter, 1996, 529). It includes the exposure to environmental 
and socio-economic stresses as well as the absence of adaptation mechanisms (Adger, 
2006). Common characteristics of vulnerability include the exposure to a threat (Mitchell, 
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1989; Watts & Bohle, 1993; Bohle et al, 1994; Dow & Downing, 1995) as defined by 
social, economic, and biophysical conditions (Alexander, 1993; Adger, 2006; Liverman, 
1990a; Dow & Downing, 1995). As such, vulnerability can be broken down into social 
vulnerability and biophysical vulnerability. The latter refers to the physical risk of a 
geographic space to a hazard. It includes the types of hazards the region is susceptible to 
experience as well as its frequency of occurrence and impact on the system. It provides the 
framework by which a system is susceptible to experiencing a hazard at its current stage 
and provides the groundwork for adaptation and mitigation strategies for predicted future 
conditions (Cutter, 2000). The former vulnerability refers to the risk that a group of people 
are susceptible to an event and its impacts (Cutter, 1996; Dow & Downing, 1995). It is a 
function of the social conditions to which a group is subject to, thus, influencing that 
group’s ability to respond and cope with a hazard (Blaikie et al, 1994; Cutter et al, 1997; 
Mileti, 1999; Cutter et al, 2000; Adger, 2006). It includes: access to resources; weak 
infrastructure and access to emergency services; lack of political representation; and 
cultural beliefs and customs.  
The parameters of social vulnerability vary from study to study; although some 
characteristics have been found to be consistent in present social vulnerability assessments. 
Among these characteristics, studies (Cutter, 1996; O’Brien & Mileti, 1992; Hewitt, 1997; 
Ngo 2001) have shown that high population density areas with a high population aged 
under 18 and above 65 are particularly vulnerable to flooding events. This can be attributed 
to mobility issues and body development. For example, children are more likely to contract 
an illness or communicable disease associated with poor water quality (as is often the case 
in flood events) as their immune system and white blood cells that fight diseases tend to 
still be developing, resulting in the individuals to be more susceptible to bacteria (Cutter et 
al., 2003). In addition to age, low income areas tend to have a high vulnerability to the 
impacts of hazards as their ability to relocate and/or be less receptive to harm is lower than 
higher income individuals; the loss of one dollar to damages associated with the hazard 
will have a greater impact on the individual with a low income compared to that of a high 
income individual (Cutter et al., 2000; Morrow, 1999). Similarly, the loss of infrastructure 
and lifelines such as emergency service access also results in a greater vulnerability. 
Having minimal support or relief post-disaster presumably results in greater stress on 
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communities as providing aid to these areas becomes increasingly difficult (Heinz Center 
for Science, Economics, and the Environment, 2000; Cutter et al., 2003). Finally, the 
collapse of infrastructure such as roads and sewer pipelines increases social vulnerability 
as exposure to toxins and bacteria is exacerbated by poor environmental conditions (Heinz 
Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, 2000). The loss of infrastructure can 
lead to more pathogens entering the water system in which the population can ingest, 
absorb, and/or inhale resulting in greater casualties, injuries, and long-term impacts. 
Understanding that populations have different risks (Oulahen, 2014; Boateng, 
2012; Cutter et al., 2000; Cutter, 1996; Blaikie et al., 1994) makes adaptation design and 
implementation complex. Although an effective universal strategy may be ideal to address 
flood concerns throughout a city or region, areas have different exposures to floods and 
may require alternative responses. Given that responses may be costly in areas where 
infrastructure and technology lack, the ability of city or region to fully adapt to future 
conditions can be constrained by timing and limited resources.2 As such, social impacts are 
unavoidable; however, the severity of these impacts can be reduced through proper 
management and adaptation responses. 
1.5 Floods and Health 
The impacts of floods on health can be categorized into three classifications: immediate 
impacts, medium-term impacts, and long-term impacts. Immediate impacts are those that 
exposure to the flood results in severe issues such as drowning, injuries, hypothermia, and 
animal bites (Du et al., 2009). In 1999, approximately 30,000 died from storms causing 
flooding and landslides in Venezuela (IPCC, 2007; Confalonieri et al., 2007). Medium-
term impacts are impacts that are not a direct result of a flood, but increases in toxins into 
the water result in lower water quality and subsequent health-related impacts (Du et al., 
2009). Research on floods show the likelihood of medium-term health related incidents 
increase as water quality decreases and exposure to the disaster increases (Du et al., 2009; 
Confalonieri et al., 2007). Health issues such as infected wounds, poisoning, mental health 
                                                 
2
 Refer to Chapters 4 through 6. 
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issues, communicable diseases (influenza, measles, mumps, and tuberculosis), and 
starvation have been seen as exposure increases. In the long-term, chronic disease, 
disability, poor mental health, and malnutrition are possible if inefficient or ineffective 
responses are present and exposure is long (Du et al., 2009). A study conducted by Waring 
et al. (2002) found that, after Tropical Storm Allison, people whose homes had been 
flooded experienced higher mental health issues post-flooding than those whose homes 
were not flooded (consistent with Mollica et al., 2004; Ahern et al., 2005). It is imperative 
to understand that floods have direct and indirect impacts on people.  
Regional topography and demographics have an influence on the impacts of floods. 
Based on the literature presented here less developed regions or regions with insufficient 
responses to floods (proactive and reactive) have a higher risk of impacts caused by 
flooding than those with sufficient and effective responses to floods. As Du et al. (2009) 
have stated, “management of the health impacts of floods is dependent upon an extensive 
knowledge and understanding of the health risks and on the capacity of the health system 
to mitigate or manage those consequences” (266). As the European Economic Area reports 
(2005), adaptation through improved infrastructure and social planning has decreased 
mortality over the past 30 years. Understanding regional variance of social, economic, 
political, technological, cultural, and biophysical characteristics can lead to proper 
management of local responses to flooding by mitigating impacts; doing so can save lives 
and prevent injury. 
1.6 Floods and Politics 
In 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) accepted the proposal 
to focus the attention of governments’ and public opinion on the importance and urgency 
of environmental issues (Vogler, 2008). It was evident post-UNCHE that environmental 
issues could not be separated from the demands for development, aid and international 
economic relations (Vogler, 2008). As such, if these demands supersede the demand for 
sustainability, sustainable development is more difficult to pursue. Therefore, policies that 
are focusing on sustainable development have greater pressure to ensure that sustainable 
development does not interfere with other superseding priorities—something that is 
becoming more difficult as flooding and other disasters become more frequent and intense.  
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When addressing climate change impacts, the former British foreign secretary, Margaret 
Becket stated, “those impacts [of climate change] go far beyond the environmental. Their 
consequences reach to the very heart of the security agenda” (Dyer, 2008, ix). One of the 
associated impacts of a changing climate is decreased resources (IPCC, 2013). According 
to Dyer (2008), resource consumption patterns of oil, gas and food availability will change 
as these resources become scarcer. As these resources decrease, geopolitical tension is 
expected to increase as countries seek to survive, leading to what Dyer (2008) calls ‘climate 
wars’. In a study that attempted to forecast future events related to climate change impacts, 
it was concluded that starving immigrants would lead to wars over food, water, and energy 
resources (Jurgensen, 2004; Lomborg, 2007). This concept of ‘climate wars’ is being 
adopted as a fundamental reason for military strategies. In the United Kingdom, the 
military is developing defense strategies against future refugees that will be seeking asylum 
due to the lack of resources elsewhere (Dyer, 2008). In order to protect their resources and 
their citizens, there is a need to develop these strategies, according to this government.  
Flooding and community resilience can be directly linked to this concept of 
‘climate wars’. As the frequency and intensity of floods increases, more resources will be 
required to respond to floods—to mitigate health impacts, financial loss, and physically 
adapt to changing conditions. It is only by developing effective responses to such disasters 
at the local, regional, and possibly national level that we can reduce the impacts of floods. 
As the IPCC (2007; 2014) indicate, adaptation and local responses to floods do not solely 
rely on technology to solve problems. Both social and technology oriented responses can 
mitigate the impacts of floods. Ideally, trans-community cooperation can help mitigate the 
impacts of flooding by helping with emergency response, but by developing effective local 
responses the rate of resource depletion, locally, can decrease. Effective local responses 
are still being researched. If we can understand the trajectories of local responses to 
flooding, it is possible that more effective responses that mitigate the impacts of floods and 
promote regional resiliency and greater response capacity can be developed. With climate 
change models suggesting that these types of events are expected to increase and become 
more intense, emphasis on disaster risk reduction strategies become a necessity in 
governance. 
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1.7 An Introduction to the Role of Government 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988 and it is one 
of the world’s leading organizations on climate change information. In its recent report, 
Working Group III recognized that governing global common problems, like climate 
change, requires international cooperation working together with local, regional, and 
national policies (IPCC, 2014a). It is through a multi-governance approach that efforts to 
address climate change and the subsequent hazards is most effective (IPCC, 2014a). One 
of the fundamental problems associated with climate change action is the evaluation of 
mitigation options. According to the IPCC Working Group III report on policymaking 
(2014a), “the evaluation of mitigation options requires taking into account many different 
interests, perspectives, and challenges between and within societies” (5). Regional and 
national environmental differences make governing issues of climate change and, 
subsequently, flooding different from region to region; however, action at the local and 
regional levels have been evident in addressing concerns related to localized events—such 
as flooding—in an effort to protect citizens and reduce the associated flood impacts. 
Emergency management policies related to disasters have multiple dimensions 
(Waugh Jr., 2007), including mitigation,3 preparedness, response, and recovery (Henstra, 
2013). Canada has three main bodies of government with ancillary branches that focus on 
different aspects of governing, but all work to reach a common goal—protecting the safety 
and security of Canadians. With respect to issues pertaining to floods, municipal 
governments are responsible for waste management, water quality management, mitigation 
practices/procedures (this could be technological, land use planning, and/or response 
during and post-flooding), and emergency management (Metro Vancouver, 2014). Issues 
that extend across multiple municipalities or if provincial and/or federal assistance is 
requested can be subject to provincial undertaking by which the role and responsibility to 
address these issues is uncertain (Henstra, 2013; Valiante, 2002). The former addresses 
issues pertaining to regulation. Municipal governments, like provincial governments, may 
                                                 
3
 Mitigation in emergency management is different than mitigation in the context of climate change. The 
latter refers to the reduction of greenhouse gases and the former refers to the prevention of an emergency. 
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have different strategies/regulations pertaining to flooding (see Chapter 3). When flooding 
extends beyond the legally defined boundaries of the city, whose regulation and how to 
regulate inter-jurisdictional issues can become blurred, allowing the provincial government 
to make decisions and/or take over. This undertaking is designed to reduce conflict between 
municipalities, and to ensure that effective and efficient responses to floods are maintained. 
The latter addresses financial assistance. Municipal governments have very tight budgets 
and high demands for issues unrelated to flooding and other environmental issues (Henstra, 
2013). As Donahue and Joyce (2001) argued, local governments worry about existing 
issues; the uncertainty of future events and the limited financial resources inhibits 
municipal action towards developing, discussing, and implementing solutions to concerns 
such as flooding. When a major flood event does occur, the budget of the municipal 
government may not be equipped to respond to the associated issues, as was the case in the 
2013 Calgary flood. In these instances a local state of emergency may be declared, allowing 
the Province to aid in the response to the flood; however, issues pertaining to the regulating 
authority between the municipal government and the provincial government become 
evident. The provincial government may have the resources available to assist in the 
response to a flood, but the municipality does not necessarily have the right to control 
where or how these resources are allocated. This can result in political tension as the 
autonomy of the municipality is constrained.  
Most environmental regulation occurs at the provincial level (Valiante, 2002). 
When addressing environmental issues such as flooding, the provinces can only regulate 
matters within their spatial boundaries. The provincial governments of Canada have the 
authority to make laws on issues, such as managing public lands and resources, non-
renewable natural resources, property and civil rights, forestry, municipal institutions, 
electricity generation, and issues of a local or private nature (Valiante, 2002).  The limits 
on provincial authority and provincial environmental statutes are similar to that of the 
municipal authority and regulations. Provincial regulations pertain only to the province; 
issues extending beyond the province is federal. If the province requests aid in a provincial 
state of emergency, they do not necessarily have control over how the resources are 
allocated (similar to a local state of emergency). Another limit concerns inter-jurisdictional 
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immunity in which the Crown and its agents may not be forced to abide by the legislation 
of another level of government (similar to diplomatic immunity).  
The federal government of Canada addresses environmental issues at the national 
scale. According to Valiante (2002), “most attention has focused on the residual power, the 
power to make laws for the ‘Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada’ (or POGG)” 
(4-5). The courts have recognized two aspects of this power: national concern and national 
emergency (Valiante, 2002). POGG is a national concern doctrine that applies to matters 
that start out as local within a province but may cause a national disturbance and matters 
that did not exist when the Constitution Act of 1867 was adopted. For an issue to qualify 
as being a national concern, allowing the federal government to take jurisdiction, the matter 
must be distinguished from matters of provincial concern and federal action must not 
infringe on the balance of power between the two levels of government. If a province 
cannot deal with the issue effectively and the failure to do so would affect the interests 
beyond the province, the federal government can intervene in uniform legislative treatment.  
A flood event could be considered a national concern if it has the potential to harm the 
national economy. For example, Metro-Vancouver is Canada’s largest port for imports and 
exports (Port Metro Vancouver, 2014). A flood in this region could prevent the 
transportation of goods in and out of the country—depending on the size and severity—
preventing economic production, revenue, and growth in the region as well as the nation. 
Therefore, if a flood occurs in this region, federal jurisdiction could be applied if there is 
potential for national disruption; however, that necessitates the municipality’s and 
province’s inability to manage and respond to the flood effectively and efficiently. 
1.7.1 The Emergencies Act 
The Emergencies Act (1985) replaced the War Measures Act in 1988. This Act outlines the 
provisions by which a national emergency can be declared and the provisions for governing 
during these emergencies. Under Section 3, 
For the purposes of this Act, a “national emergency” is an urgent and critical situation 
of a temporary nature that 
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such 
proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to 
deal with it, or 
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(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve 
the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada 
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada. 
This provision of the Act addresses the issue outlined in the previous section regarding a 
province’s inability to manage and respond to an emergency and outlines the conditions 
necessary to declare that a national emergency has occurred. Ultimately, the purpose of 
this Act is to provide the context by which a national emergency is appropriate and is not 
construed as infringing on a province’s right to govern by undermining its authority. 
 Under Section 5(a), a public welfare emergency (PWE) is “an emergency that is 
caused by a real or imminent fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural 
phenomenon and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption 
or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources, so serious as to be a 
national emergency.” When a PWE has occurred the Governor in Council—the Governor 
General who is advised by the Cabinet—must declare so and outline the areas affected 
by the emergency if all of Canada is not affected, the measures by which the emergency 
can be dealt with, and the reasoning behind the declaration of the PWE (S. 6 (1)(2)).  
This Act gives full authority to the federal government to take the lead in 
responding to a national emergency, limiting the role of both municipal and provincial 
government. Since the Act was legislated in 1988 there have been no national 
emergencies declared in Canada; however, the provisions are in place in case that a 
situation arises—a precautionary approach addressing disasters. 
1.7.2 The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements 
The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) is a program that was 
established in 1970 to provide provincial and territorial governments with financial 
assistance post-disaster. It is not intended, nor designed, for disaster mitigation projects, 
meaning that only after a disaster occurs can a provincial or territorial government be 
eligible for financial relief assistance. The federal program is a cost-sharing approach to 
disaster relief, administered by Public Safety Canada. This program provides assistance to 
the provincial and territorial governments and not individuals or businesses. Individuals 
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and businesses can receive financial assistance for costs associated with a disaster through 
their territorial and provincial government, however, the program will not directly provide 
the assistance to these groups.  
When a disaster occurs, provincial and territorial governments can apply for 
financial assistance to subsidize some of the costs associated with a number of expenses 
and restoration projects, including, but not limited to, evacuation operations, infrastructure 
and public works restorations to their pre-disaster state, and replacing or repairing essential 
personal property, small businesses and farmsteads. In this application, governments are 
responsible for identifying where financial assistance is required and it is up to the DFAA 
to decide what costs and how much of the costs will be eligible for cost-sharing. Returning 
to the above point regarding ineligible groups for this financial assistance, it is not that they 
are ineligible to receive financial assistance, rather they cannot directly apply for the DFAA 
but can receive assistance by applying to their territorial government or provincial 
government who in turn may be eligible for assistance.  
In order to be eligible for disaster financial assistance, a province or territory’s 
eligible costs must exceed a threshold based on their provincial or territorial population. 
Beginning February 1st, 2015, amendments were made to the cost-sharing that the federal 
government would be responsible for. Prior to February 1st, the provincial or territorial 
government were responsible for the first dollar per capita of population without federal 
assistance. Beginning February 1st, that amount changed from one dollar to three dollars 
per capita of population before financial assistance is provided. The next six dollars per 
capita of population is split by the provincial or territorial government and the federal 
government. As the costs increased for provincial or territorial governments, the more 
disaster financial assistance those governments would be eligible for (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 1: Cost-sharing responsibility (DFAA, 2015) 
Eligible provincial expense thresholds 
(per capita of population) 
Government of Canada share 
(percentage) 
First $3 0 
Next $6 50 
Next $6 75 
Remainder 90 
 Since the start of the program in 1970, the Government of Canada has been 
responsible for more than $3.4 billion of financial assistance to provincial and territorial 
governments. Notable examples of recent floods that have involved financial assistance 
from this program include the 2005 Alberta floods and the 2006 flood in Newfoundland. 
Again, the main point to be made here is that this program is designed for post-disaster 
relief. The responsibility to mitigate the risk of a flood occurring and the potential 
subsequent impacts is still on the onus of the local governments. It is from this point that 
we need to focus our attention towards what measures are in place to mitigate such risk 
and impacts, and how and why such measures were developed, decided on, and 
implemented. 
1.8 Defining Development Pathways 
More effective local responses are necessary to mitigate the impacts of floods at local and 
regional scales. A development pathway is defined as “a complex integration of economic, 
social, technological, institutional, cultural and biophysical characteristics that determines 
the interactions between human and natural systems” (Sathaye et al, 2007). Development 
pathway components have been examined individually in relation to climate change 
adaptation and mitigation at a global scale; however, these components and their 
interactions have not been examined in unison (Burch, 2009; Swart et al., 2003; O’Riordan, 
2001). Understanding the interactions between the components of development paths are 
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essential to the development of effective policies seeking to manage flood causes and 
impacts (Swart et al., 2003; O’Riordan, 2001).  
The trajectories of development paths are guided by response capacity (Burch & 
Robinson, 2007; Winkler et al., 2007). Response capacity is the ability of a group to 
respond to risk by utilizing human and financial capital, and institutional resources (Burch, 
2009), while adaptive capacity is the ability of a group to implement strategies aimed 
towards preventing a disaster from occurring (Smit & Wandel, 2006), and mitigative 
capacity is the ability of a group to implement strategies aimed towards reducing the 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Winkler et al., 2007). Response capacity is not 
the sum of adaptive and mitigative capacity, rather it is the ability to respond most 
effectively. Adaptive and mitigative capacity are a function of response capacity.  
Flood policy progress has been made through: growing public awareness on the 
issues; new policies that address both causes and impacts; and research (Burch, 2009; 
Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). Inconsistencies in past research practices and response design 
have resulted in a confusion between best-practice local responses and knowledge on 
effective local responses to flooding (Burch, 2009). Research focusing on identifying 
existing development pathways of local responses to floods and the relationships between 
development pathway components seek to resolve this disconnect.  
1.9 Research Questions 
This research addresses the following research questions:  
1. What are the development pathways of local responses to floods? 
2. How are local responses to floods reflective of the subjective views of and for 
flood management? 
3. What factors affect municipal action?  
The research seeks to develop an understanding of these pathways and address future flood 
management concerns on policymaking/response by providing necessary information to 
make informed decisions on efforts to increase response capacity to floods. This study is 
not comparing the different techniques/approaches to flood response; rather, emphasis is 
on how flood action emerges and what factors affect the ability to respond to flood risk. 
19 
 
1.10 Study Sites 
The Metro Vancouver region has been identified as one of many regions that will be under 
high stress with rising sea-levels, and increased frequency and intensity of disasters 
(Nicholls et al., 2007; IPCC, 2013). The melting of glacial ice and warming of oceans have 
resulted in global sea level rise (Pearce et al, 2012). The IPCC (2013) predicted that it is 
likely (66-100%) that sea levels will rise up to 0.97 meters by 2100. The damages of floods 
to regions are being documented (Pearce et al, 2010; Forbes et al, 2002; Boateng, 2012; 
Balica et al, 2012), but reducing the impacts and creating effective local responses to flood 
events is an area of concern in this region. The latest Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 
report (City of Vancouver, 2013) has argued that current policy and practices that are aimed 
towards flood events are outdated and needing revision.  
 
Figure 3: Study Area (Google Maps, 2014) 
Two cities in the Metro Vancouver region have been chosen as the study area for 
this research, including the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge (see Figure 
3). The purpose of two study areas was to conduct a comparative study that seeks to explore 
existing development pathways. As urban characteristics vary from city to city, including 
values and vulnerability to flood events, flood responses are likely to differ. Two study 
sites allow development pathways to be explored, recognizing that one pathway to flood 
responses is unlikely. Together, the two study sites were used to identify and explore the 
relationships between development pathway components, seeking to increase knowledge 
of local response capacity to floods and provide information that can be used to revise 
policy and practices accordingly. 
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1.10.1 City of Vancouver 
The City of Vancouver has been identified as a top 50 city in the world vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change (Nicholls et al, 2007). The coastal city can expect, and, thus 
vulnerable to, rising sea-levels and frequent and intense storm surges (City of Vancouver, 
2013; Nicholls et al., 2007). The City of Vancouver (2013) expects to see an increase of 
6% and 9% of precipitation during winters by 2050 and 2080. They are expecting that 
events that typically occur once every 25 years will occur 2.5 times as frequently by the 
2050s. Being an inner city of Metro Vancouver, the existing infrastructure and 
development leaves limited room for permeable surfaces. As such, the city has an exposure 
to flood events that can only be expected to increase. 
With a regional population greater than 2 million people (British Columbia 
Statistics, 2013), the City of Vancouver is a hub for economic activity. Port Metro 
Vancouver is the largest port in Canada (Port Metro Vancouver, 2014). A major flood in 
the City of Vancouver could prevent imports and exports into and out of the city, province, 
and country. As such, the importance of flood management from an impact mitigation 
standpoint and in response to floods after one occurs is vital in protecting the economy.  
Current local responses to floods in Metro Vancouver can be categorized under 
three main themes: flood-proofing policy/strategies; waste management; and emergency 
management and response practices (City of Vancouver, 2013). Under these different 
themes, the latest Climate Change Adaptation Strategy report (City of Vancouver, 2013) 
has argued that current policy and practices are outdated. This report has argued that the 
latest climate predictions suggest that current policies are not as effective as they could be 
and such policy/strategies should be re-evaluated and updated. It identified that a lack of 
public participation in flood-response development exists and future response strategies 
should be more inclusive and cover multiple layers of development paths.  
As the City of Vancouver is already developed and surrounded by other developed 
municipalities, there is little room to continue development and expand the urban 
boundaries. As such, development is occurring vertically and less emphasis can be placed 
on more social or land use responses as opposed to technology or infrastructure related. 
Currently, the City is in the process of implementing a storm-wastewater separation system 
that allows a greater capacity to reduce the likelihood of a flood event. Although the City 
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is looking at all options for flood prevention and impact mitigation responses, it has been 
expressed by participants in the study that technological responses are more common than 
land use responses due to existing development and limited capacity to expand the urban 
boundaries. That said, it is clear through the City of Vancouver report (2013) and recent 
flood events that updating flood management policy and practices is a must. 
A flood event on September 19th, 2010, publicized the ineffective nature of current 
local responses to flooding in Vancouver (City of Vancouver, 2013). As a highly populated 
coastal city with local response strategies being identified as outdated, examining 
development paths of local response to flooding in Vancouver provides knowledge of 
current best-practices, and the relationships between development path components. We 
can identify the strengths and limitations of existing responses in the city by understanding 
the development pathways of local responses to floods. This knowledge can be used in 
discussing policy and practice. 
1.10.2 District of Maple Ridge 
Maple Ridge is a district municipality in the Metro Vancouver region. It is located along 
the Fraser River in the northeastern part of Metro Vancouver with Pitt Meadows and 
Mission being adjacent. It has a population of approximately 75,000 people (Statistics 
Canada, 2011). In 2006, approximately 65% of the labour force in the District of Maple 
Ridge commuted to surrounding communities for work (District of Maple Ridge, 2010). A 
flood in the City of Vancouver, the District of Maple Ridge or anywhere between the two 
cities could disrupt the economy by restricting commuters to and from work, thus, causing 
a reduced labour force and resulting in stress onto the local and regional economies. 
Therefore, it is important to examine how these cities approach flood management. 
Unlike the City of Vancouver, Maple Ridge has less concern with floods caused by 
sea-level rise as the region is further inland. The risk of a flood is less than that of the City 
of Vancouver, and, therefore, responses are likely to be different and directed towards 
different threats to the system. The primary concern with regards to flooding in this area is 
overland flow caused by the flooding of the Fraser River or by heavy rainfall events (see 
District of Maple Ridge, 2012). The region has had a number of floods since 1900, 
including a 200 year riverine flood in 1948, a 10 year riverine flood in 2007, and, most 
22 
 
recently, a 10-25 year riverine flood in 2012 (Nagel, 2014). The area’s largest flood on 
record was in 1894, too, caused by an excess amount of water that had entered the Fraser 
River (Nagel, 2014). Similar to the City of Vancouver, the District of Maple Ridge has 
been identified as being vulnerable to future flood events as water volume in the Fraser 
River increases (Nagel, 2014; District of Maple Ridge, 2012; Districts of Maple Ridge & 
Pitt Meadows, 2008). 
According to a Fraser Basin Council’s report (2010), “a major flood today would 
result in severe social, economic, and environmental impacts, including billions of dollars 
in damage to public and private property, temporary loss of infrastructure and community 
services and disruption of business and trade” (2). The Fraser River Freshet Operational 
Flood Management Plan (District of Maple Ridge, 2012) suggest that social and economic 
impacts of a major flood in the region would likely be “nothing less than catastrophic” (5). 
This report suggests the industrial sector, particularly the Albion Industrial Area (see 
Figure 4), is a large concern if a flood were to occur due to its contribution towards the 
community’s economy. In the Albion Industrial area a flood could cause more than 850 
jobs to be lost. With a growing population and the need to develop the urban area, preparing 
for future floods has been identified as a priority (District of Maple Ridge, 2012). 
In the District of Maple Ridge, the region is mixed with urban and rural areas. As 
the population grows, urban development outward is likely to ensue. The mixed land uses 
in the region allow the City to explore and implement more social responses to prevent 
vulnerable populations from developing. Although the region has not implemented a 
storm-wastewater system, the use of pump stations seeks to prevent flooding and reduce 
the impact that floods could have on the region. As the region continues to expand 
outwards, emphasis is placed on implementing infrastructure that will protect these newly 
developed areas. Major flood concerns currently are on the already developed area where 
existing infrastructure is needing maintenance or upgrades. Attention to and investment in 
flood management is far more limited in the District of Maple Ridge than in the City of 
Vancouver, in part, due to a much smaller budget. As such, this research identifies 
similarities and differences in flood management decision-making through the 
development pathways for flood response capacity and action.  
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The District of Maple Ridge was chosen as the second study site because of its 
differences with urban and biophysical characteristics, values, and the history of floods to 
those of the City of Vancouver. Unlike the City of Vancouver, a large portion of the District 
of the District of Maple Ridge’s population commutes elsewhere; although the Albion 
Industrial Area is integral to economic activity in District of Maple Ridge. Also, as the 
District of Maple Ridge is located on the outskirts of Metro Vancouver the city has both 
urban and rural area that is under the City’s governance. The different land uses make 
responses towards flood management different than those of the City of Vancouver as 
infrastructure and development in the City of Vancouver is already present, whereas some 
rural areas in the District of Maple Ridge do not have this infrastructure in place that could 
reduce the impact of flood. As District of Maple Ridge continues to expand through 
development based on a growing population, how that development occurs in conjunction 
with flood responses becomes an important point of inquiry. Finally, District of Maple 
Ridge is further upstream along the Fraser River than the City of Vancouver. Its position 
relative to the City of Vancouver makes the biophysical vulnerability to overland flow 
along the Fraser River greater. As such, response in District of Maple Ridge is oriented 
around the Fraser River and storm surges, whereas the City of Vancouver’s response is 
directed towards coastal flooding. Comparing the two cities approach to managing floods 
are ideal for identifying development pathways for local responses to floods and, thus, were 
chosen for this study. 
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Figure 4: District of Maple Ridge land use (District of Maple Ridge, 2015) 
1.11 Overview of the Proceeding Chapters 
This concludes the introduction to the study. To recap, the following was discussed: the 
various impacts that floods are having and are expected to be exacerbated by a changing 
climate; a brief introduction into the role of Canada’s municipal, provincial, and federal 
governments; details of the Emergencies Act and the Disaster Financial Assistance 
Arrangements program; development pathways; and the purpose and study area of this 
research. In the coming chapters, emphasis is placed on the results of the study. Chapter 2 
outlines the methodology that used in this study. Chapter 3 focuses on legal responsibility 
and liability of emergency management which is critical in understanding the motivations 
and process of decision-making in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge. 
Chapters 4 through 6 focus on variables affecting response capacity to flood response and 
municipal action, and mechanisms for increasing response capacity as viewed by 
participants of the study. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the paper by summarizing the 
information presented, identifying major limitations and discussing future research needs 
for response capacity to floods and flood action. 
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2 Q Methodology 
Identifying development pathways of local flood response that is present is a major 
component of this research. It should be understood before proceeding any further that 
development pathways are not a constant, rather they shift over time and space. As such, it 
is the conditions by which decisions are made at the present that directly reflect these 
development pathways. How and why we make the decisions that we do can be asserted 
as a manifestation of social constructs. Social constructionism focuses on shared 
viewpoints, knowledge and discourses (McHoul & Grace, 1995) “that represent the 
substantive, cumulative and publicly accessible product of innumerable human selections” 
(Watts & Stenner, 2012, 42). As Watts & Stenner (2012) further explain, “[constructionist] 
research generally attempts to understand and map the currently predominant viewpoints 
or bodies of knowledge relative to a particular context, event or object of enquiry” (42). 
Making the decisions on the appropriate course of action becomes more based on the social 
constructs of the decision-makers—thus, subjectivity—as many possible approaches to 
flood response by reducing impacts and increasing the effectiveness of emergency 
management exist. The ‘where,’ ‘what,’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ we implement specific responses 
to floods becomes a reflection of these shared views.4 Therefore, a methodology designed 
and oriented around subjectivity was been chosen to complete this study. 
2.1 General Overview of Q Methodology   
Q methodology was developed by William Stephenson (1953) and later refined by Block 
(1978). The methodology was developed as a measurement technique to examine human 
behaviour by attempting to access the views of individuals and groups through a form of 
factor analysis. It was designed as an alternative measurement technique to psychology 
tests and scales, but it is increasingly being used in various research fields, including public 
opinion (Webler, Tuler & Krueger, 2001), policy analysis (Durning, 1999), communication 
(Carlson & Trichtinger, 2001), landscape planning (Swaffield & Fairweather, 1996; 
                                                 
4
 Refer to Chapter 3, Responsibility and Liability in Emergency Management, for further evidence and 
explanation of the subjective nature of decision-making in emergency management. 
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Previte, Pini, & Haslam-McKenzie, 2007), and environmental issues (Barry & Proops, 
1999). The methodology is centered on subjectivity, self-reference, concourse theory and 
abduction. 
First, it recognizes that individuals are made meaningful by the nature of the 
relationship with and on the immediate environment. As Stephenson (1953) argues 
subjectivity is a behavior or activity that is best understood through its impact on the 
immediate environment. Decision-making in emergency management is based on the 
individual or group’s expertise and judgment towards the best course of action resulting in 
a City’s response system, making these actors meaningful in studying decisions-making 
and the human-environment relationships that exist. Ultimately, the research conducted is 
examining the activity or behavior of decision-making in flood management.  
Second, in this study, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that 
focuses on their level of agreement with a number of statements (see Appendix A). The 
process of completing this questionnaire is known as Q-sorting and the completed 
questionnaire is a Q-sort. The process of Q-sorting is self-referent. As Stephenson (1982) 
states, Q methodology uses “a collection of statements, usually verbal, upon which a person 
projects feeling, with self-reference” (238). In this methodology, feeling should be 
understood as a process or activity. It is the “projection of feeling by an active subject” 
(Watts & Stenner, 2012, 32). In other words, participants reflect on their own experience 
and opinion to determine their level of agreement with each statement in the questionnaire. 
Therefore, the views of a participant on each statement is self-referent.  
Third, Q methodology is oriented on the concept of communicability; that is to say, 
an observable domain of shared knowledge and meaning through a series of self-referent 
statements (Stephenson, 1986). Each identifiable domain is a called a concourse. All 
concourses represent “the individual’s cultural heritage, born of history. It is the single 
most significant contribution to subjective science. All Q-sorts dip into it, as an empirical 
field out of which new subjectivity grows” (Stephenson, 1982, 242). In other words, all Q-
sorts are in themselves an observable representation of an individual, but together each Q-
sort represents part of the shared knowledge and meaning on the topic in question. 
Therefore, the Q-sorts can be studied individually and as part of the overall collective view 
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of many Q-sorts. Similarity among Q-sorts lead to identifying these concourses and, thus, 
identifying domains of behaviour for decision-making in flood management practices.  
Fourth, Q methodology is an abduction technique. Abduction is an explanatory 
framework formalized by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). Where deduction refers to a top-
down explanatory framework providing a means of linking the cause of a phenomenon to 
an effect through law/theory, and induction refers to a bottom-up explanatory framework 
of establishing an applicable description that links the observed facts to the cause, 
abduction, like induction, is a bottom-up explanatory framework, but it seeks to link the 
effect to the cause through suitable laws based on a range of hypothetical conditions 
(Inkpen & Wilson, 2013). It is similar to induction in that it consists of linking the effect 
to the cause (Shank, 1998); however, it is different in that through induction the effect and 
the cause are known, but the linking law/theory is unknown, whereas in abduction the 
effect is known, but the cause is unknown because abduction recognizes that different 
conditions can lead to different causes (Inkpen & Wilson, 2013). In other words, 
“abduction is based on being able to tell a plausible story to link effect and cause together 
via a valid law” (Inkpen & Wilson, 2013) and that many possible laws could be applied to 
explain an effect which also means that there are a range of possible causes.  
In Q methodology, abduction is associated with a factor analysis. Stephenson 
(1961) viewed “factor analysis as the technical extension of Peirce’s theory of abduction, 
as a way of generating hypotheses de novo” (Brown, 1980, 134). As such, the purpose of 
the factor analysis is to identify collective views within the questionnaire in order to 
provide a plausible theoretical explanation for these groupings’ existence. As Haig (2008) 
and Watts & Stenner (2012) state, a main difference between abduction and induction is 
that the latter is an explanatory framework, whereas the former is an exploratory 
framework. As abduction recognizes many possible laws that could be applied and many 
possible causes that could result, it becomes difficult to ascertain a causal relationship. 
Therefore, by using Q methodology, the researcher recognizes that the phenomenon in 
question may not have an absolute theory that can be applied and that different variables 
have varying influence that will be dependent on a host of characteristics that differ 
temporally and spatially.  
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2.2 Q-set Design and Content 
Q method involves four steps:  
1) The collection/review of ideas, beliefs, and opinions;  
2) The formulation of a set of meaningful statements based on the first step;  
3) The distribution and completion of Q-sorts; and 
4) A by-person factor analysis comparing participants’ Q-sorts. (Shinebourne, 2009). 
2.2.1 Pre-Q-sort Data Collection 
The data collection involved several different methods, including a literature review of 
existing responses and theories, in-depth interviews, and the completion of Q-sorts. This 
multi-method approach was used to explore, identify consistency, and build on the results 
of each other while recognizing that subjectivity is the key to unveiling the development 
pathways of local flood response. A multi-method approach to research has been shown to 
enrich data collection and explore different angles to the same research question (Nagy 
Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2004; Rank, 2004). The following paragraphs and sections to come 
explain the process by which data was collected, analysed, and interpreted. 
A literature review of existing development pathway theories and current local 
responses in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge was a necessary 
component to the research process (see Table 2). It provided background knowledge on 
different theories and their critiques, as well as insight into traditional development 
pathways. The conducted literature review consisted of research on the relationships 
between development pathway components (Swart et al., 2003; O’Riordan, 2001), socio-
technological change theory (Geels & Schot, 2007; Smith et al., 2005; Berkhout, 2002), 
organizational theory (Hosmer, 1995; Jones, 2001), social movement theory (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006; Escobar, 1998; Laraña et al., 1994; Della Porta et al., 1999; Melucci, 
1984), deliberative and participatory democracy (McLean & McMillan, 2015; Calhoun, 
2002; Cohen et al., 2012; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Ran, 2012), and local responses to 
flooding in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge.  
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Table 2: Theories of Development Pathways 
Theory 
Socio-Technological Change Theory: 
Socio-technological change theory refers to the interaction between human behaviour, 
including an organization’s behaviour, and infrastructure. It examines how people use 
space and it seeks to identify ways in which technologies or processes can be developed 
to optimize a sustainable interaction between the two (Geels & Schot, 2007; Smith et al., 
2005; Berkhout, 2002). As Berkhout (2002) explains, technological innovations for the 
betterment of a region involves a desire and commitment to replace the existing 
technologies. Without a firm commitment by the organization or institution for a radical 
shift towards a new system, the innovation and adoption of such a system is not possible. 
One of the biggest issues with developing/shifting to a new technological system is that 
it is difficult to determine which system will produce the best results, particularly if such 
systems have not been tested or present (Berkhout, 2002). This is one of the reasons why 
current organizations or institutions are not accepting of the idea of ‘re-inventing the 
wheel’ or re-structuring their current system without evidence showing the success of 
the new system. With that success evident comes a greater desire to shift and 
commitment for change. It is a function of “resources, interests and expectations of 
institutionally embedded networks of actors” (Smith et al., 2005, 1508). Therefore, for 
socio-technological change to occur, there needs to be a network of actors committed to 
adapting the desired regime (Smith et al., 2005; Berkhout, 2002). 
 
Social Movement Theory: 
Social movement theory explores the socio-cultural characteristics of society that are 
fundamental to human mobilization (Laraña et al., 1994). Its research provides insight 
into the power dynamics, collective identity, and influence of institutions that control 
human behaviour (Della Porta et al., 1999; Laraña et al., 1994; Melucci, 1984). This 
theory investigates the causes of collective mobilization and the relationship that such 
mobilization has on influencing change to institutional behaviour. As Tilly & Wood 
(2013) explain, social movements are the result of multiple stressors which often have 
negative implications infringing on the human rights of a group of individuals. These 
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authors explain that, historically, when human rights have been violated activism 
towards correcting/replacing the instigating body with one that meets the wants and 
needs of the community. 
Organizational Theory: 
Organizational Theory (also known as institutional theory) is a philosophical approach 
to understanding how organizations, both governments and businesses, function. It 
examines the formations of businesses and their relationship with society (Hosmer, 
1995). It emphasizes the importance of organizational culture—the set of shared values 
and norms that control the interaction between the organization and those that seek the 
attributes and products in which the business provides—and gaining a competitive 
advantage in the market (Jones, 2001). This theory is formulated around organizational 
structure, design and culture (Jones, 2001).  It provides insights into an organization or 
institution’s behaviour by examining the interaction between its members and its 
consumers. 
Deliberative Democracy: 
Deliberative democracy is a democratic process leading to decisions through publicly 
expressed reason, mutual understanding and political inclusion (McLean & McMillan, 
2015). 
Participatory Democracy: 
Participatory democracy emphasizes public engagement and involvement in political 
situations (Calhoun, 2002).  
 
Seven interviews of local practitioners were conducted within the two cities. Seven 
interviews was sufficient in gathering a data-enriched preliminary view of the development 
pathways that may exist in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge due to the 
downloaded responsibility of emergency management and, subsequently, flood 
management to municipalities and the internal and external practitioners involved. 
Interviewed participants ranged in terms of their field of expertise and their role within the 
development, decision-making, and implementation of flood responses in various 
organizations and institutions (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: Interviewed Participants5 
Interviewed Participants Background 
1. Environmental Specialist (City of Vancouver) 
2. Environmental Specialist (City of Vancouver) 
3. Manager/Executive (City of Vancouver) 
4.Technical Expert (District of Maple Ridge) 
5. Resource Specialist(District of Maple Ridge) 
6. Manager/Executive (District of Maple Ridge) 
7. Regional Expert 
 
The purpose of these interviews was to collect ideas, beliefs and opinions and create an 
expanded review of the development, implementation, and operation process of existing 
local responses to flooding. Based on the theories described in Table 2, the main principles 
from these theories were extrapolated and the information gathered regarding the responses 
that are current in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge were used to shape 
the main question that were to be asked in the interviews and formed a foundation to 
interpret the results of the factor analysis. In the theory presented above, emphasis was 
placed on technology, culture and public behaviour as it relates to human-environment 
interaction. How these theories compare to local responses to flood risk is critical in 
understanding the major components to response capacity to floods and municipal action. 
Therefore, major focus points for the conducted interviews were designed to examine 
public behaviour as it relates to concern/advocacy and engagement, and the role that 
priorities and values have on affecting local response to flood risk. Other major focus points 
                                                 
5
 General pseudonyms are provided to protect the identity of participants. 
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were centered on science and uncertainty, internal characteristics and interactions with 
external stakeholders, local demographics, financial capability of the institution or 
organization and the current state of the economy, biophysical characteristics of the area, 
and technology and urban planning as these relate to local flood response. This is because 
of their relevance to these theories and the supporting literature that suggests these topics 
may have an influence in the development, decision-making and operations for 
organizations and institutions. Emphasis in these interviews were placed on disaster risk 
reduction—how to reduce the likelihood of a flood occurring in a specific area and impact 
mitigation if one were to occur.  
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded into themes based on an 
inductive interpretive analysis. The results of the inductive interpretive analysis 
categorically addressed 6 themes, including drivers for, controls on, approaches to, 
limitations of, dependencies for success, and the direction of future flood management. It 
is from the interview data and, thus, within these themes that the statements comprising the 
Q-sort were formulated. 
2.2.2 Development of the Q-set (Items) 
This stage of the Q method included 23 meaningful statements that participants are rank-
ordering based on their level of agreement with each statement. Each of these statements 
are referred to as an Item. Together, these 23 Items formulate what is known as the Q-set 
(see Appendix A). Although Shinebourne (2009) concludes that Q-sets should be at least 
40-80 statements to produce satisfactory results, there is little evidence to justify this 
conclusion (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In fact, a smaller number of Items may produce very 
satisfactory results (Watts & Stenner, 2005). In studies that involve a larger Q-set, the 
process of completing Q-sorts tends to be exhaustive to participants and can lead to skewed 
results (Shinebourne, 2009; Watts & Stenner, 2005). In the context of this study, more than 
23 Items was not necessary as the Items were designed to allow the participants to complete 
the survey in a timely manner and to explore areas needing further interpretation in order 
to make the appropriate conclusions.  
The Q-set consisted of positive and negative Items (as recommended by Schlinger, 
1969) and similar sentence phrasing for Items oriented around the same theme. For 
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example, Items 1-4 were worded as “The major driver for developing and implementing 
flood management initiatives exceeding provincial and federal legislation is…” As Watts 
& Stenner (2012) explain, similar sentence phrasing makes it easier for the participant to 
complete the Q-sort by minimizing the confusion between Items that are inquiring about 
the same principle component. From here, the design of the Q-sort for which participants 
can rank-order Item relative to a corresponding level of agreement was chosen. 
In Q method, completed Q-sorts are illustrated through a matrix in which each cell 
corresponds to a level of agreement value that an Item can be placed in. The matrix format 
is pre-determined prior to the distribution of Q-sorts to participants. It can follow two 
different formats: a free distribution format or a forced distribution format. Since the latter 
forces participants to order all Items and only a set number of Items can be assigned to 
each level of agreement value, the free format was chosen which (refer to Figure 5) allows 
participants to assign as many Items a specific value as they feel is appropriate.  
 
Figure 5: Freely Distributed Q-Sort 5 
In this stage of the research, the Q-sort followed a free-distribution format in which 
local practitioners placed each Item in a valued cell of the Q-sort based on their level of 
agreement. Items could be placed in one of nine cells corresponding to a level of agreement 
value of -4 (strongly disagree) to 0 (neither agree nor disagree or the participant is unsure) 
to +4 (strongly agree). The free distribution format was suited for this study as it allowed 
participants to express their views without constraining their ability to rank Items. 
Although a forced-distribution format has been shown to produce more stable results (see 
Block, 1978; Bracken & Fischel, 2006), this format may not be as accurate for this study 
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because the Q-set covered multiple subject areas. Therefore, a forced distribution could 
have led to skewed results. 
2.2.3 Administering the Q-sort (procedure) 
The development of the Q-sort, to be distributed, was completed in December of 2014 and 
it was distributed to participants up until January of 2015. In this period, 12 leading local 
practitioners within various organizations were involved in completing the Q-sort based on 
the position of their organization/institution and/or the department within the 
organization/institution that they are affiliated with (see Table 4). A representative of the 
requested organizations was ideal in this study for two reasons. First, it became apparent 
early on in the distribution phase of this research that individuals within the same 
organization have the same position as their colleagues and, as such, they would forward 
the request along with a corresponding email indicating thusly. 
Second, Q methodology is less concerned with the number of participants due to 
its purpose (Watts & Stenner, 2012). As Brown (1980) notes,  
Q methodology requires enough subjects [or participants] to establish the existence of a 
[collective view] for purposes of comparing one [collective view] with another. What 
proportion of the population belongs in one [collective view] rather than another is a 
wholly different matter and one about which Q technique…is not concerned (192).  
The methodology has little interest in generalizing to a population scale; instead, the focus 
is on establishing the “existence of particular viewpoints” (Watts & Stenner, 2012, 72; 
Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). It is by this logic that 12 participants representing 
different organizations and departments within these organizations was considered suitable 
for the purposes of this study. 
Completed Q-sorts were placed in a single document in which no identifiers were 
present due to the ethical provisions of confidentiality that were conditional for 
participation in this study. All ethical information was passed along to the participants 
when requesting their involvement in the study (see Appendix D). 
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Data collection concluded on February 25th with the completion of the 12th 
participant’s Q-sort. All completed Q-sorts were included in the factor analysis, as 
described in the next section. 
 
Table 4: Q-sort Participants6 
Q-sort Participants’ Background 
1. Environmental Developer (City of Vancouver) 
2.Technical Expert (City of Vancouver) 
3.Technical Expert (City of Vancouver) 
4. Emergency Management Expert (District of Maple Ridge) 
5.Technical Expert (District of Maple Ridge) 
6. Technical Expert (District of Maple Ridge) 
7. Development Expert (District of Maple Ridge) 
8. Non-governmental organization (District of Maple Ridge) 
9. Regional Environmental Organization 
10. Regional Environmental Organization 
11. Regional Institutional Manager 
12. Regional Consulting Expert  
                                                 
6
 General pseudonyms are provided to protect the identity of participants. 
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2.2.4 Statistical Analysis 
Q methodology uses a by-person factor analysis to identify patterns of similarity and 
distinct regularities in the Q-sorts. As Watts & Stenner (2012) explain, “it involves a 
statistical inspection of the correlation matrix that mimics the conceptual or eyeball 
inspection” (98). The process of a by-person factor analysis measures the correlation 
among Q-sort configurations. Q methodology is focused on the relationship between 
participants. In Q the participants are variables being measured and the Items are the 
sample. Therefore, it should be understood that Q method focuses on the relationship 
among participants through the factor analysis of completed Q-sorts. The result of this by-
person factor analysis is the identification of group(s) representing a collective view or 
shared behaviour, known as a Factor. Each Factor is a representation of a group of 
participants that have been identified as having similar behaviour with each other, as 
expressed through their Q-sorts. They will have their own Q-sort that is outputted, 
representing the behaviour/views of the Factor. They are designated as Factors because in 
abduction there are many possible links to a cause and because, in Q methodology, each 
Factor represents a group’s behaviour through its views and they are involved in flood 
response; attributing a single Factor to link the effect to the cause is inappropriate. Each 
Item of the Factor’s Q-sort has new calculated value that represents that Factor’s view. 
These output values for each Item are known as factor arrays. In order to arrive at these 
factor arrays there are a series of steps involved. 
The by-person factor analysis process in Q method can be understood as being 
complicated and, as such, it will be described in a step-by-step fashion. The statistical 
analysis of Q method involves 6 steps, including: 
Step 1: Intercorrelation of Q-sorts; 
Step 2: Factor extraction; 
Step 3: Factor rotation; 
Step 4: Factor-defining Q-sorts for 3 factors; 
Step 5: Factor weights and estimates; and 
Step 6: Factor arrays. 
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2.2.4.1 Intercorrelation of Q sorts 
The first step in Q method is to examine the relationship that each Q-sort has with every 
other Q-sort in the study. The purpose of this step was to identify groupings of high and 
low correlations and, thus, variance by producing a correlation matrix (see Table 5). Based 
on the correlations among Q-sorts, a factor matrix was outputted, identifying “shared forms 
of understandings among [local practitioners]” (Shinebourne, 2009, 94). As Watts & 
Stenner (2012) explain, “these initial relationships within the correlation matrix—these 
patterns of similarity and difference—are very important because they are the site from 
which our Factors will be born” (98).  
The calculation of the correlations between Q-sorts involved Pearson’s Coefficient. 
The other option was to use Spearman’s Coefficient, but it really did not matter as the 
methods would have produced the same results (Brown, 1980). It is from here that a 
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) was performed on the correlations, leading to the 
extraction of Factors. Since there were 12 responses to the questionnaire, one can see from 
Table 5 that some responses were highly correlated and other negatively correlated. For 
example, Q-sorts 5 and 3 were correlated at 0.801 and 5 and 9 at 0.695 while 1 and 8 were 
negatively correlated and small (-0.073). 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
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2.2.4.2 Factor extraction 
The second step, factor extraction, is the process of identifying the number of Factors (also 
known as groupings of shared behaviour) in the study through the identification and 
removal of common variance from the initial correlation matrix (Kline, 1994; Brown, 
1980; Watts & Stenner, 2012). There are two main approaches to factor extraction: 1) a 
centroid factor analysis; and 2) a PCA. Harman (1976) argues that the two methods are 
likely to produce similar results, the difference being that the PCA will produce a 
mathematically best solution. 
In this study, the PCA factor extraction technique was performed in which 
eigenvalues above 1.00 were indicative of a Factor. It is recommended by Brown (1980) 
and Watts & Stenner (2012) that the number of Factors extracted be based on eigenvalues 
greater than 1.00—satisfying the Kaiser-Guttman criterion (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser, 
1960)—as values less than 1.00 account for less than 1 Q-sort of study variance. As it is 
indicated in Table 6, three Factors were extracted, equating to 72.73% of the study 
variance. 
Table 6: Factor Extraction 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 5.458 45.485 45.485 5.458 45.485 45.485 
2 1.801 15.007 60.492 1.801 15.007 60.492 
3 1.469 12.239 72.730 1.469 12.239 72.730 
4 0.865 7.212 79.942  
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5 0.647 5.388 85.330 
6 0.494 4.119 89.449 
7 0.422 3.515 92.964 
8 0.330 2.747 95.711 
9 0.266 2.219 97.930 
10 0.119 0.988 98.918 
11 0.085 0.708 99.626 
12 0.045 0.374 100.000 
**Extraction Method: Principle Component Analysis 
 Q-sorts have a corresponding factor loading to each Factor. A factor loading is the 
degree of correlation that each Q-sort has with each Factor (see Appendix B). It is these 
factor loadings that become integral to the final product/arrays as their loadings will 
determine which Factor they will represent. 
2.2.4.3 Factor Rotation 
The third step of the by-person factor analysis is a factor rotation. Factor rotation is the 
process of manipulating the conceptual dimensions of the extracted Factors in order to best 
position the factor loadings relative to each Factor. It is common practice to perform a 
factor rotation in Q methodology (Watts & Stenner, 2012; Brown, 1980). As Watts & 
Stenner (2012) state, “The close proximity of two mapped Q-sorts signals their general 
agreement and the presence of similar viewpoints. The greater their physical separation, 
however, the more their respective viewpoints diverge” (115). It is the purpose of factor 
rotation to align the unique viewpoints of each Q-sort with a shared viewpoint of a Factor 
by rotating the axes and, thus, spatially adjusting the factor loadings and avoiding negative 
loading values. This process was undertaken and it is fully described in Appendix B. 
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2.2.4.4 Factor-defining Q sorts 
The next step of the by-person factor analysis was to define the Q-sorts that would be used 
to calculate the final factor arrays for each Factor. Factor rotation results in new factor 
loadings for each Q-sort relative to each Factor. It was using these new loadings (see Table 
7) that factor-defining Q-sorts were selected. Following the rotation, Q-sort 1’s factor 
loading with Factor 2 has increased while the loadings for Factors 1 and 3 have decreased. 
It is safe to assume that Q-sort 1 would have a higher significance/role in defining the factor 
arrays for Factor 2 as opposed to Factors 1 and 3 in this study. Therefore, Q-sort 1 is factor-
defining of Factor 2. This process of selecting factor-defining Q-sorts was performed on 
each Q-sort, resulting in Table 8.  
Table 7: Factor loadings post-rotation 
 
Component (Grouping of Shared 
Behaviour) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Q Sort 1 0.132 0.845 -0.287 
Q Sort 2 0.09 0.663 0.249 
Q Sort 3 0.833 0.069 0.339 
Q Sort 4 0.062 0.72 0.401 
Q Sort 5 0.835 0.389 0.178 
Q Sort 6 0.402 0.212 0.734 
Q Sort 7 0.901 0.137 -0.121 
Q Sort 8 0.616 -0.079 0.525 
Q Sort 9 0.564 0.255 0.586 
Q Sort 10 0.039 0.43 0.578 
Q Sort 11 0.331 0.765 0.33 
Q Sort 12 0.065 0.093 0.823 
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Table 8: Factor-defining Q-sorts 
 
It should be noted here that Q-sort 9 had essentially the same loading on Factors 1 
and 3.7. According to Watts & Stenner (2012), the significant loading of a Q-sort on two 
or more Factors indicates that the Q-sort is a confounding variable and, as such, it cannot 
be used as a factor-defining variable. This does not mean that Q-sort 9 is not important or 
irrelevant to the results of this study, rather, it just cannot be used in determining the final 
factor arrays. It is in the interpretations of the final product of each Factor that Q-sort 9’s 
distribution was compared to the final factor arrays of Factor 1 and 3, focusing on 
similarities and differences between these products and this variable with regards to the 
results of this study. Following the placement of Q-sorts into individual Factors, factor 
weights, estimates and z-scores were calculated. 
2.2.4.5 Factor weights and estimates 
Factor weights and estimates are essential to formulating the final factor arrays. A factor 
estimate is “an estimate of the Factor’s viewpoint” (Watts & Stenner, 2012, 129) on a 
particular Item. It is calculated using the factor weights of all factor-defining Q-sorts of an 
individual Factor. The final factor weights indicate the percentage that each Q-sort will 
contribute to the final factor estimates relative to the Q-sort with the highest score (1). It 
involves three steps that are indicated in the following tables: 
 
                                                 
7
 Q-sort 9 is the 9th participant’s completed questionnaire. 
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Table 9: Calculating Factor Weights 
Step 1: Initial Factor Weight (for Q sort 1)=Factor Loading/(1-Factor Loading^2) 
Factor 1 
Initial Factor 
Weight Factor 2 
Initial Factor 
Weight Factor 3 
Initial Factor 
Weight 
Q Sort 3 2.721235108 Q Sort 1 2.954803742 Q Sort 6 1.591348614 
Q Sort 5 2.757823466 Q Sort 2 1.18301807 Q Sort 10 0.867977342 
Q Sort 7 4.787485587 Q Sort 4 1.495016611 Q Sort 12 2.550585581 
Q Sort 8 0.992677393 Q Sort 11 1.844373455     
 
Step 2: Reciprocal of Largest Factor Weight from Step 1=1/Initial Factor Weight of Qx 
  Reciprocal   Reciprocal   Reciprocal 
Factor 1 0.208877913 Factor 2 0.338431953 Factor 3 0.392066829 
 
Step 3: Final Factor Weight (for Q Sort 1)=Initial Factor Weight (Step 1)*Reciprocal of 
Largest Factor Weight (Step 2) 
Factor 1 
Final Factor 
Weight Factor 2 
Final Factor 
Weight Factor 3 
Final Factor 
Weight 
Q Sort 3 0.568405911 Q Sort 1 1 Q Sort 6 0.623915004 
Q Sort 5 0.576048411 Q Sort 2 0.400371115 Q Sort 10 0.340305124 
Q Sort 7 1 Q Sort 4 0.505961391 Q Sort 12 1 
Q Sort 8 0.207348383 Q Sort 11 0.62419491     
 The calculation of factor estimates were derived from these weights by multiplying 
the initial score of each Item in the Q-sorts with their corresponding factor weights. The 
sum of the weighted scores of an Item is the factor estimate for that Item. These factor 
estimates are indicators for the corresponding factor arrays (see Table 10).  
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 The tables over the next 4 pages show the weighted scores of each Item based on 
the Q-sort weights and the factor estimates under the ‘Total’ column. Again, it is from these 
factor estimates that the factor arrays were derived. 
Table 10: Factor 1 estimates 
Q sort 
Weight 
3 
(0.5684) 
5 
(0.5760) 
7 
(1.000) 
8 
(0.2073) Total 
Item  
(Item 
Ranking)*Weight=Weighted 
Score     
1 4.5472 4.032 9 1.6584 19.2376 
2 3.4104 3.456 8 1.2438 16.1102 
3 4.5472 4.608 5 0.8292 14.9844 
4 2.842 3.456 5 0.6219 11.9199 
5 2.842 2.304 5 0.4146 10.5606 
6 2.842 4.032 6 1.4511 14.3251 
7 3.9788 4.608 8 1.6584 18.2452 
8 3.9788 4.032 7 1.2438 16.2546 
9 4.5472 4.608 5 1.6584 15.8136 
10 2.842 2.304 5 0.4146 10.5606 
11 3.9788 4.608 9 1.6584 19.2452 
12 3.4104 3.456 5 1.4511 13.3175 
13 2.842 4.032 5 0.6219 12.4959 
14 3.9788 5.184 9 1.2438 19.4066 
15 1.7052 1.728 4 0.2073 7.6405 
16 2.842 2.88 4 1.6584 11.3804 
17 2.842 2.88 5 0.6219 11.3439 
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18 2.842 4.032 5 0.6219 12.4959 
19 2.2736 0.576 2 0.2073 5.0569 
20 3.4104 4.032 5 1.4511 13.8935 
21 1.7052 1.728 3 1.4511 7.8843 
22 3.9788 4.608 6 1.4511 16.0379 
23 3.4104 4.608 8 0.6219 16.6403 
Table 11: Factor 2 estimates 
Q sort 
Weight 
1 
(1.000) 
2 
(0.4004) 
4 
(0.5060) 
11 
(0.6242) Total 
Item   
(Item 
Ranking)*Weight=Weighted 
Score   
1 2 1.2012 1.518 1.2484 5.9676 
2 7 3.2032 2.024 4.3694 16.5966 
3 7 3.6036 3.036 4.9936 18.6332 
4 6 0.8008 3.036 2.4968 12.3336 
5 5 0.4004 3.542 3.121 12.0634 
6 5 3.6036 3.036 1.8726 13.5122 
7 6 2.002 4.048 4.9936 17.0436 
8 4 1.6016 4.554 5.6178 15.7734 
9 1 3.2032 3.542 3.7452 11.4904 
10 6 2.4024 4.048 4.3684 16.8188 
11 7 2.8028 4.048 5.6178 19.4686 
12 6 3.2032 4.048 4.3694 17.6206 
13 6 3.2032 4.048 4.3694 17.6206 
14 9 3.2032 3.542 5.6178 21.363 
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15 6 1.2012 1.518 0.6242 9.3434 
16 3 0.4004 2.53 3.121 9.0514 
17 7 2.4024 3.542 3.121 16.0654 
18 9 3.6036 4.554 5.6178 22.7754 
19 1 1.2012 2.024 1.2484 5.4736 
20 6 3.6036 3.036 3.7452 16.3848 
21 3 3.2032 3.036 4.3694 13.6086 
22 9 2.8028 4.554 5.6178 21.9746 
23 3 1.2012 3.036 4.3694 11.6066 
Table 12: Factor 3 estimates 
Q sort 
Weight 
6 
(0.6239) 
10 
(0.3403) 
12 
(1.000) Total 
Item 
(Item 
Ranking)*Weight=Weighted 
Score   
1 4.9912 2.0418 7 14.033 
2 3.7434 1.3612 3 8.1046 
3 4.9912 2.0418 6 13.033 
4 1.8717 1.0209 6 8.8926 
5 3.7434 0.3403 6 10.0837 
6 2.4956 2.3821 5 9.8777 
7 5.6151 0.6806 7 13.2957 
8 5.6151 2.3821 6 13.9972 
9 5.6151 2.3821 8 15.9972 
10 5.6151 3.0627 8 16.6778 
11 5.6151 1.7015 6 13.3166 
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12 4.9912 1.7015 7 13.6927 
13 3.7434 1.0209 6 10.7643 
14 4.9912 1.7015 5 11.6927 
15 2.4956 0.3403 1 3.8359 
16 4.9912 0.6806 7 12.6718 
17 1.2478 1.0209 3 5.2687 
18 4.9912 3.0627 8 16.0539 
19 2.4956 0.6806 4 7.1762 
20 4.9912 0.6806 8 13.6718 
21 4.9912 2.7224 5 12.7136 
22 5.6151 2.3821 5 12.9972 
23 4.3673 1.7015 2 8.0688 
2.2.4.6 Factor arrays 
The final step of the statistical formulation in Q method is determining the factor arrays of 
each Factor. As mentioned, factor arrays are the corresponding values of a Factor’s Items 
based on the factor estimates of Q-sorts. They represent the Factor’s view for each Item. 
The distribution format (free versus forced) is fundamental in determining the factor arrays. 
Factor scores or arrays are derived by identifying the factor estimate range that any Item 
could have and dividing that range by the number of possible rankings—in this case, 9. 
Each rank is given the same range and Items with factor estimates that fall within a rank’s 
given range will receive the corresponding value. The final factor arrays are displayed in 
Figures 7-9. It is from the literature review, interview data and these factor arrays that 
Chapters 4 through 6 of this paper are centered on.  
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Figure 8: Factor 3 arrays 
Each Factor can be characterized based on the outputted factor arrays that 
correspond to each Item of the Q-sort. Factor 1 is characterized by risk and collaboration. 
With Items 1, 11, 14 and 7 being valued the greatest in its configurations (+4 and +3), 
Factor 1 views risk as the biggest or most influential driver for flood management. 
48 
 
Although uncertainty and competing priorities influence investment in flood management, 
according to this group, the risk of a flood and the associated impacts make flood 
management a priority in the region. This group takes a precautionary approach to flood 
response in that they would rather be safe than face the consequences of no preventative 
action given that a flood event could occur. 
Factor 2 can be characterized by institutional tension that exists among different 
levels of government or organizations and the action that results is more social and 
economically based as opposed to Factor 1’s risk-based approach. Based on the outputted 
factor arrays, Factor 2 views potential economic impacts as the greatest drivers for flood 
management. This group views the risk of a flood occurring as less of a driver than public 
pressure and economic impact. They operate more based on public input regarding the 
existing issues in the region at the present time than the potential risk of a flood occurring. 
What can be seen as an issue because the impacts are visible (what their reality is) is more 
influential on institutional behaviour than a perceived threat. Therefore, uncertainty of an 
event occurring impacts the investment in flood management. Finally, this group views 
flood management as being a provincial or federal responsibility as opposed to a municipal 
one. This suggests that a lack of acceptance of responsibility could lead to less investment 
in and attention to flood response from this group, as will be shown in Chapters 4-6. 
Factor 3 is characterized by organizational or institutional structure. It controls the 
investment in flood response and who is responsible for the development and 
implementation of the organization or institution’s flood response. Although 
communication and collaboration are important for successful flood management, 
disconnect among staff and more senior officials within the organization or institution is 
present and reflects the current state of flood management in the region. This group views 
climate change and the potential economic impacts associated with a major flood as being 
major drivers for flood management, but how the organization or institution views the state 
of the current system and the need to improve that system takes priority. Therefore, 
disconnect and disagreement regarding responsibility, in part, shape this group. It is also 
characterized by the politics of approaching issues where results can be seen immediately 
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for the purpose of re-election and keeping the public happy by approaching their concerns 
first followed. Ultimately, response occurs when needed.  
2.3 Conclusion 
Q methodology studies human behaviour through the views, beliefs and experiences of 
individual participants. It identifies clusters of individuals that share similar viewpoints in 
order to identify group behaviour. These clusters are known as Factors and the behaviour 
is identified through the factor scores/arrays that indicate a group’s level of agreement with 
an Item within the Q-sort.  
In this study, these Factors and their factor arrays form part of the basis for 
understanding how institutions and organizations manage and respond to flood risk. They 
identify patterns of behaviour framed by interacting components in order to aid in the 
discussion of conceptualizing institutional response capacity to floods and municipal 
action. The results of the by-person factor analysis supports interview data and information 
gathered in the literature review. Together, these methods of data collection lead to the 
conceptual frameworks presented in the coming chapters. Items 4, 5 and 6 of the Q-sort 
are excluded in the write-up of Chapters 3-7 because the by-person factor analysis shows 
no conclusive evidence that these Items factor in response capacity to floods or municipal 
action.  
In Chapters 4-6, results of the Q analysis are presented in conjunction with findings 
from the literature review and the interviews. The tables presented in these Chapters are 
designed to show the views of the three Factors on particular Items. It should be understood 
that the values presented on a particular Item should not be taken as a representative value 
that can be summed to provide one view for all participants; rather, the factor arrays that 
correspond to a Factor represents that Factor’s particular level of agreement with a specific 
statement. It is not the purpose of these tables to say that Factor 1’s level of agreement of 
an Item is greater or less than that of Factor 2 or 3’s level of agreement. The purpose of 
these tables is to show how these Factors view various aspects of flood response to provide 
an indication, in conjunction with interview data and literature review findings, of the 
components of response capacity to floods and municipal action. Therefore, by 
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understanding that these Factors correspond to separate views from each other, this paper 
can now proceed with discussing responsibility and liability in emergency management, 
followed by response capacity to floods and municipal action. 
3 Responsibility and Liability in Emergency Management 
3.1 Introduction 
Jurisdiction, responsibility and exposure to civil liability in emergency management 
situations are major considerations in the development of emergency policy and response 
practices. Together, they outline the roles of governments and provide a legal framework 
for the approach to emergency management.  
The main purpose of this Chapter is to provide context for the Chapters to come 
through a review of the applicable statutory and common law principles and to review the 
influence that legal responsibility and exposure to civil liability have in emergency 
management decision-making. The objectives of this Chapter are: 
1. Identify the roles and responsibilities of the municipal, provincial, and federal 
governments as derived through legislation;  
2. Explain the heterogeneity in emergency management and planning among 
municipalities in British Columbia; and 
3. Explore the provisions in place that reduce government exposure to liability in 
emergencies. 
3.2 Jurisdiction and Responsibility 
Jurisdiction refers to the authority to make laws. In Canada, jurisdiction is a product of the 
Constitution Act of 1867. In 1867, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick 
signed the British North American Act (now referred to as the Constitution Act of 1867), 
followed by the remaining provinces and territories at later dates. It established the federal 
and provincial governments of Canada, outlining their legislative authority over matters in 
Canada. The federal government was given legislative authority over the militia, military 
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and naval services, and Defense, as well as criminal law and other matters (Section 91). 
Provincial governments had legislative authority on all matters pertaining to land and 
water—provided that the body of water is solely contained in that province—and, most 
notably, authority over municipal institutions (Section 92).  
 Probably the most important aspect of this document, at least in the context of 
emergency management, is that subject matters not mentioned in the Act allows federal 
and provincial governments to define their roles. Both the federal and provincial 
governments have the authority to make laws pertaining to emergency management and 
can use that authority to define their roles. The federal government’s approach has 
traditionally been that emergency management is best suited to be dealt with at the 
provincial or local level and should not be a federal responsibility because most emergency 
management has to do with waterways and land which are under provincial jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the federal government recognizes that responsibility for emergency 
management lies with the provinces through the Emergency Management Act. This is not 
to say that the federal government is not involved in emergency management, just that the 
obligation for planning and implementation of emergency management is not their 
responsibility. Instead, the federal government has chosen to take on a funding and 
assistance role. The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement program is designed to 
assist provinces in post-disaster recovery. In events where a state of emergency is declared, 
the federal government has provisions in place so that the military can aid in disaster relief 
(as described in Chapter 1). The actual involvement in emergency management planning 
and implementation, however, has very little to do with the federal government. They 
downloaded that responsibility to the provinces. 
Provinces also have jurisdiction to make laws on emergency management and can 
make laws that impose obligations on local governments to do things or not do things. 
While the province has ultimate jurisdiction to make laws governing emergency 
preparedness and to establish minimum standards and criteria, that responsibility has 
largely been devolved down to municipalities who have limited capacity given the financial 
constraints and other priorities facing them.  
In British Columbia, the Emergency Program Act passes down responsibility of 
emergency management to municipal institutions. Instead of taking the lead on emergency 
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management, the province’s approach is that emergency management is best dealt with at 
a local scale. Risk to hazards differ between municipalities. The City of Vancouver, for 
example, is exposed to coastal flooding caused by sea-level rise and storm surges. Maple 
Ridge on the other hand may not have to address direct flooding caused by sea-level rise 
because it is further inland. A universal plan at the provincial level that can be applied in 
all regions is viewed as not being the most effective strategy. Instead, management at a 
local level made more sense to the province. As such, that responsibility was delegated to 
the municipalities. The province remains involved in emergency management, but their 
position should be recognized as an advisory role with funding and financial assistance 
opportunities. 
 Municipalities, on the other hand, are legal entities defined by provincial 
legislation. Municipal governments are representative entities of their communities that 
make communal decisions based on what they perceive to be in the best interest of the 
community (Local Government Act). Where the province and federal government have the 
authority to define their roles in emergency management, municipalities do not. 
Municipalities are creatures of statute. They derive their power and existence through 
legislation, such as the Local Government Act. Municipalities, like private entities and 
citizens, are bound by provincial statutes, including those that direct or require emergency 
preparedness. As such, they make emergency planning and implementation decisions in 
both a statutory and common law context.  
In 1996, the province of British Colombia adopted the Emergency Program Act 
outlining the duties and responsibilities of government for emergency management and the 
provisions for which a state of emergency can be declared. It was under this Act that 
municipalities were given the responsibility for developing and implementing local 
emergency plans. As stated under Section 6(2) of the amended Emergency Program Act 
(2015), “a local authority must prepare or cause to be prepared local emergency plans 
respecting preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters.” 
Given that sea-levels are rising and storm surges are becoming more frequent and intense, 
coastal communities have the responsibility to create an emergency plan that should 
address such concerns. However, communities may be subject to multiple types of hazards 
and, thus, can interpret this provision of the Act—and the extent to which “preparation for, 
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response to and recovery from” is appropriate—however they like. For example, 
“preparation for” could be interpreted as developing a plan if a disaster were to occur, but 
it does not actually mean that infrastructure has to be implemented that would reduce the 
likelihood of a flood occurring in a given area. In the City of Vancouver, there is an entire 
department designated with the task of designing a plan and carrying out that plan 
addressing climate change which includes reducing flood risk. Other cities will not have 
the same emergency plans as the City of Vancouver for a variety reasons, but the point here 
is that the wording in Section 6(2) of the Emergency Program Act allows for multiple 
interpretations and the policies, programs, and decisions made are reflective of such 
interpretations. Although this Act imposes responsibility for emergency management onto 
municipalities, there is no defined standard in approaching it. Municipalities are able to 
approach emergency management as they see fit.  
There are programs that are designed to financially assist municipalities in post-
disaster recovery that may influence the decisions that municipalities make due to the 
conditions attached. This can deter emergency management by restricting access to 
resources if certain requirements are not met. For example, municipalities can receive 
financial assistance or compensation through the province. The Compensation and 
Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation of the Emergency Program Act is designed to 
outline the conditions for which municipalities and homeowners qualify for financial 
assistance in the event that a disaster occurs. Claims for compensation by municipalities 
can be made for structural repair, rebuilding or replacement; however, Section 30 raises 
issues pertaining to flood plain mapping and the ability to receive assistance. Section 30 
states, 
If an area is designated under the [Local Government Act] as flood plain and a public 
facility is built or installed in that area after the area has been so designated, no 
assistance will be provided to repair, rebuild or replace the public facility if it is damaged 
in a flood unless the structure was determined by the Minister of Environment, Lands 
and Parks or by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation to have been properly flood 
protected. 
 
This provision acts as a deterrent for flood plain mapping. It incentivizes local governments 
to neglect flood plain mapping in their jurisdictions in order to be eligible for assistance if 
a disaster were to occur. In the event that flood plain maps are up-to-date and a flood 
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occurs, the burden of the cost to repair, rebuild or replace damaged or destroyed structures 
located in the designated flood plain falls completely on the local authority without the 
possibility for compensation or assistance. As one participant in this study explained, the 
Columbian Basin Trust had the resources to conduct a hydrological assessment in 
Kootenay for 20 municipalities, but the municipalities turned it down because of the 
liability attached. Therefore, the liability attached to flood plain mapping was the root 
deterrent for making this decision. It was decided that the best thing for these communities 
was not knowing so that if a flood were to occur they would remain eligible for assistance 
and avoid a potential economic collapse.  
Claims for financial assistance or compensation can be reduced or declined if the 
Minister determines that insufficient measures were taken before, during or after the 
disaster (Compensation and Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation, S. 31). Therefore, 
although the Emergency Program Act, outlined earlier, requires the coordination of action 
to protect the health, safety, well-being and property from damage in the event that a threat 
of a disaster exists, if the minister believes that too little action has taken place to protect a 
structure then that assistance or compensation can be declined.  
It is clear that municipalities are responsible for emergency management defined in 
provincial legislation and that there is no defined standard in its approach allowing 
municipalities to make decisions on the planning and implementation of responses based 
on financial resources and other priorities. Again, municipalities choose whether or not to 
act and how to act with regards to emergency management. The assistance provided in the 
event that a disaster does occur will be reflective of those choices and, thus, the social 
constructions of the community’s reality. The question now becomes: when does the local 
authority, having that responsibility to protect the people and property, become legally 
liable for their actions—including the choice not to act—and the associated costs in the 
event that a disaster does occur. 
3.3 Liability 
Legal liability refers to a finding that is made by a court that someone did something that 
they should not have done or did not do something that they should have which caused 
damage to someone else. It is a conclusion of law. Someone who does something wrong to 
55 
 
someone else is liable to pay damages. There is a distinction to be made between being 
responsible and being liable. Having the responsibility does not mean that one is legally 
liable. 
As described earlier, municipalities are legal entities that are treated at law as a 
person; however, there are circumstances by which municipalities have different liability 
exposure than private individuals. Like a company, municipalities operate in the interests 
of their shareholders. For companies, the interests lie in maximizing profits (Jones, 2001). 
For government, they operate for the greater good and, therefore, they have to make tough 
decisions at times. As such, municipalities need to be protected against civil liability for 
the decisions that they make. Provisions in legislation and court decisions have reduced 
government exposure for this reason. In Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, the Supreme Court 
of Canada found that governments have different exposures to private law, stating 
“municipal legislative functions, are different in kind and are not amenable to judicial 
constraint by the imposition of a private law duty of care”. The Court distinguished 
between policy decisions, to which no civil liability is attached, and operational decisions 
where a private law duty of care may arise, the breach of which gives rise to civil liability.  
The difference between a policy decision and operational decision is a legal 
rationalization (Roman, 2002; Henstra & McBean, 2004). McLachlin C.J. wrote in R. v. 
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited: 
“Core policy” government decisions protected from suit are decisions as to a course or 
principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, 
social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad 
faith. This approach is consistent with the basic thrust of Canadian cases on the issue, 
although it emphasizes positive features of policy decisions, instead of relying 
exclusively on the quality of being “non-operational”. […] Difficult cases may be 
expected to arise from time to time where it is not easy to decide whether the degree of 
“policy” involved suffices for protection from negligence liability.  (para. 90). 
Due to the complexity of decision-making, policy versus operational decisions are made 
on a case-by-case basis. As McLaclin C.J. further stated, “a black and white test that will 
provide a ready and irrefutable answer for every decision in the infinite variety of decisions 
that government actors may produce is likely chimerical” (para. 90). The choice to 
implement infrastructure in one area, for example, versus another area is a policy decision 
due to the economic, social and political factors that influence the decision. If a flood 
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occurs, the City may not be liable for the damages in the area without the protecting 
infrastructure because a policy decision was made.  
The choice not to act is also a policy decision. In Eliopoulis v. Ontario, George 
Eliopoulis had been infected with West Nile Virus in 2002 and was treated in hospital but 
later died in 2003. His estate and family members sued Her Majesty the Queen in Right of 
Ontario for negligence, arguing that Ontario owed the deceased a private duty of care and 
had the capability of preventing the outbreak in 2002 but chose not to act. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal found that the choice not to act was a policy decision and, therefore, 
negated the existence of a private law duty of care, which is a necessary pre-condition to 
civil liability in negligence.  
It is important to understand that reduced government exposure does not mean no 
exposure to civil liability, just that it is limited in comparison to a private company or an 
individual. Legislation can limit exposure to liability when acting in face of an emergency 
or impeding emergency provided the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. For 
example, under Section 18 of the Emergency Program Act, government cannot be found 
liable in private law unless in doing the act, decisions were taken in bad faith or they are 
found to be grossly negligent in doing or omitting that act. Their main exposure to legal 
liability lies with operational decisions. In a report prepared for the Institute for 
Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Henstra & McBean (2004) concluded that in order for a 
government to be found legally liable, they have to be “found negligent in the event that 
an operational decision breaches a duty of care owed to citizens” (4). Claims regarding the 
failure to uphold the duty of care can be made in negligence or nuisance.  
 Operational negligence is a private law claim that can be asserted against 
governments. Negligence is the result of a defendant’s failure to satisfy a duty of care owed 
to the plaintiff, which causes damages (Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse). Returning to 
Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, municipalities cannot be found negligent for policy 
decisions; however, it is important that government not be completely exempt from 
liability. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada, McLachlin C.J. wrote:  
There is a wide consensus that the law of negligence must account for the unique role 
of government agencies: Just. On the one hand, it is important for public authorities to 
be liable in general for their negligent conduct in light of the pervasive role that they 
play in all aspects of society. Exempting all government actions from liability would 
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result in intolerable outcomes. On the other hand, “the Crown is not a person and must 
be free to govern and make true policy decisions without becoming subject to tort 
liability as a result of those decisions.” (Just v. British Columbia, 1239). 
 
Thus, governments have exposure to liability in negligence for operational decisions. The 
key issues remain with the existence of a duty of care and proximity. If it is determined 
that a private law duty of care is owed, and proximity exist, and, if the decision was 
operational, a local government can be eligible in negligence. 
Under the Emergency Program Act, a government has to be grossly negligent in 
their actions for liability to rise. Claims for gross negligence must show damages occurred 
where there exists a duty of care. A duty of care is an obligation to take reasonable care to 
avoid actions that result in an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Odhavji Estate v. 
Woodhouse). The plaintiff must prove that a private law duty of care exists, as defined 
through: 
(a) A statutory scheme; 
(b) Interactions between the local authority and the plaintiff without interference 
from a statute; 
(c) Proximity based on (a) and (b); or  
(d) Common law for operational action. (R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada; 
Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)). 
Foreseeability of the risk of injury can give rise to a duty of care if the harm is a reasonably 
foreseeable by-product of the action in question. For example, in Anderson et al. v. 
Manitoba, the province diverted water resulting in massive flooding in other communities. 
The question became whether or not a duty of care existed knowing that by diverting water 
away from one area to another, the receiving community would be more vulnerable to 
massive flooding. Although the court declined to certify the action as appropriate for a 
class action, the court found that the allegations in negligence against Manitoba disclosed 
a cause of action and permitted that claim to proceed as individual actions by affected 
persons. 
Nuisance is a further ground of civil liability that may apply to flood situations. 
Nuisance refers to the interference with an individual’s use and enjoyment of property 
through a thing or activity (MacGregor v. Penner; Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. v. Ontario 
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(Transportation)). It may be the result of negligence (Penno v. Manitoba). In order to prove 
a nuisance claim the plaintiff must prove that the interference was substantial and 
unreasonable. To put this into context, in emergency situations there are times where an 
evacuation order can be implemented. In the event that an evacuation order is implemented 
during a disaster, the government has the legal authority to occupy private land, under 
Section 10 of the Emergency Program Act. It is expected that the owner tolerates the 
adverse effects of that occupation (Anne Hotel Co. v. Ashcroft; Smith v. Inco). As stated by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Under the common law of nuisance, sometimes the person whose property suffered the 
adverse effects is expected to tolerate those effects as the price of membership in the 
larger community. Sometimes, however, the party causing the adverse effect can be 
compelled, even if his or her conduct is lawful and reasonable, to desist from engaging 
in that conduct and to compensate the other party for any harm caused to that person’s 
property. (Royal Anne Hotel Co. V. Ashcroft (Village), paras 8-10). 
 
Therefore, civil liability claims on the grounds of nuisance need to show the local authority 
either acted unlawfully causing harm to the enjoyment or use of one’s self or property or 
even if the municipality acted under lawful authority, the interference with the individual 
landowner’s property is so great that it is unfair to expect that person to absorb those 
adverse effects without due compensation. In the event that no physical damage has been 
done, the question becomes whether it is unreasonable for the plaintiff to accept 
interference for the greater good of the public in all situations or if certain provisions should 
be in place to protect the plaintiff from such interference (MacGregor v. Penner; Royal 
Anne Hotel Co. v. Ashcroft; Smith v. Inco Ltd.). As stated in MacGregor v. Penner: 
In essence, the common law of nuisance decided which party’s interest must give way. 
That determination is made by asking whether in all the circumstances the harm caused 
or the interference done to one person’s property by the other person’s use of his or her 
property is reasonable. (2). 
Hypothetically, an argument could be made that the local authority could be found guilty 
of nuisance in a disaster situation or impeding disaster if the authority occupied land from 
private landowners and exceeded the necessary time to respond to the disaster thereby, 
causing an unreasonable interference with the owner’s enjoyment and use of their land. In 
such cases, compensation may be awarded to the plaintiff/landowner. 
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 Municipalities have tight budgets and many duties to fulfill (Henstra, 2013). With 
responsibility for the cost of emergency mitigation measures remaining in large part with 
municipalities, exposure to civil liability for decisions made have to be carefully 
considered. Natural disasters can affect local, regional and national economies. Evidence 
in Haiti, the Philippines, Christchurch (New Zealand) and others have shown that the 
ability to recover post-disaster is highly dependent on resource capacity. When issues 
pertaining to wrongdoing by the government to an individual or group of individuals arises 
in the event of a disaster, the ability to recover can be further constrained as it lessens 
resources available to the institution and region. Resources that would otherwise be used 
for the collective are restricted, particularly if compensation is owed to a few individuals. 
That said, compensation is usually awarded at a much later date, but it impedes the region’s 
ability to develop and reduce exposure in the event that a disaster does occur.  
Liability for operational decisions could facilitate even tighter budgets and result in 
delays or dissolution of projects in emergency management or other areas. In the interviews 
conducted in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge, participants described 
resources as being tight which has affected on-going projects. The results of the Q analysis 
suggests that priorities have a role in the investment in emergency management planning 
and implementation. If decisions made are found to be liable for damages the available 
resources allocated to projects can become constrained. Again, governments act in the 
greater good for their communities. A government that is found liable for an operational 
decision impedes the ability for governments to act. Therefore, it is important for 
municipalities to ensure that resources can be allocated for the benefit of the community as 
a whole. To do so, exposure to civil liability needs to minimized and, thus, it becomes 
integral in the emergency management decision-making process. 
To conclude, statutory responsibilities and potential legal liabilities inform municipal 
decisions in emergency management. Although municipalities have less exposure to civil 
liability than that of a company or private individual, they do have to be careful in their 
approach to emergency management as to not act in bad faith or grossly negligent. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
Jurisdiction, responsibility and legal liability are critical considerations in planning and 
implementing emergency management. The absence of emergency management in the 
Constitution Act of 1867 has allowed the federal and provincial governments to define their 
roles. While the province has ultimate jurisdiction to make laws governing emergency 
preparedness and to establish minimum standards and criteria, that responsibility has 
largely been devolved down to municipalities who have limited capacity given the financial 
constraints and other priorities facing them. Although municipalities are responsible for 
emergency management in British Columbia, there is no defined standard in its approach, 
allowing municipalities to address emergency management as they see fit. Financial 
assistance and compensation by the provincial and federal government for damages 
resulting from a disaster can come with conditions, such as no assistance or compensation 
being provided to municipalities that develop in a designated flood plain. Such conditions 
have been found to inform emergency management decisions and, in some cases, deter it.  
Governments have to make tough decisions at times and, as such, they need to be 
protected from civil liability for the decisions that they make. Although municipalities have 
the responsibility for emergency management that does not mean that they are legally 
liable. When decisions are made, governments have less exposure to civil liability than that 
of a private individual or company. Policy decisions made are exempt from civil liability 
unless those decisions were taken in bad faith. Governments do have exposure to civil 
liability when the government is found to be grossly negligent in their actions. Although 
that exposure is reduced, governments still take into account their exposure to inform 
planning and decision-making. Decisions that have greater exposure to civil liability are 
less likely to be made than a decision that has minimal or no exposure. 
Municipalities act in the interest of their communities. The decisions that they make 
are for the greater good. Their approach to emergency management can be viewed as a 
social construction of the community’s reality. Consistent with organizational theory that 
argues that culture dictates institutional or organizational behaviour by framing behaviour 
to meet societal demands, emergency management, too, conforms to this theory.  The laws 
that are in place dictate what is acceptable, unacceptable and the standards to which 
municipalities, organizations and even the population must conform to reflect the cultural 
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values of the region. Therefore, emergency policy and practices of communities are a 
reflection of wants, needs and values of their populations. Although statutory 
responsibilities and legal liabilities inform the decisions that they make, those decisions 
will not impede on the interests and values of the community; instead, they work in tandem 
for the purpose of the greater good. The question becomes what other variables influence 
planning and decision-making in emergency management, particularly in the context of 
flood management.   
4 Development Pathways of Response Capacity to 
Floods  
4.1 Introduction 
Response capacity is a term that depends on context for its meaning. As Burch (2009) 
explains, response capacity is the ability of a group to respond to any risk by utilizing 
human capital, financial capital, and institutional resources. The IPCC report (2007) 
describes response capacity as the ability of humans to manage greenhouse gas emissions 
and associated effects of climate change (Tompkins & Adger, 2005). In both Burch (2009) 
and the IPCC (2007), the researchers viewed response capacity as being the ability to 
manage risk. A nation or region’s ability to manage risk is viewed as being highly 
dependent on resources as related to their socio-technical systems and economic 
development. Past research has focused on economic elements that influence response 
capacity (Handmer et al., 1999) but as the IPCC (2001b; 2007) and Sathaye et al. (2007) 
argue, response capacity is complex and should include other factors that influence a 
region’s ability to respond, such as socio-cultural dimensions. 
As Hadfield & Seaton (1999) explain, environmental management involves the 
complex interactions of human capital, social capital and institutional behaviour and 
physical change (see Figure 9). Together, these variables affect the way resources are 
allocated and used in natural and human systems. These authors claim that a change in any 
component of this interactive model would result in change in environmental management. 
This model is relevant to the discussion on response capacity to floods as the same themes 
influencing change in this model are present in what is described throughout this Chapter. 
As knowledge of flood management continues to develop and emergency management 
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changes as a priority within institutions, the effect on what resources are allocated to 
address the issue will result. What is described in this Chapter are the major components 
by which response capacity is influenced, which are consistent with findings made by 
Hadfield & Seaton (1999) and Burch (2009).  
 
Figure 9: Factors influencing change in environmental management (Hadfield & 
Seaton, 1999, 586). 
 In the previous Chapter, the process of downloading responsibility and the legal 
mechanisms in place that influence decision-making in emergency management are 
examined. Questions of response capacity and development pathways to flood 
management now become the critical focus of this Chapter. What influences a 
community’s ability to respond to flood risk is difficult to quantify due to complex issues. 
What needs to be noted at this time is that response capacity and action are separate. 
Although action is reflective of response capacity, having the ability to manage risk does 
not necessarily mean that action takes place. 
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The purpose of this Chapter is to identify and explain some of the factors influencing 
response capacity in flood management. It does not offer a complete picture of all 
influencing factors, rather it seeks to identify and explain some of the main elements 
affecting response capacity, including: legislation; institutional behavior as seen through 
priorities and collective agreements; collective action; technological pathways; and 
resource management. Evidence is presented based on the interview data, literature review 
and Q analysis. 
This Chapter argues that provinces have the ability to develop a baseline response 
capacity through legislation that mandates a standard for emergency management. 
Although in Chapter 3 it became clear how responsibility and liability can inform decision-
making, how legislation affects response capacity remained incomplete. Beyond the legal 
aspect, this Chapter argues that institutional behavior in recognizing that flooding is an 
issue needing attention and investment and collective action, both internally within a 
municipal institution and with external stakeholders and levels of government, can act as a 
control mechanism on response capacity as it dictates how resources are allocated. Next, 
this Chapter focuses on technological pathways and the relationship of technology 
responses and land use responses with cultural values and urban development. This paper 
argues that cultural values and urban development influence the orientation of responses 
in a region, particularly as highly developed areas with limited space to expand place 
greater reliance on technological responses as the population grows compared to areas 
where space for urban expansion is greater. Finally, this Chapter concludes with a brief 
explanation of resource management as it pertains to response capacity, arguing that it is 
fundamental to institutional response capacity.  
4.2 Jurisdiction and Baseline Response Capacity 
The provinces have the ability to establish baseline conditions for response capacity of 
emergency management and, subsequently, flood management through their authority to 
make laws governing land, water, and municipalities within their provincial boundaries. 
They can force municipalities to abide by a specific set of conditions that would control 
institutional behaviour in what practices would be considered legally acceptable or 
unacceptable with regards to land use and emergency management. Provinces have the 
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ability to create a standard for emergency and flood management which all municipalities 
and organizations would be required to meet. 
It is evident in the previous Chapter that no standard is set in British Columbia’s 
legislation on how municipalities are to proceed with regards to emergency management; 
instead, municipalities can approach the situation however they see fit provided that there 
is at least a plan for the “preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies and 
disasters” (Emergency Program Act, 2015, 6.2). What those plans consist of and what 
action results are, in part, a function of the responsibilities imposed on local governments 
and the liability attached. Legislation imposing a minimum standard in emergency 
management can be viewed as reflective of response capacity as it can provide boundaries 
for action. More laissez-faire legislation allows municipalities to interpret statutes and 
regulations more freely, whereas stricter policies on emergency management practices 
would increase what is minimally required by municipalities. As such, the provinces have 
the ability to influence response capacity by mandating a standard in emergency 
management practice that municipalities would be forced to abide by.  
To illustrate this in an international context, in the United States, state 
environmental employees in Florida were told by state officials not to use terms such as 
climate change and global warming because the state was not convinced that climate 
change is occurring (Korten, 2015; Jaffe, 2015; The McCoy, 20015). By not recognizing 
climate change as occurring and, thus, an issue, the state does not have to respond. 
Therefore, although there is no official policy that states climate change is not occurring, 
baseline response capacity in Florida remains low because precautionary municipal and 
state action is not needed for something that is not recognized as occurring. If the state 
recognizes sea-level rise, for example, as an issue then it can impose obligations onto 
municipalities for action. If the state’s position rejects the need for action then the 
municipalities would have to take it upon themselves to recognize sea-level rise as an issue 
needing action, but due to the state’s position, they are not required to. 
In British Columbia, however, climate change is an issue and the disasters that are 
likely to occur in the future are recognized as a concern. Although in the Emergency 
Program Act there is no mention of climate change, municipalities are required to have 
plans for emergencies that they are likely to experience, which can include flooding. 
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Therefore, municipal response capacity is greater because they are forced to address 
emergency management to the degree set out by the province. With stricter legislation 
obligating a standard, municipal response capacity would increase as it would force 
municipalities to meet greater minimum requirements.  
Response capacity in flood management, therefore, is, in part, a reflection of legislation 
as controlled by the institutional behaviour of the actor with the greatest authority to impose 
obligations through law. Their position can dictate bottom-line behaviour by mandating a 
minimum standard for local governments and organizations. Therefore, baseline response 
capacity can be viewed as the outcome of a product (legislation) that is developed through 
a jurisdictional body. However, this is not to say that developing a standard for emergency 
management through legislation is the appropriate course of action to increase response as 
it will be clear in the upcoming sections that factors interact with each other, creating a 
complex system that must be carefully managed. 
4.3 Institutional Behaviour and Collective Action 
Baseline response capacity should be referred to when discussing what is minimally 
required by municipalities and organizations. It speaks to the entire region where such 
requirements are imposed; however, within the region different municipalities and 
organizations will act beyond what is minimally required to different degrees. What factors 
influences these municipalities and organizations’ ability to manage flood risk should be 
kept separate from baseline response capacity or, if viewed as a mathematical equation, an 
addition to the baseline response capacity where baseline response capacity remains a 
constant. 
Fundamental to the concept of institutional response capacity—which exceeds 
minimum requirements—is institutional behaviour and collective action. The former refers 
to “individual behaviour [that] can be simply aggregated into collective phenomena, thus 
yielding the behaviour of institutions amenable to explanation simply by reference to the 
preferences of the individuals that compose that institution” (Burch, 2009, 180). How an 
institution prioritizes items affects how much investment is placed on any given item. In 
other words, the response capacity of an institution is influenced by competing priorities. 
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The lower flood management is as a priority results in a smaller financial investment and, 
thus, reducing the response capacity of an institution on flood management. 
This claim is evident in a comparison of the City of Vancouver and District of 
Maple Ridge. The results of the Q analysis show that competing priorities affect investment 
in flood management (see Table 13). Such findings are consistent with interview data. In 
the study sites, participants agreed that flood management is a high priority, but other 
priorities, such as transit, economic development, and environmental conservation, can 
deter focus on and investment in flood response as was particularly the case in the District 
of Maple Ridge. As one interviewed participant in the study explains, governments have 
to balance response with other priorities. As a result, competing priorities can inhibit action 
by deterring investment or focus on issues that are not as high of a priority as others. 
Table 13: Results for Items 12-15 of the Q-sort analysis 
Item Factor (factor array) 
12. Success of flood management is dependent on or will 
increase depending on competing priorities elsewhere that 
put less emphasis on and investment in flood management. 
Factor 1 (1) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (2) 
13. Economic and relating activities, such as tourism, are 
controls on updating existing infrastructure. 
Factor 1 (0) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (1) 
14. Flood management and initiatives that focus on reducing 
the impacts if a flood occurs are a high priority within your 
municipal boundaries and/or in your profession. 
Factor 1 (4) 
Factor 2 (4) 
Factor 3 (1) 
15. Flood management is the top priority in the region, 
above, for example, transit, economic activity, and 
environmental conservation. 
Factor 1 (-2) 
Factor 2 (-1) 
Factor 3 (-3) 
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 Similar to the discussion in the last section, collective agreements can increase 
response capacity to floods by mandating action on particular issues. They can force 
response by prioritizing items in which response beyond provincial legislation is voluntary. 
For example, the Metro Vancouver 2040 was adopted by 21 municipalities in 2011 as a 
regional growth strategy, representing a “collective vision” for accommodating population 
growth. It contains strategies relating to urban development, regional economy, the 
environment and climate change, housing, and land use and transportation (Metro 
Vancouver, 2015). Under Section 3.4.1 of Metro Vancouver 2040, risk assessments are to 
be incorporated “into the planning and location of Metro Vancouver utilities, assets and 
operations” (42). For municipalities, they must adopt Regional Context Statements 
outlining policies that promote settlement in areas while minimizing risk associated with 
natural hazards and they must also consider using risk assessments in planning. 
 Therefore, what can be concluded here is two-fold. First, the Metro Vancouver 
2040 is a reflection of emergency management response capacity exceeding baseline 
requirements as it recognizes emergency management from a risk-mitigation standpoint as 
a primary objective in the region as the population continues to grow. As it was identified 
in the previous section of this Chapter, by recognizing climate change and the need for 
disaster risk reduction, the response capacity of an institution is greater than those that do 
not recognize the issue because a region will not plan or prioritize if they believe that 
response is not necessary. Recognizing the issue can make it a priority. As several 
interviewed participants explained, the flood management response in the City of 
Vancouver has, in large part, resulted because the municipality believes that potential 
flooding is an issue that endangers the population, assets and operations within the city. 
This is consistent with findings by Burch (2009), Lawrence & Suddaby (2006), and 
DiMaggio (1988) regarding institutional theory. As Burch (2009) explains, “organized 
actors with resources may significantly impact the structure and function of institutions by 
utilizing strategies such as lobbying or leadership. […] Strategies are revealed by which 
actors may guide the evolution of institutions” (181). The behaviour of individuals within 
the institutions have made flood management a priority for the municipality. The focus on 
and investment in flood management will be dependent on where this issue stands as a 
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priority when compared with other concerns and responsibilities as determined by 
institutional behaviour. 
Second, similar to the previous section, the wording of the regional growth strategy 
is open to interpretation as to the degree to which risk assessments in planning are used. 
Risk assessments are powerful tools in planning as they can provide the basis for 
formulating strategies that align with the values of the region while mitigating the impacts 
that disasters could have. As Adger (2006) explains, vulnerability assessments challenge 
“the design of good governance to promote resilience to minimize exclusion thereby 
reducing the severity of perceived vulnerability and its structural causes” (276). They 
spatially allow practitioners and government to identify areas at highest risk for flooding 
and populations where the greatest impacts may be experienced. It reflects response 
capacity by reducing uncertainty for areas at greatest risk, thereby, providing a framework 
for the strategic development and implementation of responses.  
The other major components in this section regarding institutional behaviour and 
collective action are the concepts of group cohesion and collaboration. Group cohesion 
refers to factors influencing group performance among a diverse group of individuals 
(Harrison, Price & Bell, 1998). In Chansler, Swamidass & Cammann (2003), the authors 
concluded that poor cohesion can lead to reduced performance.  
In the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge, interviewed participants and 
the results of the Q analysis indicated that although participants believe flood management 
should be the responsibility of a different level of government, communication among 
departments within organizations and among organizations, and strong collaboration with 
the province are major factors in the region’s current state of flood management. It was 
evident in these interviews that a lack of cohesion internally could disrupt flood 
management response as issues pertaining to the appropriate course of action, the resources 
that should be allocated, and debates over whether or not flooding is within that 
organization’s purview, could become a major factor in preventing flood response.  
That said, it was also evident in the District of Maple Ridge that miscommunication 
between senior officials within organizations and their staffs have produced a 
misconception regarding the need for greater flood response. The interview data shows 
several staff members in an organization discussing the need for greater flood response; 
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however, when discussing the current state of flood response with more senior ranking 
officials within this organization they mention only minor issues that need to be addressed, 
their perception overall remains that the current state of flood management in the region 
does not require major revisions. As one participant in the District of Maple stated,  
I would say this community is pretty solid in terms of flood risk. I do not think we really 
have to make that a big consideration. Like the areas that we are at risk to flood—like 
I’m talking about the Fraser now—I do not think we are particularly. I think that we 
have kind of built that into the way that the community has been built. I do not think 
there are any areas that could flood where we would be going.  
The results of the Q analysis are consistent with this claim. Approximately one-third of the 
participants gave a negative score to Item 23—our flood management approach has been 
very successful here and can be seen as a leader for others to follow—indicating that the 
overall perception on flood management in this region is diverse, which can ultimately 
influence flood response as discussed. In fact, the results of the Q analysis for Item 21 
further indicates that a disconnect among staff may exist. Factor 3’s factor array for Item 
21 is 2, which corroborates the above claim regarding a disconnect; however, Factor 1’s 
factor array of -2 shows the opposite. Factor 1’s position supports interview data in the 
City of Vancouver as participants indicated strong cohesion among staff, other 
organizations and council, whereas several participants in the District of Maple Ridge 
argued that disconnect in the region exists, thereby effecting flood response (consistent 
with Factor 3).8 
Therefore, an organization’s cohesion internally, among various organizations and 
levels of government, act as a control mechanism in response capacity as it influences 
institutional behaviour. The ability to respond to flood risk can decrease as tensions 
increase and information is miscommunicated among these actors.  
Institutional response capacity exceeding provincial legislation is, therefore, a function 
of institutional behaviour and collective action as dictated through competing priorities, 
collective agreements, group cohesion and collaboration. Together, they provide a key part 
of the foundation for institutional response capacity by accepting the responsibility for 
                                                 
8
 Factor 2’s factor array of 0 does not provide any indication to whether or not disconnect exists as this 
Factor’s view is that it neither agrees or disagrees or it is unsure whether disconnect is present.  
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flood management exceeding baseline requirements. Institutional behaviour is an 
important factor in evaluating response capacity, but it represents only part of the system 
comprised of interrelating variables. 
4.4 Technological Pathways 
How an institution recognizes the risk of flooding, combined with the characteristics of the 
region, influences the orientation of responses and can limit options for response, which, 
in turn, may adversely affect the region’s ability to respond to flood risk. As Burch (2009) 
explains, there has been a recent shift in technological pathway research that recognizes 
the role of cultures, perceptions and institutions in decision-making with regards to the type 
and extent of response. The purpose of this section is to present technological pathways of 
flood response as influenced by culture and land use, making clear connections with the 
way these pathways relate to response capacity to floods. 
 As it relates to decision-making on the type and extent of flood response, the 
cultural values of a region play an important role. Elected officials are representatives of 
the people. They make sure the wants and needs of the people are being met while ensuring 
that cultural values are maintained. As one participant explains, regarding the response in 
the City of Vancouver, 
Vancouver has traditionally had a very ‘Green’ attitude. You know, we are very proud 
of our parks and outdoor spaces, sea-wall, and Stanley Park and whatnot, so I think that 
carries through with flood work, that we don’t want to diminish any aesthetics of our 
city and they want to make sure what measures are put forward are still ‘Green’.  
In the District of Maple Ridge, the Official Community Plan (2014) suggests that one of 
the priorities of the region is to maintain Maple Ridge’s unique identity as it relates to the 
environment. As several participants noted, inputting infrastructure that would impinge on 
the values of the region, even though it would increase protection from floods, is not 
necessarily the best course of action. Planners and decision-makers must work together to 
find a solution that increases flood protection while not impinging on those values. 
Therefore, cultural values act as a control on response capacity as it aids in dictating how 
responses are developed and decided on.  
 Urban development is another major component influencing technological 
pathways of response capacity to floods. It is evident in this study that highly developed 
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areas with limited space to expand are more likely to have technological/infrastructure 
related responses as the population grows compared to areas where space for urban 
expansion is greater. This is not to say that highly developed areas, like the City of 
Vancouver, do not explore and utilize a diverse range of options that include land use 
planning responses, but when it comes to protecting the population and assets of the region 
technological solutions are more likely than social responses (see Table 14). As another 
participant stated,  
Some areas may not have technologies built to be clear. It is not just looking at 
infrastructure. The City is looking at the full range of approaches—and emergency 
management and response, building construction—those are all things that are definitely 
on the table. Planning tools are definitely on the table. For us it is a little challenging in 
that most of the city is built out, so retreat takes a long time. 
 
In the District of Maple Ridge, with urban development continuing, land use planning and 
more socially-oriented responses are able to be included in flood management practices 
because the space is there to make these types of decisions. As one participant explained, 
they can implement the necessary infrastructure without having to remove existing 
infrastructure that is out-of-date or they can designate areas for different land uses in order 
to minimize vulnerable populations before they can become highly vulnerable based on 
where they live. It is in these developing areas where infrastructure design and other 
technological responses become the primary way to respond to mitigate risk. 
 Again, the argument being made here is not that highly developed areas are more 
likely to seek out technological responses to mitigate potential flood impacts; rather, major 
responses that exist in these areas are more likely to be technologically-based due to the 
degree of mitigation impact and the fact that infrastructure is likely already in place. It 
influences response capacity because it controls what response occurs and how response is 
developed. What is concluded in this section of the Chapter is that culture and urban 
characteristics can influence institutional behaviour and, therefore, responses. As Burch 
(2009) stated, with reference to Anderson (1998) and Arthur (1989), “the institutional and 
cultural contexts within which innovation occurs are of equal importance to the 
technologies themselves and represent path dependent trajectories, which are not easily re-
oriented” (180). 
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Table 14: Results of Q analysis for Items 16-17 
Item Factor (factor array) 
16. Response to reduce flood impacts are 
primarily based on technology with some 
social components. 
Factor 1 (0) 
Factor 2 (-2) 
Factor 3 (2) 
17. Responses to flooding are primarily 
based on social approaches (land use 
designations) with some technological 
components. 
Factor 1 (0) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (-3) 
4.5 Institutional Behaviour and Resource Management 
As it has been alluded to in all previous sections of this Chapter, resources are critical to 
response capacity. It is through resource management that institutional responses are 
developed, decided on, implemented and maintained. As Mitchell (2002) defines it, 
resource management is “the capacity to control, handle or direct” how resources are 
allocated and used (6). It can include action and decisions pertaining to “money, materials, 
staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organization in order to function 
effectively” (Oxford Dictionary, 2015).  
Response capacity is, in part, a function of resource availability as controlled 
through resource management. How resources are managed depends on institutional 
behaviour as dictated by priorities.  With tight budgets and a host of duties to fulfill, 
resources within organizations have to be carefully managed. For example, municipalities 
in British Columbia receive 8 cents of every dollar paid to the government which is 
inadequate to allow municipalities to address all issues at once and develop a perfect 
system. As one participant states, “for municipalities to shoulder the burden of massive 
environmental catastrophe is very challenging. Unfortunately the way it works is that the 
federal government, if there is a flood, they will come and help you financially, but they 
will not help you prevent the damage from a flood.” Municipal ability to respond is affected 
by the resources that they have available to them.  
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At times, institutions have not had the resources available to properly handle flood 
management responses. As several participants explained, in the District of Maple Ridge 
there are several dykes that need to be fixed; however, the municipality is not equipped to 
handle such projects. As one participant stated,  
The modelling on the Fraser River has changed. So they came out with one that said 
‘you have to raise the dykes by half a meter’ and the next one says ‘oh, well they need 
another half of a meter.’ It’s like when is it going to stop. Unfortunately, that model 
keeps making a worse and worse case scenario, but we are not catching up with raising 
the dykes. Raising the dykes in the Albion area is like a $20 million endeavor. It’s not 
going to happen. 
It exposes the reality of the situation, that the ability to respond to flood risk is a function 
of the available resources. Without the resources—whether it be money, materials, staff, 
or other assets—the ability to invest in developing, implementing and maintaining flood 
initiatives becomes constrained.  
As another participant stated in the City of Vancouver, “I would say by far, in a 
way, the single biggest barrier to investment is how we are feeling about climate change 
which is a very hard thing to write a policy to overcome and then right after that would be 
just competing priorities for municipal dollars.” What it comes down to is where flood 
management is as a priority within an organization and the available resources for any 
given project. The priority of flood response will dictate how much is invested.  
Therefore, response capacity to floods is, in part, a function of available resources as it 
dictates the degree of response that can occur. As such, municipalities have to assess the 
risk, compare the need to act with other priorities and make a decision as to how much of 
their resources they can afford to spend on flood management given a flood might not even 
occur. It is a complex system that involves government weighing many different factors 
(see Chapter 5).  
4.6 Conclusion 
The literature review, interview data and Q analysis findings indicate that legislation, 
institutional behaviour, technological pathways, and resource management are major 
factors affecting response capacity. The jurisdiction over land, water, and environmental 
issues within provincial boundaries allows a province to determine a baseline response 
capacity to floods by mandating a precise or imprecise (or no) standard in emergency 
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management practices. While the province can establish a baseline response capacity to 
floods, institutional response capacity will vary from region to region, but the factors 
influencing their abilities to respond to flood risk remain consistent.  
As it has been reiterated time and again in this paper, municipal governments are 
representatives of and for the people. Their political platforms are a reflection of the wants 
and needs of the public as voted on through an electoral system.  As such, the priorities of 
local governments are a reflection of the wants, needs, and values of the public. Literature 
on the politics of disaster risk reduction has argued that political conflict in disaster risk 
reduction policy is the result of differences of stakeholders’ interests, jurisdictional conflict 
between levels of government, and citizens as ‘aggressive consumers’ of policy (Prater & 
Lindell, 2000). In fact, some researchers assert the claim that local governments often reject 
adopting risk reduction strategies due to liability concerns (see Chapter 3), competing 
priorities, and disruption of cultural values favouring aesthetics (Prater & Lindell, 2000; 
Burby & French, 1981; Burby et al., 1985). 
It is evident in this Chapter that institutional response capacity is a function of 
interacting variables. Changes to any one of these variables could impact a region’s overall 
ability to manage risk. With limited resources, tight budgets, many responsibilities, 
changing environmental conditions and urban growth, understanding the interactions that 
affect institutional response capacity remains an important aspect of flood response and 
research. As one participant noted on flood management practices in the District of Maple 
Ridge, 
I think one of the biggest issues related to flooding is the limited resources and attention 
given by senior governments to the issue and more and more downloading the 
responsibility to local governments with their limited resources, time and talents for 
such a task.  Maple Ridge is influenced by a number local rivers that in themselves have 
significant flood issues that are not well understood or documented. The occurrences of 
significant storm events is increasing significantly each year.  It is not uncommon now 
in any winter to experience not just one but multiple 1 in 100 year storm 
events.  Development continues to be allowed in the region on all flood plain protected 
by dykes that are both public and privately managed, some of which are 
probably inadequate to the task. 
 
It is evident that there are clearly some issues between levels of government, each 
having limited resources that impact the effective management of risk. The questions now 
become: when does response capacity lead to action knowing that it is, in large part, 
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controlled by competing priorities and resource management; and how can response 
capacity to floods increase so that the effectiveness of flood management in regions can 
too increase? 
5 Municipal Priorities Dictating Flood Response 
5.1 Introduction 
To recall, response capacity to floods, exceeding baseline requirements, is a function of 
institutional behaviour, collective action, technological pathways and resource 
management; however, having a high response capacity does not necessarily lead to action. 
Action is the result of institutional behaviour as dictated by competing priorities within an 
organization or institution. The priority that an issue is given by the organization or 
institution will determine whether or not action takes place. If an issue is recognized as 
needing action that exceeds the minimum requirements set in legislation then the degree of 
action will depend on how the need for action for this priority compares to other priorities 
as prioritization will determine the amount of resources allocated.  
Institutions and organizations have a responsibility to their stakeholders. For many 
organizations, that responsibility is to maximize revenues for the benefit of investors and 
the company (Jones, 2001). For municipalities, their responsibilities and duties are vast, 
requiring decision-makers to evaluate the wants and needs of the city and their individual 
objectives in determining the appropriate course of action. Evidence from the literature 
review, interview data and Q analysis shows that competing priorities act as a control 
mechanism for action in terms of timing, resource management and response capacity.  
Establishing priorities within these institutions is complex, involving many interacting 
variables. It is through public concerns and advocacy, risk, vulnerability and uncertainty, 
politics and collective agreements, that municipal priorities are influenced and the degree 
of action is determined. 
 In Chapter 3, it is evident that responsibility and liability exposure have influenced 
decision-making in emergency management and, subsequently, flood management. In 
Chapter 4, evidence from this research and others is presented to discuss factors influencing 
response capacity, including institutional behaviour through competing priorities. What 
remains absent in these chapters are the factors which influence institutional priorities 
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requiring action that exceeds minimum requirements. As responsibility and liability in 
emergency management have already been discussed in Chapter 3, and collective 
agreements in mandating institutional attention were discussed in Chapter 49, the emphasis 
of this Chapter is on additional factors influencing institutional priorities that, ultimately, 
dictate action beyond baseline requirements and collective agreements. In this Chapter, this 
paper argues that flood response is, in part, a function of resource management that is 
determined by institutional priorities. The purpose of this Chapter is to identify and discuss: 
1. The role of the public in setting municipal priorities through cultural values and 
collective action; 
2. The link between uncertainty, risk and vulnerability in establishing municipal 
priorities; and 
3. The influence of politics and re-election on investment in and focus on flood 
management. 
5.2 The Role of the Public 
One of the most critical factors influencing institutional priorities is public advocacy for 
action. Public behaviour has the ability to influence policy and practices through collective 
action. High advocacy on an issue can force institutions to examine their current position 
on the matter and re-evaluate their approach. Past research suggests that collective action 
in the public sphere can affect environmental management by influencing public policies 
through environmental citizenship and the support or acceptance of public policies (Stern, 
2002; Jamison, 2010). As Stern (2002) notes, individual behaviour for action is less 
influential on public policies and practices than collective movements. The author further 
notes that the influence on public policies and practices can change the behaviour of 
individuals, groups and organizations. 
In Canada, municipalities are representatives of the people and operate in the 
interests of their community’s wants, needs and values. As such, the public can aid in 
establishing municipal priorities through collective action. By pressuring practitioners and 
                                                 
9
 See pages 79 & 80 of Chapter 4, Development Pathways of Response Capacity to Floods. 
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government, action can be facilitated by mandating priorities. In fact, current investment 
in and focus on floods in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge are, in part, 
the result of the public’s concern for the need for action. As one participant explains, “[the 
City of Vancouver] routinely gets in the high 80 percentage points for support on the 
Greenest City Action Plan and climate adaptation is even higher than that still, so obviously 
it is something people want to see the City working to address.”  
The results of the Q analysis reinforce this position as Factors 1 and 2 view public 
concern and advocacy for flood management as a major driver for action exceeding 
provincial and federal legislation (Item 2). Factor 3 yielded a score of -1, which suggests 
that the overall influence of public concern/advocacy for action has less influence on 
developing and implementing flood response than other drivers. This is not to say that the 
collective action on flood response has no influence on action in the view of this group, but 
that it tends not to be the dominant influencing driver. In fact, all interviewed participants 
and Factors of the Q analysis suggest that greater public pressure on practitioners and 
government will lead to more successful flood management practices (see Table 15).  
Table 15: Results of Q analysis for Items 2, 8, 11 & 19 
Item Factor (factor array) 
2. The major driver for developing and 
implementing flood management 
initiatives exceeding provincial and 
federal legislation is public 
concern/advocacy for flood management. 
Factor 1 (2) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (-1) 
8. Successful flood management is 
dependent on or will increase with public 
pressure on local practitioners and on 
government for increased action. 
Factor 1 (2) 
Factor 2 (1) 
Factor 3 (2) 
11. Success of flood management is 
dependent on or will increase with having 
an engaged community and a community 
voicing their concerns towards flooding. 
Factor 1 (4) 
Factor 2 (3) 
Factor 3 (2) 
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19. The public/community is not or has 
not expressed concerns about 
flooding since the 2010 election. 
Factor 1 (-3) 
Factor 2 (-3) 
Factor 3 (-2) 
 
Even so, as this paper has noted previously, institutions, including municipalities, 
have to balance resources with many responsibilities and other priorities. As a result, what 
the public views as the most pressing issues requiring immediate attention will be given 
higher priority, which affects investment in and focus on other priorities, including flood 
management. As one interviewed participant stated regarding competing priorities and 
operating in the District of Maple Ridge,  
It definitely has an impact. You know we’ve got the Golden Ears Park up here, one of 
the busiest parks in the lower mainland during the summer. You are stupid to do any 
road work on the way to the park during the summer. […] You have all this traffic. 
Thursday is the worst day. That is the mother with the kids screaming, pulling the fifth 
wheel up there to get a campsite. Don’t even think about working on the way to the park 
on Thursday. 
It is evident here that competing priorities have the ability to inhibit action, not just through 
investment in or focus on, but when and where action can take place which is controlled, 
at least in part, by the public. 
 Priorities are not a constant, rather they shift over time. What the public values 
affects the priorities of government. As priorities shift, investment in and focus on such 
priorities will also shift. As another participant explains regarding the District of Maple 
Ridge,  
What is a priority one year is not necessarily a priority the next. Priorities shift. Right 
now, I think we are more focused than we were on economic sustainability [which] 
relies on having a healthy local economy. […] The creation of local jobs is a huge part 
of what we need to do to help our environment. […] The priority is to build a balance, 
healthy, sustainable community. What we need to do at any given time changes to try 
and hit that target. Where our needs are and where our gaps are changes. It changes with 
the economy. It changes with the reality. 
 
In the City of Vancouver, participants emphasized when the public’s concern for 
flood action is highest and when their voices are the loudest on the issue. Financially, flood 
management is a high priority according to participants, but as a day-to-day matter that 
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people worry about, it is not something that people are very concerned with. As one 
participant stated, “People worry about: how much they are paying for housing; are their 
children looked after; are they going to a job during the day or school or whatever it is that 
they want to be; increasingly, are my parents looked after if they are seniors; and then 
transit.” When it comes to flood management, “people tend not to prioritize things that are 
working well even though they may value it.” 
 In the District of Maple Ridge, several interviewed participants noted that public 
concern over flooding remains minimal and that it is only after the Fraser River water levels 
are high that a few people start to initiate discussion with the City. In fact, these participants 
argued that public concern and advocacy for flood management tended to be highest when 
a flood in the area had occurred and, ultimately, this has affected the behaviour of the 
municipality. The municipality’s attention to and investment have fluctuated with the 
public’s stance on the issue. 
Attention to public problems increase when events exploit failures in practice (True et 
al., 2008; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Light, 1982; Walker, 1977). Such an incident is 
known as a ‘focusing event’. As Birkland (1998) explains, a focusing event is an event that 
is sudden, relatively uncommon, defined as harmful or has the possibility to be harmful, 
and is known to the public and policy-makers simultaneously. Past research by 
Baumgartner & Jones (1993) and others have found that following a focusing event, 
interest groups, government leaders, media and/or members of the public pay greater 
attention to problems that highlight a failure of policy for the purpose of developing an 
active search for solutions that would lead to policy change (Birkland, 1998).  
Concern over issues become something that the public prioritizes when a perceived 
threat becomes a reality. Consistent with findings made by Baumgartner & Jones (1993), 
Kingdon (1995) and Birkland (1998), interviewed participants in this study stated that 
following the 2008 flood, there was greater public concern and advocacy for better flood 
management practices. Although attention to flood management dissipated over a short 
period and focus on flood management in government shifted in response to the public’s 
concern, it is evident that it was not until a perceived threat became a reality that public 
scrutiny over the governance of that issue was brought to bear. Focusing events have an 
impact on institutional priorities as stakeholders want to be protected and the failure of 
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existing policy and practices show the public that their needs are not being met to the degree 
of satisfaction that they require. It is when these events occur that the public’s voices tend 
to be loudest. This is not to say that flood response is not a priority currently within these 
institutions; rather, the focus on and investment in flood response tends to be partially 
reflective of the public’s behaviour.  
Municipal priorities, therefore, are a function of the public’s behaviour on issues. When 
the public is able to see first-hand what issues are present in the community, their advocacy 
on those issues tends to be higher. This is fundamental to understanding why public 
concern on flood action is typically at its highest following a focusing event. The reality is 
that the public does not necessarily know or recognize their vulnerability until a disaster 
happens because it becomes difficult to analyze the effectiveness of current practices and 
policy without an event. Without the direct impacts being visible to the public, their 
behaviour on the issue tends to be reduced and so does focus on flooding within 
government. Therefore, what can be concluded from the data is that collective action can 
facilitate or inhibit action by controlling competing priorities and, thus, resource 
management. 
5.3 Risk, Vulnerability and Uncertainty 
5.3.1 Risk and Vulnerability 
The second major factor influencing municipal prioritization of flood action that will be 
discussed in this Chapter is risk and vulnerability to a flood event. Risk is often referred to 
as the product of a hazard’s probability of occurrence and its consequences (Birkmann, 
2007). As Birkmann (2007) explains, “risk can be viewed as a function of the hazard event 
and the vulnerability of the elements exposed” (21). Vulnerability, as defined earlier as 
“the potential for loss” (Cutter, 1996, 529), can be viewed as an inherent characteristic of 
a system (Birkmann, 2007). Together, risk and vulnerability are integral in disaster risk 
reduction action as they provide the foundation warranting action. Without risk or 
vulnerability action is not necessary. As the findings from this research will show, 
questions surrounding whether or not risk and vulnerability exist remain absent; however, 
the question becomes whether or not the risk and vulnerability present warrant action. As 
one participant noted, 
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The two big factors [for action] are the likelihood of something happening and 
severity/repercussions/downside if it does happen. Low likelihood and severity then we 
do not have to worry about it. If it is a high-high then it is a no brainer, we have deal 
with it. It is when you get that low-high mix that we get differences in opinions. 
It is up to decision-makers to evaluate the region’s risk and vulnerability, knowing that 
high risk does not necessarily mean high vulnerability, and determine whether the current 
risk and vulnerability is acceptable to not act or should immediate action take place and, if 
so, the degree of that action. 
The results of the Q analysis suggests that the risk of climate change and its disaster-
related effects on people and the economy motivates municipalities to address disaster risk 
reduction. Factors 1 and 3’s scores for Item 1 and Item 3 suggest an association between 
risk and action (see Table 16). In the City of Vancouver, interviewed participants argued 
that by knowing that various models suggest the region is vulnerable to flooding caused, 
primarily, by sea-level rise and more frequent and intense storm surges as the result of 
climate change has motivated the City to act. In part, it facilitates action by making flood 
management a municipal priority. These interviewed participants went further in 
suggesting that climate change and its potential impacts are the most influential drivers in 
promoting action beyond provincial and federal legislation. 
In the District of Maple Ridge, interviewed participants sported the claim that the 
risk of a flood event is a major driver for action. They argued that safety of the public is 
the most important priority when it comes to flooding. The fact that there is risk of flooding 
which ultimately poses a threat to the safety and well-being of the population puts flood 
management on the political agenda. As one participant explained, “People sleeping in bed 
drowning is not a good scenario. A business getting wet at night, okay, yeah a lot of money 
but less life. Life is high on the list; property not as high. So it really helps with 
prioritizing.”  
 
 
 
82 
 
Table 16: Results of Q analysis for Items 1 & 3 
Item Factor (factor array) 
1. The major driver for developing and 
implementing flood management 
initiatives exceeding provincial and 
federal legislation is climate change and 
impacts from storm surges, sea-level rise, 
and/or spring snowmelt. 
Factor 1 (4) 
Factor 2 (-3) 
Factor 3 (2) 
3. The major driver for developing and 
implementing flood management 
initiatives exceeding provincial and 
federal legislation is the potential 
economic impact that a flood could have 
on the city or business.  
Factor 1 (2) 
Factor 2 (3) 
Factor 3 (2) 
 Institutions will use a number of tools to aid discussions surrounding risk, 
vulnerability and action, including forecasting models, history, and risk and vulnerability 
assessments. The use of forecasting models and the history of flood events in the region 
have assisted discussions surrounding the need for action. For example, the District of 
Maple Ridge is further inland and, thus, does not have to worry about overland flow 
encroaching as the result of sea-level rise.  Instead, focus has been on the annual freshet 
snowmelt further up the Fraser River and potential severe weather-related events. 
Historically, the area has not experienced a major flood event since 1948 (200 year event). 
As several participants explained, this has been used to fuel differences in opinion among 
decision-makers regarding the likelihood of a major flood event happening, the severity of 
that potential event and, thus, the need for action. In the City of Vancouver, the 
municipality’s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2012) set out a need to conduct a 
coastal flood risk assessment, including the types and severity of impacts that would likely 
occur through storm surge and sea-level rise. Through this assessment the municipality has 
recognized that the results of various models and extreme scenarios present a range of risk 
to the region for which the costs to not act, given that these models are correct, is too great. 
With the population of the city growing, emphasis on protecting the public in the event of 
a flood has become a priority.  
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In both study locations, the use of forecasting models and the history of floods in 
the region have been critical in determining flood action. Where these two regions’ 
approaches differ is in the value that forecasting models versus the history of floods in the 
area have on local flood response. The City of Vancouver emphasized forecasting models 
as the main motivation for local response, whereas the District of Maple Ridge, although 
they value and use forecasting models in their approach, the history of floods in the area 
has weighed more heavily in the attention and investment in flood response. Although the 
actual degree to which each of these tools influenced decision-making on flood action 
remains incomplete here, it is evident that risk and vulnerability are being measured to 
determine if action is needed. 
5.3.2 Uncertainty 
The other major component influencing priorities and action as it relates to risk and 
vulnerability is centered on uncertainty. The uncertainty of when and where an event will 
occur and the intensity of the event is integral to decision-makers in prioritizing issues. 
Decision-makers examine uncertainty to assess the degree of risk requiring action and 
whether or not action can be delayed. As one participant stated,  
Uncertainty is more around the details and stuff and I don’t think municipalities 
care so much about the fact that we don’t know whether sea-levels are going to rise 
by 20 centimeters or 30 centimeters—that’s not the uncertainty. The uncertainty 
that concerns municipalities in terms of their lack of action is we don’t know when 
it is going to happen or where it is going to occur; that is the bigger issue for 
municipalities. 
As other interviewed participants explained, uncertainty leads to differences in opinions in 
terms of whether or not to act, where to act and how to act. As Donahue and Joyce (2001) 
argue, local governments worry about existing issues; the uncertainty of future events and 
the limited financial resources inhibit municipal action in developing, discussing, and 
implementing solutions to concerns, such as flooding. Reinforcing these findings, the 
results of the Q analysis shows that uncertainty does affect investment in flood 
management initiatives (see Table 17). With greater uncertainty, participants argued that 
flood management becomes less of a priority than issues where the impacts can already be 
seen or are more readily apparent. Similar to the argument made in the previous section on 
public behaviour, it is not until a disaster occurs that municipalities focus more on flood 
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action. As the quoted participant above further stated, “It is not a priority until it is 
happening and then it is too late.” 
Table 17: Results of Q analysis for Item 20 
Item Factor (factor array) 
20. The uncertainty of floods—in terms of 
when, where and intensity—and frequent 
changes to recommendations on how to 
reduce impacts of flooding deter 
investment in flood management and 
more towards other high priority projects. 
Factor 1 (1) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (2) 
 
Risk and vulnerability are integral to prioritizing issues in a municipality. They act 
as drivers for and controls on action that interact with a number of variables. For action to 
result, municipalities must recognize that the risk of an event and the vulnerability to its 
impacts are great enough to cause action—that a threshold for acceptable risk without 
action has been breached. As described by participants, this is usually determined through 
cost-benefit analyses, but other information tools are clearly evident in the decision-making 
process. Although municipal focus on floods tends to be highest when risk becomes a 
reality, it has not prevented action in the absence of an event in the City of Vancouver and 
District of Maple Ridge. It is clear in these two cities that proactive measures are being 
taken in the event that a flood may occur. It has been recognized by the municipalities that 
the choice to not act could be detrimental to the city and its citizens. Therefore, municipal 
priority-setting is, in part, a balancing of risk, vulnerability and uncertainty. With greater 
risk and vulnerability, issues tend to be a higher priority. The question now becomes what 
is the role of decision-makers in priority-setting, given their personal goals/objectives. 
5.4 Politics and Prioritizing Flood Action 
5.4.1 Political Cycle 
In British Columbia, local elections for mayor and council have to be held every four years 
as required under the Local Government Act. Elections are a time for municipal leaders to 
raise awareness on the concerns of the public and address their plans to ensure that the 
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wants, needs and values of the public are kept. During the time of election, however, 
emphasis on flood management in campaigning tends to be pushed aside. Despite flood 
management being a high priority, during ‘election season’ candidates’ campaign on other 
issues where evidence of their past success on other relevant issues can be seen or on issues 
where there is the greatest ongoing debate. As one participant explains, there is little 
emphasis on flood management in campaigning, in part, because “nobody cares” about 
how much is spent on flood management even though the “single largest allocation in the 
Capital Plan is flood management related.” This participant further stated, “people will 
argue over the $3 million for whatever bike related infrastructure is in [the Capital Plan], 
but the $325 million for the sewage upgrades is like ‘meh. Whatever. Fine. Sure.’” The 
reality is candidates focus on the issues where there is the greatest public debate because 
these are the issues that the public really wants something to be done and it is what will 
determine winners in elections. Why campaign about the problems of the current flood 
management policy and practices if the public does not think that the system is broken?  
In the District of Maple Ridge, a participant viewed the current flood management 
system as successful, emphasizing the major issues in the area relate to post-secondary 
education, mental health and policing. Another participant discussed tourism and that dyke 
maintenance is done in advance of the “busy season” in coordination with park managers 
because the tourism industry is a high economic priority in the area. A third participant 
argued that work on flood management is really controlled by shifting politics as it 
determines the amount of resources that will be allocated to fund different projects. In all 
three interviews, emphasis was on the effects of competing priorities which take away from 
the need for and investment in flood management; instead, the emphasis rests on the key 
issues being debated. 
As was described earlier, public awareness and advocacy for more focus on and 
investment in flood management is highest post-disaster—also known as a focusing event 
(True et al., 2008; Jensen, 2010; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 
2008). This is due in large part to the realization by the public that the current emergency 
management system is ‘flawed’ and ‘should be’ better; however, it escapes most political 
campaigns in the absence of these events because it is not until an event occurs that the 
effectiveness of the emergency management system can really be evaluated and used to 
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promote or leverage a candidate’s campaign. In the Q-sort of this study, participants were 
asked to provide their view on the dependency of flood management action in relation to 
the political cycle (Item 10). The results can be seen in Table 18 below. All three Factors 
viewed the political cycle as having an influence on flood management action. It supports 
the claims made by interviewed participants—that flood management falls into the 
background at certain times in political cycles, most notably during elections, and that the 
politics of re-election is a reflection of other municipal priorities.  
Table 18: Results of Q analysis of Item 10 
Item Factor (factor array) 
10. Flood management initiatives are 
dependent on the political cycle. 
Factor 1 (1) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (4) 
5.4.2 Champions for Action 
The downloading of responsibility and acceptance of that responsibility for emergency 
management by municipal governments are critical in establishing municipal priorities. 
Although municipalities are required to address emergency management under the 
Emergency Program Act, response exceeding provincial legislation is directly affected by 
the degree of willingness to accept that responsibility. A municipal government’s 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for emergency and flood management translates into 
resources allocated to address the matter only to what is necessary to meet minimum 
requirements. As the majority of interviewed participants noted, flood management action 
is highly dependent on council recognizing that flooding is an issue that needs to be 
addressed, even if the view is that efforts to mitigate flood risk should be the province’s 
responsibility. As one participant stated, “it really does come down to 1 or 2 champions, 
whether it is citizen champions or someone on staff, who decides this is their issue.” If a 
municipal government does not recognize that flooding is their responsibility, then the 
resources allocated to address it will be minimal.  
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In the City of Vancouver, interviewed participants noted that it was council’s acceptance 
of the need for climate change adaptation and, subsequently, flood management that has 
increased action. By accepting that responsibility and investing in flood management, the 
municipal government prioritizes the issue. As the four interviewed participants in the City 
of Vancouver argued, residents in the city have been concerned about the environment, 
their natural environment, and, increasingly, toxins and climate, which has translated into 
municipal action. From the municipality’s perspective, these are issues that the public 
wants to see their government working on. The government’s willingness to accept an issue 
as their responsibility makes it a priority in the region. Again, this returns to the public’s 
behaviour in establishing municipal priorities, but what is being noted here is that there is 
a relationship that exists between the public behaviour and politics.  
 In the District of Maple Ridge, several participants concurred with the above 
argument, stating that the council’s willingness to accept responsibility for a potential 
threat to the city is fundamental to municipal priority-setting and, thus, resource 
management. What became evident in these interviews is that changes in government have 
resulted in a fluctuation in government focus on and investment in flood management over 
time as different players have different objectives and political platforms. Where the 
District of Maple Ridge differs from the City of Vancouver is in the recognition and 
acceptance that the current flood management system needs to be revised. Contradictory 
views were expressed by several participants in the District of Maple Ridge with respect 
to the need to invest more and pay greater attention to the changing environmental 
conditions to which the area will be exposed. One participant went as far as to say that the 
current state of flood management in the District of Maple Ridge is good because they have 
not experienced a flood in a long period of time, but where the major issues of the area are 
is in post-secondary education and mental illness. This is consistent with the views 
expressed by other participants in the area that although they believe that there is a need 
for greater attention and investment in flood management, they perceive that others in 
management within various organizations, businesses, and the municipality do not 
necessarily agree and this can be seen in the area’s current response. As changes in 
government, including staff, occurred, municipal priorities have been affected. These 
changes did not and do not occur overnight, but took and continue to take, at least, months 
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to years of restructuring. Such changes are a reflection of changes in public behaviour that 
translate into political will.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Competing priorities are the foundation for institutional resource management. Legal 
responsibility and liability (Chapter 3), collective agreements (Chapter 4), public 
behaviour, risk, vulnerability and uncertainty, and the politics of municipal governance are 
factors affecting decision-making with regards to action on municipal priorities. Together, 
they interact to inform decision-makers as to what degree of response is necessary on any 
given issue. The complexity of balancing resources and priorities in government makes it 
difficult to assess the thresholds and the degree of influence that each factor affects action 
in relation to one another.  
In the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge, participants viewed their 
flood management response as being highly dependent on public concern and advocacy for 
action, council recognizing that the costs not to act breaches the threshold of acceptable 
risk, and champions in government or through external institutions who take the lead on 
flood management. The evidence presented in this Chapter has suggested that public 
advocacy for action is reduced, most notably during ‘election season’ and in the long 
absence of an extreme event. Although this is not to say that flood management is not a 
municipal priority, interviewed participants have noted that attention to and investment in 
flood response has faded in the past as a result. Therefore, increasing the awareness of the 
issues and increasing municipal response is critical to flood management.  
Past research (Birkland, 1998; Jensen, 2010; True et al., 2008) has shown that 
municipal response tends to be highest in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, forcing 
municipalities to (re)engage in the environmental stressors that face their region. Some 
have argued that focusing events are necessary to facilitate action. As one participant 
explained, to re-engage municipalities in greater flood management practices another flood 
event is needed because “at the end of the day that is what really motivates municipalities 
to change.” It shows the failure of existing policy and practices, and thereby changes public 
behaviour, and translates into municipal action. 
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The premise of social movement theory is that socio-cultural characteristics 
influence the collective behaviour of citizens guiding the decisions and behaviour of 
institutions (Passy, 2003). The success of such movements are rooted through networks; 
the more networks connected to the socio-cultural characteristics of the region has resulted 
in a greater turnover (Diani and McAdam, 2003). As Passy (2003) explains, people 
participate in social movements because they “share certain norms and values” that are 
related to a political disagreement. In these instances social movements provide an outlet 
for the collective voice of a subset of the population, providing individuals with an identity 
or a sense of purpose (Freeman, 1973; Morris, 1984; Andrews, 1991; and Melucci, 1996). 
The networks aid in the development of an identity by acting as the forum through which 
groups of people can express their views and they reinforce these identities by reaffirming 
individuals that their views are representative of the movement. By creating a collective 
identity through networks, social movements grow in numbers and strength (Passy, 2003). 
As Tilly & Wood (2013) explain, social movements are the result of multiple 
stressors which often have negative implications infringing on the human rights of a group 
of individuals. These authors explain that, historically, when human rights have been 
violated, activism leads to correcting/replacing the instigating body with one that meets the 
wants and needs of the community. By raising the issue to the municipality for a better 
management system, the public has expressed to the institution their expectations which in 
turn forces the institution address the issue. 
This process can lead to a socio-technological regime shift as institutions recognize 
that the current system is undesirable as evidenced by the outcome of an event, and that 
the culture may have changed by the event to value greater environmental management. It 
may lead to greater investment in flood management technological innovation or even the 
adoption of a system that has been employed elsewhere. In the City of Vancouver, the 
municipality adopted a sustainable adaptive framework developed by ICLEI (Local 
Governments for Sustainability). They recognized a need for a different climate change 
adaptation system, which includes flood response, and they are making that transition to a 
new socio-technological regime.  
Therefore, there is a relationship that exists between the factors presented in this 
Chapter regarding institutional behaviour and the dynamic interaction that physical change 
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and technological systems have with each other, as Hadfield & Seaton’s (1999) 
environmental management model suggests (Figure 10). In this Chapter, it was evident that 
factors affecting municipal priorities are diverse and range from forces within institutions 
to external pressures. Although major contributors to action have been discussed and 
analyzed in the Chapter, questions surrounding how to increase an institution’s ability to 
manage flood risk becomes a main point of discussion for flood response policy and 
practice.  
6 Mechanisms to Increase Response Capacity 
6.1 Introduction 
While the ability to respond to flood risk is dependent on a number of components, 
including resources, institutional behaviour and collective action, and technological 
pathways, attention to approaches that would enhance an organization or institution’s 
ability to respond to flood risk is critical in flood response research. Evidence from the 
research conducted shows that tight budgets and limited resources, combined with limited 
knowledge and disconnect internally among organizations and levels of government can 
inhibit response capacity to floods. Together, they act as barriers to response capacity. As 
such, future flood management response will depend on minimizing these barriers so that 
an organization or institution can increase its response capacity to floods. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify and discuss mechanisms—as identified 
by participants—that have the potential to increase the response capacity of an organization 
or institution. Resource efficiency, increasing cohesion through greater communication 
and interdisciplinary collaboration, shared responsibility and management, and utilizing an 
adaptive framework for flood response are mechanisms viewed by participants that could 
have this effect on response capacity to floods and will be discussed in this Chapter. This 
Chapter does not focus on the ‘how to’ develop an adaptive framework or increase 
cohesion through interdisciplinary collaboration as that is an area of further research that 
goes beyond the scope of this research; rather, this Chapter provides a simple explanation 
of four mechanisms that have the potential to enhance response capacity. 
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6.2 Resource Efficiency and Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration 
Resource efficiency is a term focused on production and consumption patterns of a system. 
It emphasizes maximizing a system’s output while minimizing input in a sustainable way 
(Huselid, 1995). It does not mean that a system is increasing its means of production; rather 
that the system is increasing the value of every input into the system. A number studies 
that have focused on strategies that have potential for significant cost-savings (Arney et al., 
1998; Clinch & Healy, 2000) have been recognized since the early 1970s (Delmas & 
Pekovic, 2015). Efficient use of human capital, social capital, financial capital and 
materials can increase a system’s output and allow for more investment in any given project 
within that system. Emphasis is on how to maximize the output of these resources. 
 In this study, the majority of those interviewed and Q sort participants argued that 
increasing resource efficiency is integral to the success of flood response (see Table 19). 
One participant strongly disagreed with this argument, indicating a score of -4, consistent 
with the view of Factor 2. One other participant did not provide a positive score to Item 9, 
indicating that the participant neither agreed nor disagreed or was unsure whether or not 
resource efficiency is important to the success of flood response. Although there was not 
100% agreement in the Q analysis regarding Item 9, two important conclusions can be 
made. First, most participants view resource efficiency as it relates to resource management 
as being influential to the success of a system’s flood response; and second, cross-sector 
communication may be able increase resource efficiency through proper coordination with 
other projects. With overlapping projects, such as upgrading sewers and road 
infrastructure, time and financial capital can be conserved by efficiently using resources 
that would otherwise be used separately and drain resources more quickly. 10 
                                                 
10
 Evidence of the latter’s effectiveness in flood response remains incomplete and is recognized here as 
such. Further research and more data would be needed to provide a definitive, in-depth analysis of this 
claim. Therefore, it stands in this report as a hypothesis. 
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Table 19: Results of Q analysis for Item 9 
 
As Chapter 4 notes, group cohesion can affect response capacity by increasing or 
decreasing an institution’s ability to respond to flood risk depending on whether or not 
strong cohesion exists. As Huselid (1995) explains, human resource management policies 
and practices can impact a firm’s performance. This author argues that High Performance 
Work Practices “can improve knowledge, skills, and abilities of a firm’s current and 
potential employees, increase their motivation, reduce shirking, and enhance retention of 
quality employees while encouraging non-performers to leave the firm” (Huselid, 1995, 
635; Jones & Wright, 1992). They have the ability to affect group cohesion within an 
institution as actors within these institutions work together toward a common goal. By 
regulating who is working on what and the communication among staff and departments, 
response capacity is ultimately affected because it affects the ability to develop and execute 
plans (Begin, 1991; Butler, Ferris & Napier, 1991; Wright & McMahan, 1992, 2011). 
According to the IPCC (2014b), leadership, staffing and skill development affect 
institutional capacity to respond to risk. Beyond recognizing flooding as an issue needing 
action (see Chapters 4 and 5; Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Carmin et al., 2012), an 
interdisciplinary approach to flood response is necessary for greater institutional response 
capacity. The dynamic human-environment interactions require environmental problems 
to be understood as complex and, as such, they extend beyond any one discipline’s 
knowledge. To understand the complexity, Lubchenco (1998) argued that an integration of 
knowledge from many disciplines is necessary. Kinzig (2001) argues that non-
interdisciplinary approaches to such complex problems limit the capability to respond to a 
problem. Taking an interdisciplinary approach to complex environmental issues like 
Item Factor (factor array) 
9. Success of flood management is 
dependent on or will increase with 
efficient use of resources such as working 
in tandem with other projects. For 
example, updating existing infrastructure 
at the same time as doing road work. 
Factor 1 (2) 
Factor 2 (-1) 
Factor 3 (4) 
93 
 
flooding by including policymakers, scientists, managers, and other stakeholders, 
essentially ‘opens the door’ to more possible solutions to address a given problem. It 
increases the collaboration and communication that takes place among disciplines.  
These arguments are consistent with the views of interviewed participants in the 
City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge. In the City of Vancouver, one participant 
notes, “where the City has had great success with the Greenest City Plan is because the 
departments have figured out how to work collaboratively together.” This participant 
argued that other projects that have been done in the past or are currently being done do 
not have the same degree of collaboration which has translated into the degree of success 
of that project. Therefore, by working together towards a common goal and recognizing 
individual limitations in accomplishing that goal, the ability to respond can be affected.  
 More broadly, establishing an environmental focal point or office in an institution 
or organization can aid in coordinating action across departments and agencies (IPCC, 
2014a; Roberts, 2008, 2010; Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Hunt & Watkiss, 2011; OECD, 
2011; Brown et al., 2012). When dealing with the complexity of environmental issues, 
responsibility can become blurred within an institution on as basic a principle as who is to 
take the lead on an issue, including flooding. Is it a problem needing an engineering 
solution or is it a problem needing an urban planning solution or is it a problem needing 
both and, if so, who should take the lead and who should be held responsible given that an 
event occurs and exposes a system’s failure? As one participant stated, “often times in 
government what you will see across departments is  ‘I don’t want to get stuck holding that 
bag so I am not going to step up for this, so you do it’ and everybody else has the same 
thoughts, so nobody actually gets around to doing it.” Having a specific department as the 
focal point in an institution with a clear mandate outlined can increase response capacity 
because it establishes overarching responsibilities that cannot be diverted to other 
departments. It creates a lead for action and clears any confusion as to which department 
is responsible.  
Therefore, the ability to respond to risk can be expected to improve with an 
established focal point from which action stems together with an interdisciplinary approach 
with appropriate staff involved. In the City of Vancouver, the City has a Sustainability 
Department which is responsible for climate change adaptation. This department is the 
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focal point for flood action within this institution. They have mandated responsibilities by 
the municipal government to focus on these issues. Responsibility within this institution is 
clear. This department is known to be working with multiple stakeholders and consulting 
with other departments to develop a flood management system that is designed to better 
protect the city’s population and assets (see City of Vancouver’s Climate Change 
Adaptation Strategy, 2013). As participants in both the City of Vancouver and District of 
Maple Ridge noted, this communication among departments and stakeholders is critical to 
establishing an interdisciplinary framework for flood response and can be indicative of an 
institution’s response capacity as it pertains to cohesion, collaboration and leadership. 
In the District of Maple Ridge, Planning, Engineering, Operations, and Emergency 
Services are City departments that have a role in flood response. Together, they make up 
the institution’s flood response and share responsibility. Participants have noted that the 
fragmented structure of the institution can influence the flood response system, but 
especially critical to flood response is the interdisciplinary communication that takes place 
between these departments and with external stakeholders. 
 Therefore, it is important to increase response capacity to floods in an institution 
by fostering an environment of increased cohesiveness of the actors involved and by 
maintaining an interdisciplinary network. Focus on enhancing social networks among 
internal and external stakeholders and managing human capital effectively is viewed by 
participants as important to being able to increase response capacity as it grants access to 
more resources that can be used to aid the development and execution of response 
strategies. Knowing that municipal resources are limited and budgets are tight, maximizing 
the input value into a project can relieve stress to the system and enhance the system’s 
performance. 
6.3 Co-Management and Collaborative Management 
One of the other major focus points from participants as it relates to increasing response 
capacity is through increased intergovernmental collaboration and having shared 
responsibility for flood response. This is not to say that should an event happen, failure of 
policy and practice is shared; rather, the investment in flood management should be shared 
among levels of government. As it stands now, municipalities are solely responsible for 
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developing an emergency management plan (see Chapter 3) and the implementation of that 
plan is dependent on municipal resources (see Chapters 4 & 5). The province’s role is more 
of an informative one with assistance being provided should an event occur, but it is not 
something that they plan and practice for on a day-to-day basis. As one participant 
describes it, 
They think of it as something you plan for and practice for, but they don’t really think 
about the day-to-day integration of it. It is like, Cities have to make sure that every 
soccer player, every baseball player, anyone who wants to do a sport today can do that, 
and tomorrow and the day after and the day after. The province is more like ‘breakup’, 
right. So they are like ‘put on the big spectacle and then everybody goes home and then 
we will do it again next year’, and that is kind of how their approach to emergency 
management is. I get the sense that should there be some big disaster they would actually 
do a reasonably good job for the first sort of 72 hours to maybe week and then we are 
kind of on our own. 
 
The main issue in emergency and subsequent flood management is a lack of resources 
and capacity to address the issues. As the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2010) noted, approximately 70% of public spending in urban areas 
is the responsibility of local governments. Carmin et al. (2012) found that approximately 
60% of local governments are not receiving any financial support for climate change 
adaptation, which includes emergency management preparation. As participants noted in 
this study, it can be difficult to receive financial support for emergency preparation or 
disaster risk reduction efforts; financial support is often reactive after the results of a 
disaster are known or are occurring and it is for the purpose of rebounding back to the 
original state. As the IPCC (2014b) further notes, large cities that have administrative 
capacity and strong economies best attract external funding. This leaves smaller cities more 
vulnerable to be stuck with the burden of funding projects with no assistance and as this 
paper has noted several times, the capacity to respond to risk is highly dependent on having 
those resources.  
Co-management and collaborative management contemplates management 
techniques “conveying the sharing of rights and responsibilities by the government and 
civil society” (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004, 63). Collaborative forms of management are 
increasingly appealing to policymakers and decision-makers because learning and 
innovation is likely to occur through meaningful interactions where uncertainty exists  
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(Armitage, Berkes & Doubleday, 2007). Co-management techniques are appealing because 
they include more efficient, appropriate and equitable governance and they can improve 
processes and functions of management (Armitage, Berkes & Doubleday, 2007). As 
Pinkerton (1989) notes, co-management may enhance data gathering, logistical decisions, 
allocation decisions, protection of resources from environmental damage, regulation 
enforcement, long-term planning, and more inclusive decision-making.  
 For emergency management, including flood management, Henstra (2013) argues 
that “management requires authority and resources from all levels of government as well 
as collaboration with stakeholders from the private and voluntary sector.” The latter half 
of that argument is not in dispute. Evidence in the previous section shows the necessity for 
collaboration with stakeholders from industry and civil society. For the former, evidence 
in this study shows that government assistance and responsibility beyond the municipality 
remains minimal. It is clear that both the province and the federal government are involved 
in emergency management, but whether or not the degree of involvement is adequate could 
be debated.  
In this study, interviewed participants, particularly in the District of Maple Ridge, 
indicated that flood management of the Fraser River should be the responsibility of the BC 
government because it crosses municipal boundaries and the scope of managing the system 
within the municipal boundaries is too great for any one municipality to handle. In the Q 
analysis, the majority of participants felt that the provincial and/or federal governments 
should have some responsibility to financially assist municipalities in flood management 
(see Table 20). Factor 1’s score of 0 does not indicate disagreement with this finding. In 
fact, only one participant in the Q study assigned a negative value (-2) to Item 18 and two 
others gave a value of 0. Overall, the results indicate that participants’ view that the 
provincial and federal governments should have an increased role in flood management 
policy and practice than is currently the practice. The results of the Q analysis are consistent 
with views expressed by interviewed participants in the District of Maple Ridge and three 
of four in the City of Vancouver. Participants of the Q analysis further expressed their 
position on future flood management success (see Table 20). All but one participant gave 
a value greater than 0 and the other participant gave a value of 0 on Item 22. The concepts 
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of co-management and collaborative management appealed to these participants as the 
appropriate direction for future flood response practice. 
Table 20: Results of Q analysis for Items 18 & 22 
Item Factor (factor array) 
18. The Provincial and/or Federal 
Government should be taking the lead on 
flood management, including the financing 
of flood management initiatives being 
done at the local level by either the 
municipality or local practitioners. 
Factor 1 (0) 
Factor 2 (4) 
Factor 3 (4) 
22. Future flood management is 
dependent on increasing communication 
and collaboration between different levels 
of government to work together and share 
the responsibility of flood management. 
Factor 1 (2) 
Factor 2 (4) 
Factor 3 (2) 
 
In the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge, it is clear that collaborative 
management is characteristic of their flood management approach. Their interactions with 
stakeholders inform decision-making and reflect existing flood response policy and 
practices. Evidence in this study suggests that emergency and flood management practice 
is less co-managed than is desired. Shared responsibility and greater input into an 
emergency management system would increase response capacity because co-management 
of emergency management would increase municipal access to external resources. One of 
the challenges to co-management with provincial and federal governments in the context 
of emergency management is whether or not it is feasible to provide all municipalities with 
access to provincial and federal resources. In other words, what would intergovernmental 
co-management of emergency management look like?  
Increased communication and collaboration with stakeholders, other municipalities and 
among levels of government could lead to greater response capacity as it relates to 
increasing group cohesion among multiple actors and access to external resources. How to 
achieve this is beyond the scope of this research and should be explored further. What can 
be concluded from this section is that municipal response capacity may be affected by co-
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management and collaborative management techniques and future flood management will 
be dependent on maximizing these relationships.  
6.4 Adaptive Co-Management 
Adaptive co-management is an adaptive management approach. It is an experimental 
management technique focused on monitoring, learning and recalibration (Noble, 2013; 
Ruhl, 2004; Armitage, Berkes & Doubleday, 2007) and can be defined as the “process by 
which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a 
dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process of learning-by-doing” (Folke et al., 2002, 20). 
As Noble (2013) and Olsson et al. (2004) explain, adaptive co-management often involves 
networks of actors sharing responsibility and management power. Its principles include: 
favour action; accept and benefit from uncertainty; be experimental; emphasize resiliency; 
provide feedback; use as a learning tool that leads to action; and it is adjustable as 
knowledge increases (Noble, 2013). As Morghan et al. (2006) note, it is designed to 
provide feedback to researchers and managers so that decisions can be improved as the 
information regarding natural systems, human systems and their interactions with each 
other continue to develop. It recognizes that the current state of the management system is 
not necessarily perfect and that adjustments will likely be required at some point. It is the 
purpose of this system to be able to make those adjustments quickly and with as little 
restraint as possible. 
As it relates to response capacity for floods, participants view that collaboration, 
shared responsibility and management, and an adaptive framework (see Table 21) would 
lead to more successful flood response. Referring to the latter, ten out of twelve Q 
participants ranked Item 7 greater than 0 and only one participant gave a negative value (-
3). The majority of participants viewed that an adaptive framework is critical in flood 
management. Interviewed participants supported this position, arguing that the knowledge 
on flood response is incomplete; having the ability to adjust current policy and practices is 
fundamental in emergency management because what works today may not necessarily 
work tomorrow. It is critical in post-recovery emergency management that a system is able 
to change policy and practices so as to make the necessary adjustments to better protect the 
population and assets.  By contrast, static systems would be as vulnerable to the impacts of 
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another event as they were prior to that initial event; their ability to reduce those impacts 
further are constrained.  
Table 21: Results of Q analysis for Item 7 
For example, under Section 25 of the Compensation and Disaster Financial 
Assistance Regulation of British Columbia’s Emergency Program Act, financial assistance 
can be awarded to a municipality for the purpose of repairing, rebuilding, or replacing 
public facilities; however, repairs must be made to return to the original state of the facility 
as it existed prior to the disaster. Assistance will not be provided to repair a public facility 
if it is determined that changes to that facility will be made using these resources even if 
those changes would minimize future risk to a similar event. The problem is that in the 
event that a flood does occur and failures in existing policy and practices are determined, 
adjusting municipal practice by enhancing infrastructure, for example, becomes very 
difficult because access to external resources is reduced. 
By having an adaptive framework in place so that institutional policy and 
practices can be adjusted as knowledge on flood response increases, the ability to respond 
to flood risk is less constricted. As one participant stated,  
Everything is fluid. It sounds like some pun on flood management, but it really is. The 
important thing is that your adaptation strategy is able to adapt and that is the 
challenge of it because politicians and staff, especially professional staff, do not like to 
say things that tomorrow might no longer be true, but the reality of flood management 
in a changing climate is we only know what we know today and tomorrow we are 
going to have to be prepared to go ‘who knew’ and ‘now we know’. So we need to 
take more action. 
Therefore, it can influence response capacity to floods as it can affect an institution’s ability 
to make necessary adjustments to policy and practices when needed in a timely manner. 
Item Factor (factor array) 
7. Successful flood management is 
dependent on or will increase if an 
adaptive framework is used so that new 
information and technology and changing 
conditions can effectively and efficiently 
lead to necessary adjustments. 
Factor 1 (3) 
Factor 2 (2) 
Factor 3 (2) 
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6.5 Conclusion 
Literature, interview data and Q analysis findings indicate resource efficiency and 
collaborative management, co-management, and adaptive co-management as mechanisms 
that can increase an institution’s ability to respond. More efficient use of resources allows 
institutions to maximize their flood management system’s output by optimizing the value 
of every input. Collaborative management focuses on maximizing performance through 
meaningful interactions with stakeholders. Co-management increases an institution’s 
access to external resources and lessens the burden of emergency management through 
shared responsibility and shared managing power. Finally, adaptive co-management is a 
hybrid management approach combining collaborative management and co-management, 
but with emphasis on adjusting policy and practice with minimal interference as knowledge 
on flood and emergency management continues to increase. 
Interviewed and Q participants viewed interdisciplinary collaboration, shared 
responsibility among levels of government, and an adaptive framework as essential 
mechanisms for successful flood response. Data suggested a need for greater involvement 
at higher levels of government beyond the municipality. Focus on enhancing cohesion 
among departments within an institution, with other institutions, and among levels of 
government is viewed by participants as necessary for future flood management success. 
Although the participants in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge noted 
strong collaboration and communication with external stakeholders, they also noted that 
the involvement from higher levels of government in emergency and flood management is 
sporadic, needing greater communication. 
Organizational theory is oriented on organizational structure, design and culture as 
fundamental to identifying organizational behaviour (Jones, 2001; Hosmer, 1995). The 
mechanisms presented in this Chapter show that organizational behaviour is influenced by 
the interactions that take place internally and with other organizations or institutions. The 
mechanisms show that the organization or institution’s output is highly dependent on 
networks of actors contributing to a common goal and the resources that can be attributed 
to having those connections in place. 
Under the various management approaches, it was evident how these approaches 
could affect response capacity, but what remained unanswered was what these flood 
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management systems should look like. This goes beyond the scope of this study although 
it is a logical next step.  At this juncture, the outcome of such study would be highly 
speculative. Interviewed participants in the City of Vancouver did note that an ICLEI 
framework for climate change adaptation, which includes their flood response, is being 
undertaken at the moment, and has been reported as being successful in other 
municipalities that follow the same framework. Again, there is a need to further explore 
adaptive co-management as it relates to increasing an institution’s response capacity to 
floods. It is through future research on increasing response capacity to floods that the 
knowledge gap in flood response may be reduced. 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Evidence of climate change and increases in disasters around the world suggest a necessity 
to adapt to future conditions; however, disaster risk reduction policy and practice has 
developed into a complicated system due to the complexity of municipal, regional, and 
national governance. The purpose of this paper is to aid decision-makers of flood response 
by creating a conceptual framework for discussion of institutional response capacity and 
municipal action. The purpose is not to expose any failure in policy and practice, but 
instead to assist decision-makers in understanding how response capacity is built and 
identify areas by which institutional action can be affected. 
This study also addresses a knowledge gap in literature relating to community-based 
response capacity and action. It is argued that the ability to manage risk is complex and 
involves many interacting variables, including institutional behaviour and collective 
action, technological pathways, and resource management. This study promotes 
precautionary adaptive co-management and it provides a foundation for further research 
that seeks to increase response capacity through different management techniques. It offers 
a preliminary investigation into urban governance and flood and emergency response. 
The purpose of this final Chapter is to summarize the findings presented in this project, 
identify significant limitations of this study, and discuss the direction of future research on 
flood response. 
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7.2 Summary of the Results 
This paper addresses questions surrounding emergency and, subsequently, flood 
management in a changing climate. With RCP scenarios and other models suggesting 
future climate conditions will lead to more frequent and intense weather-related events, 
sea-level rise, and other disaster scenarios, research on managing risk and adapting to these 
future conditions have become major focus points in environmental management, 
academically and in government. It is the purpose of this paper to address a gap in literature 
for which flood and emergency management policy and practices at a community scale can 
be understood in order to aid in guiding future research and governance. It addresses three 
distinct questions identified in Chapter 1: 
1. What are development pathways of local responses to floods? 
2. What factors affect municipal priority-setting? 
3. How is local response reflective of a community’s reality? 
 From the by-person factor analysis (Q analysis), three groups of behaviour known 
as Factors emerged: Factor 1 was highlighted as having a risk-based approach to flood 
response; Factor 2 was identified as relying on the public to identify issues needing 
immediate attention which really dictates the priority that flood response receives; and 
Factor 3 was oriented more towards the politics of institutional behaviour and the 
arrangements that these institutions or organizations have with each other and different 
levels of government in relation to their flood response.  
As the information presented throughout this paper has shown, the approach to 
flood risk differs among organizations and institutions in the City of Vancouver from those 
in the District of Maple Ridge. Certain Factors can be seen as similar or common with the 
organizations and institutions within these two regions, based on a comparison of the 
interview data gathered and the Q analysis. For example, in the City of Vancouver, 
interviewed participants argued that risk is the dominant factor in their approach to flood 
response and that, although the public is influential in institutional/organizational 
behaviour, their approach to flood risk is more associated with taking a 
proactive/precautionary approach using forecast models. Again, public advocacy and 
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concern do have a role in the attention and investment that flood management receives, but 
the probability of a flood occurring in the area necessitates action. Therefore, the 
organizations and institutions in the City of Vancouver can be associated closely with 
Factor 1.  
The views of the interviewed participants in the District of Maple Ridge is more 
oriented toward Factor 2’s association. In the interviews conducted in the District of Maple 
Ridge, participants frequently attested to the public’s involvement in institutional and 
organizational behaviour, arguing that, although the history and forecasting models show 
the region’s vulnerability/exposure to flooding, the public’s concern and advocacy for 
various issues is essential in determining the issue’s priority within the organization or 
institution and, thus, their action. According to these participants, it is less about the risk 
of a flood occurring at higher positions within the organization or institution and more 
about meeting the demands of the public first. 
Finally, Factor 3 is associated more with department leads within organizations and 
institutions in the District of Maple Ridge and their views on flood response as it compares 
with the views of more senior ranking officials within the organization or among 
organizations. Where Factor 1 argues strong communication and collaboration exists—
both internally and externally and is consistent with interviewed participants in the City of 
Vancouver—several interviewed participants in the District of Maple Ridge noted a 
disconnect between departments and other organizations, as well as with higher 
management which is consistent with Factor 3’s description. This group emphasizes 
politics as being influential on response, suggesting that action at the municipal level is 
typically directed toward issues where an impact can be immediately seen as opposed to 
one that has not occurred recently like a flood; the results of that action cannot be seen until 
an event allows for an evaluation. This has resulted in greater attention to and investment 
in addressing issues where results can be seen in a short turnaround time rather than for a 
perceived but only potential threat. Again, this is not to say that this group’s behaviour in 
respect of floods does not involve action, rather politics and structure are critical in its 
approach. 
Therefore, it is evident that Factors 2 and 3 are more apparent in the District of 
Maple Ridge while Factor 1 is predominately associated with the organizations and 
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institutions in the City of Vancouver. The factors that define response capacity and 
municipal action are consistent among interviewed participants and the Factors in both 
regions; however, the degree of influence that these components have with regards to 
response capacity to floods and institutional action in these two regions varies. The 
information presented throughout this paper demonstrates the importance of these 
components to response capacity for floods and institutional action and these Factors aid 
in illustrating the differences in the two regions’ approach to flood response and emergency 
management. 
7.2.1 Defining Response Capacity to Floods 
Through interviews, literature, legal documents, and a by-person factor analysis on 
participants’ view of flood response in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge, 
major indicators of an institution or organization’s ability to manage flood risk are 
identified. This paper argues that the governing body with the greatest jurisdictional 
authority has the ability to mandate a minimum standard for emergency and, subsequently, 
flood management, thereby establishing a baseline response capacity to floods. Beyond 
this baseline response capacity, this paper notes institutional behaviour and collective 
action, technological pathways, and resource management characterize an institution or 
organization’s response capacity to floods.  
 The evidence presented throughout this paper show that in a broader context, these 
components are consistent with Burch’s (2009) findings on sustainable development 
pathways to climate change and Hadfield & Seaton’s (1999) environmental management 
model. These factors influencing community scale response capacity should not be 
understood as being the same as action. These two components of emergency management 
are separate, but related; action is a function of response capacity. An institution or 
organization’s flood response does not have to equal their response capacity, but it also 
cannot exceed it.  
This paper notes the factors affecting action differ in terms of their degree of 
influence on action at a local or community as to what may exist at a national level. It 
should be understood that the factors affecting local or institutional action, in terms of the 
orientation of the responses that occur, is likely to be different at a smaller scale than at a 
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national or sub-national level. The way that emergency management is approached at 
different levels of government show that emergency management response capacity and 
action is different among levels of government, organizations and institutions. 
7.2.2 Urban Governance as Social Constructions of Reality 
Under the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), five priorities were identified to assist in 
building disaster resilient communities and countries. They included: making disaster risk 
reduction a local and national priority with strong institutional arrangements; monitor and 
assess risk and vulnerability; use knowledge, innovation and education to create a culture 
of resilience; reduce risk through appropriate management; and strengthen disaster 
preparedness at all levels of government (UNISDR, n.d.). Understanding what influences 
an institution or organization’s ability to manage risk is fundamental to this Framework. It 
is clear that educating decision-makers and the public could increase awareness and lead 
to more radical shifts in disaster governance; however, the public’s behaviour on issues 
with uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of something occurring is critical to action.  
Human behaviour, as it relates to institutional action, has traditionally been oriented 
to the ‘here and now’ scenario by which advocacy for action is loudest only when an 
individual or group’s traditional way of life is infringed upon (see Chapter 5). Whether the 
infringement comes from an organization or institution imposing certain restrictions 
impacting cultural values and traditions or from a natural disaster causing various social, 
economic, health, political or biophysical impacts, it is not until that abstract becomes a 
reality that people’s behaviour toward an issue really takes flight, increasing advocacy for 
action. The public activism translates to an institution or organization’s behavioural change 
because these institutions have a responsibility to meet the public’s wants, needs and values 
and organizations have a responsibility to their shareholders which are typically aimed at 
maximizing access to the market (Jones, 2001). 
 Institutions have to make difficult decisions that involve many interacting factors. 
Beyond the influence of the public, but still important to institutional behaviour for local 
response to floods, are risk, vulnerability and uncertainty and the politics of action, 
including responsibility and liability. It is through these factors and by this logic that urban 
governance can be understood as a social construct of a community’s reality.  
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7.3 Q Methodology in Hindsight  
Q methodology is an approach to study the subjective views of an individual or group of 
individuals in order to identify group behaviour on a particular topic (Stephenson, 1953). 
In this study, participants completed a questionnaire, known as a Q-sort, on their own. By 
not being present during the Q-sorting process the depth of the data gathered was more 
narrow than it could have been. It would have benefited the study if the researcher was 
present during the Q-sorting process to make inquiries as to why the participant rank-
ordered each Item the way that they did. By having a brief interview regarding each 
statement in the Q-sort, the researcher may access the individual’s behaviour with more 
empirical thought as oppose to speculation as to why such behaviour exists. In the study, 
interviews were conducted prior to the distribution of the Q-sort, allowing for this empirical 
thought, but to enrich the data, an interview post-Q-sorting is recommended. 
 It can be difficult to identify the behaviour of an individual or even group behaviour 
when the content of the Q-set can be interpreted loosely by the participant. In the study, 
several participants needed clarification as to what was being stated in the questionnaire 
and whether or not their interpretation of the statements were correct. In particular, the 
wording of Item 12 in the Q-sort was considered confusing to some participants and to 
others nothing was stated. Again, having the researcher present during the Q-sorting 
process would benefit the study as the researcher can guide participants through the Q-sort 
to ensure that all participants understand each statement to the same extent and reduce that 
degree of inference by the participant. As it stands in this paper, some of the results 
presented using Q findings had cautionary statements attached to the Factors factor arrays, 
such as Factor 3’s factor array for Item 2 (see pages 77). An argument can be made that 
having the researcher present during the Q-sorting could assist in eliminating or reducing 
the need for such statements. 
7.4 Limitations 
While the study provides an analysis of flood management policy and practice, the 
framework for understanding response capacity and municipal action was derived through 
two study sites and should not be applied, with certainty, to all communities and 
organizations. As participants noted, the applicability of this research to other regions 
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should be approached with caution. The research provides an overview for small-scale 
response capacity to floods and urban governance in a First World city. The degree that 
each component has on response capacity and municipal action in relation to one another 
remains incomplete and is likely to differ among municipalities and regions. How the 
results compare to response capacity to floods and urban governance in other cities and 
countries and other political regimes remain incomplete. An analysis of intergovernmental 
politics in other countries could aid in this discussion by providing greater insight into 
emergency management and flood response. 
 The study identifies components that determine baseline and institutional response 
capacity and municipal action, but it fails to analyze the degree of influence that each 
component has in relation to one another. In part, this is due to the methodology that was 
chosen. In Q methodology, the purpose is not to compare Item 1 against Item 2, for 
example, rather identify the subjective views of individuals and groups through a by-person 
factor analysis. It is not suited to examining the degree of influence that each variable has 
on municipal action, particularly due to the complexity of urban governance and the small 
number of participants included. Performing R methodology factor analysis on the factors 
affecting municipal action and response capacity to floods could provide greater insight 
into the findings presented in this paper, but to do so would require significantly more 
participants, a greater understanding of all variables that could affect response capacity to 
floods and municipal action, and a way to standardize the variables. 
 In the paper, it is argued that public behaviour is influential to politics. Examining 
this relationship more closely by talking with residents and business owners to understand 
differences in opinion and power relations with government could provide greater 
knowledge on flood response. The evidence presented show response capacity to floods 
and municipal action as a complex system involving many interacting variables. The study 
focuses on developing a conceptual framework for discussion and identifying further 
research needs.    
7.5  Future Research 
In Chapters 4 and 5, it is argued that cohesion and collaboration with stakeholders act as 
control mechanisms on response capacity. The evidence presented show co-management, 
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collaborative management and adaptive co-management as management techniques that 
could positively affect response capacity by increasing access to external resources and 
allow smooth transitions to new policy and practices as knowledge on flood response 
increase. What remains absent in these Chapters, however, is how these management 
techniques should be framed to allow optimal response capacity. The research conducted 
here in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge fails to include provincial and 
federal government input as it is designed to focus on municipal governments and other 
organizations working on flooding. Therefore, further research on intergovernmental 
management and local management techniques that addresses this gap is a key focus point 
for future flood research. Questions surrounding the feasibility of intergovernmental 
adaptive co-management or the degree of co-management that could exists through 
strategic planning are fundamental to future response capacity research. 
 It is presented in the previous section that this study focuses on two sites to make 
the conclusions that are presented throughout the paper and it presents a major limitation 
as to its applicability to other communities, both within British Columbia, across provinces, 
and to other urban centers around the world with different political regimes. Response 
capacity is recognized in Chapter 4 as being different from region to region, and the degree 
that factors affecting municipal action have (Chapter 5) will differ on a case-by-case basis. 
Where further research is needed is on the conceptual framework’s applicability throughout 
the province and even across provinces. The wants, needs and values are different 
throughout the provinces in Canada and in other countries, but whether or not the same 
components of response capacity to floods and municipal action are consistent is necessary 
in validating and further exploring this topic. By exploring this area more in other regions, 
research could provide the groundwork for developing a response capacity index. 
The study indicates major factors affecting both response capacity to floods and 
municipal action, but it should be recognized that not all factors may have been included. 
In particular, the study did not examine or discuss the influence that the state of local, 
provincial, and national economies have on response capacity and municipal action. 
Questions surrounding whether or not the ability to respond and the investment in flood 
response shift in times of economic downturn was not investigated enough to determine its 
relevance to this research. Emphasis in this study is placed on the role of the public, risk 
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and the politics of local flood management and not on the economic processes ongoing 
within the cities. When asked about the role of the state of the local economy on investment 
in flood management, most participants said it is hard to determine as there has not been 
enough evidence in the study areas to describe what would happen. To provide an in-depth 
analysis into the role of the economic status in emergency and flood management in the 
City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge would have been highly speculative. 
Therefore, further research examining economic downturn and its influence on response 
capacity to floods through institutional behaviour could provide greater insight into this 
research area. 
 Similar to the above argument, provincial and national influence on local flood 
response remains largely absent in the study, excluding jurisdiction, responsibility and 
liability. Although the roles of each level of government was defined, the operations of 
these higher levels of government remain absent in the study, in part, due to the complexity 
of intergovernmental politics and to do so goes beyond the scope of the research. Further 
research is needed to understand intergovernmental relations and their impacts on flood 
response. 
 The conducted research focuses on organizations and institutional flood response; 
however, response capacity to floods should not be understood as being solely institutional 
and/or organizational. Further research is needed to examine individual response capacity 
and neighbourhood response capacity. Interviewing local residents and business owners on 
how they respond to flood risk beyond what their municipality provides could lead to 
greater tools for institutional practices to work with and optimize local response capacity. 
It could provide interesting community-government research and collaboration 
opportunities. 
Finally, the role of aboriginal communities on decision-making with regards to flood 
and emergency management is not included in this study. The history of aboriginal 
relations with government throughout Canada can be described as tenuous. Relocating 
communities, violating land treaties, and efforts to assimilate aboriginals into Canadian 
culture (including the use of residential schools), have aided to developing a complicated 
aboriginal-government relationship. In the study, interviewed participants in the District of 
Maple Ridge acknowledged that communication and collaboration with aboriginal 
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communities are important to decision-making. Clearly, these communities have a role in 
urban governance, but due to the complicated history of aboriginal-government relations 
and the limited time period to conduct the research it made sense to keep this subject matter 
separate. Further research needs to consult with these communities as the evidence 
provided by interviewed participants representing various organizations and institutions 
can only provide a piece of an incomplete picture into the role that aboriginal communities 
have on urban governance and flood management. By consulting both parties, a further 
understanding can be developed, but for the purpose of this paper their role remains 
incomplete. 
7.6 Conclusion 
While the study provides insight into response capacity to floods and municipal action, it 
is clear that the findings should act as no more than a preliminary inquiry into flood 
response. The information presented in the paper contributes to the overall knowledge on 
response capacity to floods and urban governance, but it is evident that further work is 
needed to complete our understanding of response capacity to floods and institutional 
behaviour. As disasters continue to rise in frequency and intensity, it is be critical to 
understand response capacity and the mechanisms that can increase local response. 
Investigating intergovernmental management and adaptive co-management techniques 
may prove to increase local response capacity to disasters, but the knowledge on such 
approaches and its feasibility in disaster risk reduction research remains incomplete. 
Although research on flood response and disaster risk reduction is incomplete, the findings 
presented in this paper make significant contributions for policy-makers and decision-
makers of institutions and organizations working in urban environments and provides 
groundwork for future research.  
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9 Glossary 
Abduction: a bottom-up explanatory framework that seeks to link an effect to a cause 
through suitable laws based on a range of hypothetical conditions. It is different from 
induction in that in abduction the linking law/theory that connects the effect and the cause 
is unknown. 
Adaptive co-management: the process by which institutional arrangements and 
ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process 
of learning-by-doing. It often involves networks of actors sharing responsibility and 
management power. 
Baseline response capacity: the minimum requirements mandated for municipalities and 
organizations as set out by the governing body with the greatest jurisdictional authority. 
By-person factor analysis: a statistical inspection of the correlation matrix identifying 
distinct regularities or patterns of similarity among Q-sorts. 
Co-management: management techniques that convey the sharing of rights and 
responsibility by government and civil society. 
Collaborative management: management techniques that recognize that learning and 
innovation is likely to occur where uncertainty exists through meaningful interactions. 
Concourse: an observable domain of shared knowledge and meaning. 
Confounding variable: a Q-sort that loads significantly in two or more Factors. 
Deduction: a top-down explanatory framework providing a means of linking the cause of 
a phenomenon to an effect through law/theory. 
Development pathway: a complex integration of economic, social, technological, 
institutional, cultural and biophysical characteristics that determines the interactions 
between human and natural systems. They characterize response capacity. 
129 
 
Factor: a collective view of particular participants manifested through a by-person factor 
analysis on completed Q-sorts. 
Factor array: a corresponding value representing a Factor’s view for a particular Item in 
the Q-sort. 
Factor-defining Q-sort: a Q-sort used in the by-person factor analysis that aids in 
determining the collective view of a particular Factor. 
Factor estimate: an estimate of the Factor’s viewpoint on a particular Item. 
Factor extraction: the process of identifying the number of Factors in the study through 
the identification and removal of common variance from the initial correlation matrix. 
Factor loading: the degree of correlation that each Q-sort has with the Factor. 
Factor rotation: the process of manipulating the conceptual dimensions of extracted 
Factors in order to best position the factor loadings relative to each Factor. 
Factor weights: the percentage that each Q-sort will contribute to the final factor estimates 
relative to the Q-sort with the highest score. 
Flood: an overflow of water onto normally dry land. The inundation of a normally dry area 
caused by rising water in an existing waterway, such as a river, stream or drainage ditch. 
Ponding of water at or near the point where the rain fell. 
Focusing event: an event that is sudden, relatively uncommon, defined as harmful or has 
the possibility to be harmful, and is known to the public and policy-makers simultaneously. 
Forced distribution format: a Q-sort format that allows participants to rank-order a set 
number of Items per value. Each cell can correspond with one Item.  
Free distribution format: a Q-sort format that allows participants to rank-order as many 
Items as they choose with a particular value. 
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Group cohesion: factors influencing group performance among a diverse group of 
individuals. 
Induction: induction refers to a bottoms-up explanatory framework of establishing an 
applicable description that links the observed facts to the cause. 
Institutional behaviour: individual behaviour that can be aggregated into collective 
phenomena, thus yielding the behaviour of institutions amenable to explanation by 
reference to the preferences of the individuals that compose that institution. 
Institutional response capacity: the ability of an institution to manage risk. 
Item: a meaningful statement that participants rank-ordered in the process of Q-sorting. 
Jurisdiction: the authority to make laws. 
Legal liability: a finding that is made by a court that someone did something that they 
should not have done or did not do something that they should have which caused damage 
to someone else. It is a conclusion of law. 
Negligence: the result of a defendant’s failure to satisfy a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, 
which causes damages. 
Nuisance: the interference with an individual’s use and enjoyment of property through a 
thing or activity. 
Operational decision: decisions as to a course or principle of action that are not based on 
public policy considerations and may give rise to a private law duty of care which, if 
breached, can lead to civil liability. 
Policy decision: decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on public 
policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are 
neither irrational nor taken in bad faith. 
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Q methodology: a methodology developed as an alternative measurement technique to 
psychology tests and scales. It attempts to access the subjective views of individuals and 
groups through an inverted or by-person factor analysis. 
Q-set: all Items that participants in the Q study are to rank-order. 
Q-sort: a completed rank-order questionnaire focused on a participant’s level of agreement 
with each Item. 
Risk: the product of a hazard’s probability of occurrence and its consequences. 
Resource: money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or 
organization in order to function effectively. 
Resource efficiency: the process of maximizing a system’s output while minimizing its 
input in a sustainable way. 
Resource management: the capacity to control, handle or direct how resources are 
allocated and used. 
Response capacity: the ability to manage risk. 
Self-reference: a reflection of one’s own experience and opinion. 
Varimax rotation: an orthogonal rotation—axes remain 90 degrees relative to each 
other—that rotates Factors to account for the maximum amount of study variance. 
Vulnerability: the potential for loss. 
Z-score: a statistical value that allows for cross-Factor comparison. 
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Appendix A: Q Sort Questionnaire 
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Understanding Development Pathways of 
Local Responses to Floods: Responses in the 
City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge, British 
Columbia 
Department of Geography 
Social Science Centre 
The University of Western Ontario 
1151 Richmond Street 
London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5C2 
1. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives 
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is climate change and impacts from storm 
surges, sea-level rise, and/or spring snowmelt. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-
4) 
 
-3 
  
-2  
 
-1 
 
Neither Agree 
or Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
2. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives 
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is public concern/advocacy for flood 
management. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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3. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives 
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is the potential economic impact that a flood 
could have on the city or business. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
4. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives 
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is the demographic characteristics and 
available technological solutions in the region. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
5. The implementation of flood management responses is based primarily on 
demographic characteristics with the risk of a flood occurring having less influence. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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6. The implementation of flood management responses is based primarily on the risk of a 
flood occurring with the demographic characteristics having less influence. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
7. Successful flood management is dependent on or will increase if an adaptive 
framework is used so that new information and technology and changing conditions can 
effectively and efficiently lead to necessary adjustments. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
8. Successful flood management is dependent on or will increase with public pressure on 
local practitioners and on government for increased action. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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9. Success of flood management is dependent on or will increase with efficient use of 
resources such as working in tandem with other projects. For example, updating existing 
infrastructure at the same time as doing road work. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
10. Flood management initiatives are dependent on the political cycle. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
11. Success of flood management is dependent on or will increase with having an engaged 
community and a community voicing their concerns towards flooding. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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12. Success of flood management is dependent on or will increase depending on competing 
priorities elsewhere that put less emphasis on and investment in flood management. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
13. Economic and relating activities, such as tourism, are controls on updating existing 
infrastructure. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
14. Flood management and initiatives that focus on reducing the impacts if a flood occurs 
are a high priority within your municipal boundaries and/or in your profession. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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15. Flood management is the top priority in the region, above, for example, transit, 
economic activity, and environmental conservation. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
16. Responses to reduce flood impacts are primarily based on technology with some social 
components. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
17. Responses to flooding are primarily based on social approaches (land use designations) 
with some technological components. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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18. The Provincial and/or Federal Government should be taking the lead on flood 
management, including the financing of flood management initiatives being done at the 
local level by either the municipality or local practitioners. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
19. The public/community is not or has not expressed concerns about flooding since the 
2010 election. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
 
20. The uncertainty of floods—in terms of when, where and intensity—and frequent 
changes to recommendations on how to reduce impacts of flooding deter investment in 
flood management and more towards other high priority projects. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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21. There is disconnect between staff with each other, others in your profession, and/or 
council on the understanding of the effectiveness of existing flood management in the city. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
22. Future flood management is dependent on increasing communication and collaboration 
between different levels of government to work together and share the responsibility of 
flood management. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
23. Our flood management approach has been very successful here and can be seen as a 
leader for others to follow. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (-4) 
 
-3 
  
-2 
 
-1 
 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree, or 
Are Unsure 
 
 
+1 
 
+2 
  
+3 
 
   Strongly Agree (+4) 
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Appendix B: Factor Rotation in Q 
methodology 
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Factor rotation is common practice in Q methodology (see Watts & Stenner, 2012; Brown, 
1980). To recall, it is the process of manipulating the conceptual dimensions of the 
extracted Factors in order to best position the factor loadings of each Q-sort relative to each 
Factor. Before manipulating the conceptual dimensions of the factor loadings of Q-sorts, it 
should be understood that these factor loadings can be spatially mapped out as coordinates 
in a space of meaning. The poles of the x and y axis represent the shared viewpoint of two 
Factors. Each Q-sort represents a unique viewpoint. By mapping these unique viewpoints 
we can conceptually visualize each viewpoints’ position relative to the shared 
viewpoints—that are the Factors—and to each other. The closer that an individual Q-sort 
is to an axis indicates that the behaviour of this participant aligns with the Factor 
represented by that axis. Each mapped Q-sort can be compared to each other and to the 
Factors themselves.  
For example, Figure 11 shows the mapped out Q-sort loadings for Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 based on the factor loadings in Table 22. In the top-right quadrant of the diagram, 
Q-sorts 1, 2, 4, 10 and 11 have significant loadings to both Factor 1 and Factor 2. By 
performing a factor rotation, it is the purpose to have these Q-sorts align more close with 
one axis as oppose to both and thus load significantly more to one Factor. In Figure 12, the 
results of this rotation can be seen. It is evident in this rotation that Q-sorts 1, 2, 4, 10 and 
11 no longer load significantly with Factors 1 and 2; rather they load more significantly 
with Factor 2. This process is important in determining Factor-defining Q-sorts (see 
Section 2.2.4.4). 
Table 22: Factor Loadings of Extracted Factors 
 Component (Grouping of Shared Behaviour) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Q sort 1 0.363 0.659 0.498 
Q-sort 2 0.544 0.463 -0.003 
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Q-sort 3 0.761 -0.449 0.183 
Q-sort 4 0.653 0.523 -0.124 
Q-sort 5 0.838 -0.166 0.388 
Q-sort 6 0.782 -0.144 -0.336 
Q-sort 7 0.580 -0.371 0.609 
Q-sort 8 0.649 -0.475 -0.119 
Q-sort 9 0.825 -0.179 -0.119 
Q-sort 10 0.575 0.257 -0.351 
Q-sort 11 0.797 0.403 0.083 
Q-sort 12 0.555 -0.067 -0.615 
 **Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Different factor rotation techniques can be used in factor analysis. The factor 
rotation method performed in this study was a varimax rotation. The varimax rotation is an 
orthogonal rotation—axes remain 90 degrees relative to each other—that rotates Factors to 
account for the maximum amount of study variance. Figures 10-15 illustrate the process of 
the varimax factor rotation that was performed in this study. Again, the objective of this 
rotation is to align the viewpoints of individual Q-sorts with the shared meanings of 
Factors. The output to this step was an adjusted factor loading matrix of Q-sorts relative to 
each Factor (see Table 7 in the section 2.2.4.4). From here, the next step was to place each 
Q-sort into 1 of the 3 Factors based on their new loadings (see Section 2.2.4.4).  
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Figure 10: Unrotated Factors 1-2 Comparison 
 
Figure 11: Rotated Factors 1-2 Comparison 
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Figure 12: Unrotated Factors 1-3 Comparison 
 
Figure 13: Rotated Factors 1-3 Comparison 
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Figure 14: Unrotated Factors 2-3 Comparison 
 
Figure 15: Rotated Factors 2-3 Comparison 
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Consent Forms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
 
Project Title: Understanding Development Pathways of Local Responses to Floods: 
Response in the City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge to Flooding, British Columbia. 
 
Investigators: Professor Gordon McBean (Principal Investigator) and Jonathan Raikes, 
Master of Arts Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario 
 
Letter of Information 
 
Purpose of Letter 
 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information necessary to make an 
informed decision to participate in a study focusing on local responses to flooding in 
proposed study locations. You are being invited to participate in this research study because 
you have experience with flood-related response development, decision-making, and/or 
implementation. To participate, you must be an existing local practitioner and/or policy 
maker that makes design and development criteria in response to flood-related issues in the 
City of Vancouver or District of Maple Ridge. Your knowledge and professional 
experience addressing flood issues makes you the ideal candidate in which understanding 
development pathways of local responses to flooding can be optimized. Participants will 
not excluded from the study based on gender, race, or sexuality, however, participants must 
be literate and able to speak English fluently. If at any point of the research you would like 
to discontinue your involvement in data collection, you are welcome to do so with no 
impact on your participation on future studies or on your employment. 
 
Purpose of Study 
 
Evidence has suggested that efforts to reduce the impacts of floods are dependent on social, 
economic, institutional, cultural and biophysical characteristics of a region. The complex 
integration of these characteristics that is deterministic of the effectiveness of local 
responses to flooding is referred to as a development pathway. Research on development 
pathway components (social, economic, institutional, cultural, and biophysical 
characteristics) tend to focus on these components separately, failing to examine the 
relationships between them. Understanding the interactions between the components of 
development paths is essential to the development of effective policies and responses 
seeking to manage flood causes and impacts.  
 
The purpose of this research is to identify existing development pathways of local 
responses to flooding in the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge, and explore 
the component relationships of such responses. This research seeks to develop an 
understanding of these relationships and optimize the potential that these relationships 
could have on policy/response formulation by providing the necessary information to make 
informed decisions through the knowledge gained from this study. 
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Why the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge? 
 
The Metro-Vancouver region has been identified as one of many regions that will be under 
high stress with rising sea-levels, and increased frequency and intensity of disasters. The 
melting of glacial ice and warming of oceans have resulted in global sea-level rise. The 
2013 IPCC report has stated that sea-levels are predicted to rise by 0.97 meters by 2100. 
The damages of flooding to regions are being documented but reducing the impacts and 
creating effecting local responses to flood events is an area of concern in this region. The 
latest Climate Change Adaptation Strategy report (prepared by the City of Vancouver in 
2013) and the Fraser River Freshet Operational Flood Management Plan (prepared by the 
District of Maple Ridge, 2012) have argued that current policy and practices that are aimed 
towards flood events are outdated and needing revision. Evidence in these reports, among 
others, have argued that existing dikes are not equipped to handle a major flood. As the 
climate continues to change stronger and more frequent weather events suggest an increase 
in major flood events occurring. Your participation in this study is critical in the 
development and implantation of future strategies seeking to prepare and prevent future 
floods. 
 
Participation 
 
There are two phases to this study where participation in warranted. You have the option 
of participating in a single stage or both stages if you choose to participate, but you must 
have experience developing, deciding on, and/or implementing responses that addresses 
flooding. For example, strategies could be anything from land use planning to emergency 
procedures or technological solutions when developing land; any strategy that addresses 
floods qualifies you as a suitable candidate to participate.  
 
The first stage of this research consists of in-depth interviews with existing local 
practitioners and/or policy makers. Written consent is required to participate in an 
interview due to the exchange of personal experience related to flood responses. The 
purpose of these interviews is to collect ideas, beliefs and opinions on existing local 
responses to flooding. These interviews will explore the relationships between 
development pathways components. Prior to the commencement of interview questions, 
you will be asked to confirm your understanding of what is meant by a development 
pathway. If there is any confusion on the definition of a development pathway clarification 
will be provided to you before proceeding. Emphasis in this stage is on the subjective 
understanding (i.e. individual approach) of response development and decision-making. 
Questions regarding your opinions on the effectiveness of local responses will be avoided; 
rather, inquiring what factors are considered when you develop, decide on, and/or 
implement local responses will be the focus of these interviews. As stated, you can choose 
at any point to withdraw from the interview or refuse to answer any questions. 
 
It is anticipated that the interview will take a little more than an hour and no longer than 
1.5 hours. Interview date and time are flexible but will be conducted from September 22nd 
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to October 4th. The interview location will be at your workplace; however, if you would be 
more comfortable elsewhere the interview location will be discussed.  
 
Interviews will be recorded using an audio recording device and transcribed post-interview. 
If you choose you do not want to be recorded with the use of an audio recording device, 
you will not be excluded from participating in an interview. The transcribed interviews will 
be analyzed and used to develop a set of approximately 20 statements that will be the basis 
for the second stage of the study. 
 
The second stage of the study where participation is warranted is the completion of a 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is a rank ordering exercise in which participants will be 
provided a set of statements that they are to identify their level of agreement (strongly 
disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or no opinion). Each of these level of agreements 
will be given a representative number that will be used in a factor analysis. For the purpose 
of this study a set of approximately 20 statements regarding individual component 
characteristics and component relationships when developing, deciding on, and 
implementing responses to strategies will be given. Completed questionnaires will be 
compared through a factor analysis identifying shared forms of understanding among 
participants, confounding and non-significant respondents.  
 
As a participant you will be filling out the questionnaire at your own convenience without 
a Project Team Member present. The questionnaire could take up to a couple hours of your 
time, but you will have approximately three weeks to sort statements. Completed 
questionnaires are to be sent via email to Jonathan Raikes at _______. Addressed envelopes 
are provided to participants. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Participants will NOT be asked to provide 
personal information during the questionnaire. Completion of the questionnaire gives the 
Project Team implicit consent to use your completed questionnaire. Instructions and 
provisions for implicit consent to participate in the questionnaire are provided on the first 
page of the questionnaire. 
 
Possible Risks and Harms 
 
There are no known or anticipated risks or discomforts associated with participating in this 
study.  
 
Possible Benefits  
 
Benefits to Participants 
The data that you provide will lead to knowledge on existing development pathways and 
component relationships. This information will be useful to you as it will provide you with 
knowledge/information needed to develop more effective responses to flooding.  
 
Benefits to Society 
153 
 
This study has the potential to create a more effective procedures in flood situations. It has 
the potential to enhance our knowledge on strategies to reduce flood impacts; ultimately, 
this research seeks to provide the regions with the opportunity to save lives and protect the 
economy. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All data collected will remain confidential and accessible only to the investigators of this 
study. Data collected will be stored on a password protected computer and/or locked 
cabinet in a locked office at the University of Western Ontario. If the results are published, 
your name will not be used. If you choose to withdraw from this study, your data will be 
removed and destroyed from our database. While we will do our best to protect your 
information there is no guarantee that we will be able to do so. Representatives of The 
University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may contact you or 
require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the research. 
 
Contact Information 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participation in this study please 
contact Jonathan Raikes (primary contact) or Dr. Gordon McBean. 
 
Jonathan Raikes 
 Email: ________ 
 
  OR 
 
 Dr. Gordon McBean 
 Email: _________ 
 Phone: ___________ 
  
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this 
study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email: 
ethics@uwo.ca.  
 
 
This letter is yours to keep for future reference.  
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Consent Form 
Project Title: Understanding Development Pathways of Local Responses to Floods: 
Response in the City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge to Flooding, British Columbia. 
Study Investigator’s Name: Professor Gordon McBean (Principal Investigator) and 
Jonathan Raikes, Master of Arts Candidate, Geography, University of Western Ontario. 
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me 
and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction. The 
completion of this form gives the Study Investigators permission to contact and interview 
me. 
 
Participant’s Name (please print): 
 _______________________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature:  
 _______________________________________________ 
 
Email That Investigator Can Contact Participant: 
 
     -
_______________________________________________ 
 
Telephone Number That Investigator Can Contact Participant (Optional): 
 
    
 _______________________________________________ 
 
Date:    
 _______________________________________________ 
 
 
Person Obtaining Informed Consent (please print): 
 _____________________________ 
 
Signature:      
 _____________________________ 
 
Date:       
 _____________________________ 
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Questionnaire Instructions and Consent 
 
Project Title: Understanding Development Pathways of Local Responses to Floods: 
Response in the City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge to Flooding, British Columbia. 
Study Investigator’s Name: Professor Gordon McBean (Principal Investigator) and 
Jonathan Raikes, Master of Arts Candidate, Geography, University of Western Ontario. 
Instructions 
Non-interviewed local practitioners and policy-makers will express their views on the 
development, deciding on, and implementation of local responses to flooding by 
completing a questionnaire. The questionnaire involves a set of meaningful statements that 
are to be ranked according to the participant’s level of agreement of each statement.  
 
There are 23 statements in this questionnaire. As a participant we ask you to read each 
statement carefully and mark the level of agreement you share with the statement. Views 
will be expressed through a rank order between negative four (strongly disagree) and 
positive four (strongly agree). Upon completion of the questionnaire, please send the 
completed questionnaire to Jonathan Raikes at the University of Western Ontario via email. 
  
Upon completion of the questionnaire each questionnaire will be placed in a single 
document where no names of participants will be included and a factor analysis will be 
conducted that compares the correlation between respondents. Your email address will be 
attached to the email you send Jonathan Raikes upon completion of the questionnaire, 
however such data will not be included in analyzing the data. Upon placing the completed 
questionnaire into a single separate document, your email will be deleted to ensure 
confidentiality purposes. 
 
As a participant you are to complete the questionnaire at your own convenience, separate 
from the presence of a Project Team member. Please complete and have the questionnaire 
sent to Jonathan Raikes by January 1st, 2015 to ensure that your views on local responses 
to flooding are included in the data analysis and results of this study.  
 
Consent 
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me and 
I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand 
that no personal information of myself or others will be asked in the completion of this 
questionnaire. The completion of the questionnaire gives the Study Investigators 
permission to use data expressing my views on developing, deciding on, and implementing 
local responses to flooding towards the results and discussion of this study. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participation or access to the results 
of this study please contact Jonathan Raikes (primary contact) or Dr. Gordon McBean. 
 
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. 
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Contact Information 
 
Jonathan Raikes 
 Email: ________ 
 
  OR 
 
 Dr. Gordon McBean 
 Email: ________  
 Phone: ________ 
  
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this 
study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email: 
ethics@uwo.ca.  
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